My working notes for the ethic + Decide how to bridge the implied ways of the diaspora and ethic. : see @ ../diaspora/working_notes.brec terminology, equations between terms originating in Greek (ēthos) and Latin (mos, mores)   ─────── ────────────────   noun ethics = morality General principles of right and wrong behaviour   adjective ethical = moral   noun ethics = moral philosophy The study of these (general) principles   noun ethic = morals Particular principles of right and wrong   ─────── ──────────────── ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Hypothesis of an absolute good ──────────────────────────────── / Should there ever be a need to introduce it. - Namely that our rational macrocommunity is an absolute good. : see notebook:2021-11-15c,f : see notebook:2021-11-19a,20a-c - Including even the comforting conjecture that the revelation/covenant is a real communication, the refuge we hope to enter being the artifact of a prior macrocommunity we would thereby join. : see notebook:2021-11-15d,20c : even though I crossed 15d out if( comparing to Kant ) : privately e.g. `^*Kant.+1785.+Groundwork` @ ~/code/WP3/way/ethic/._/sources_boneyard.brec : ‘… suppose there were something *the existence of which in itself* has an absolute worth, that, as an *end in itself*, could be a ground of determinate laws … Now I say: a human being and generally every rational being *exists* as an end in itself, *not merely as a means* for the discretionary use for this or that will, but must in all its actions, whether directed towards itself or also to other rational beings, always be considered *at the same time as an end*.’ 4:428 + Indicate the differences of my view, which is collective, untied to any particular rational nature or origin. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Rights entailment fallback ─ a postulate ──────────────────────────── / The fallback option of a supporting postulate should my entailment of rights — non-hindrance of the (two) conditions of rational action — ever prove indefensible. + First consider other, less question-begging options. + Review the work of Kurt Baier and his followers, which is clearly pertinent. : re `clearly pertinent` see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_Baier#Philosophical_work : He sought ‘nonquestion-begging requirements … to favor morality over egoism.’ : see notebook:2021-9-24e2,k…o : see notebook:2021-9-25c,d,f,j,m,n : see notebook:2021-9-26b,d…g : see notebook:2021-9-27a,b : see notebook:2021-9-28d : see notebook:2021-9-30b,c,d,h : see notebook:2021-10-18a : N.B. notebook:2021-9-24n formula - See the note references above, but from memory it would be akin to this: all hindrance of the (two) conditions of rational action is unreasonable. warrant: reasons in support of the postulate / Viz. reasons that together support the claim that all hindrance of the (two) conditions of rational action would be unreasonable, including e.g.: ∵ Practical reason relates tightly to morality and we are in a state of moral uncertainty. ∵ Practical reason is crucial to R. ∵ Practical reason is what the macrocosm safeguards. + Consider quoting Kant as an example of what consensus on that might hold, and why it would be unreasonable to make assumptions pending that consensus. : privately see `an end in its own right.+Kant` @ ~/code/WP3/way/ethic/._/HR/the_bounden_search_boneyard.brec - This might require addressing that Kant seems to take ‘humanity’ *in a person* (individual rational nature) as an end, not in general. ∵ Practical reason is safeguarded in the macrocosm by non-hindrance at a distance. - The postulate rescales the safeguard from an interstellar to an interpersonal (?) distance. ∵ Practical reason is safeguarded in the macrocosm by non-hindrance of conditions. - There the condition is physical integrity (?) alone, while here it is all (precarious) conditions (viz. exposed to interpersonal hindrance). ∵ The mystery of the macrocosmic fit is profound enough to demand our respect in default of consensus on cause and meaning. - Anticipatory speculation is barred on all sides by unsettling implications. parsimony: the option of justifying the postulate on a principle of parsimony : see notebook:2021-10-22 / I am inspired here by Schneewind’s reading of Grotius, where I detect a similar principle. : cf. `^*Schneewind.+1998.+The invention of autonomy` @ sources.brec : Grotius’s ‘understanding of the depth and imporatance of the problem of maintaining the social order leads him [in *On the law of war and peace*, 1625] to a new way of understanding natural law. … while he deplores the present “lack of restraint” in war and the haste with which men engage in it, he nowhere condemns it as such. Controversy with war as the most extreme form is one of the facts of life. We are self-preserving and quarrelsome beings; but we are also sociable. These two aspects of human nature make the problem of maintaining the social order quite definite. How are quarrelsome but socially minded beings like ourselves to live together? What limits must we place on our tendency to controversy in order to satisfy our sociable desires?’ p. 72 + Make ‘definite’ (as Schneewind says) the problem I am solving with this postulate. | How prevent a state of moral uncertainty undermining the means of escaping that state? - We are caught in a [kind of] trap. - On that account, we run a high risk of going extinct long before we reach the existential refuge afforded by the macrocosm. + Tell how the macrocosmic refuge, *appears* to be an application of the same principle, problem and solution (non-hindrance). - It offers in future a way out of the trap. - It shows in the present, by that example, a way out of the trap. / As though it were a rope or ladder hanging from above. : private