Precarious conditions of rational action      + Begin with the notebook’s powerful summary (as it still seems) of the argument.      : see notebook:2021-10-13f,16a,23b,26b,27g      : see notebook:2021-11-21b : reason and morality express|show the same existential concern      : N.B. notebook:2021-9-20a : optimal cosmic fit, which could be described earlier      : note : this suggests an instance of cosmological fine tuning, but one that is immune from the anthropic objection      : privately cf. @ ~/code/WP3/way/ethic/._/cosmic_fit.brec      : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fine-tuning/      : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fine-tuning/#AnthObje      : re `earlier` see e.g. `Relate optimal fit` @ ~/code/WP3/way/ethic/._/a_failure_of_reason_boneyard.brec      : N.B. notebook:2021-11-8d : an objection to consider      + Consider for salvage:      - We see there {in what nightfall reveals} a formal thing like an ethic, a form for what matters, a structure that cradles a thing of value.      + In the final sentence that ushers what ‘gives me entry|access to that society and ethic’, this is no longer the formula of a postulate/premise, but rather the recognition that the bounden ends entail (at least some) conditions of rational action.      : re `gives me entry\|access` see notebook:2021-10-13f      : private      ───────────────────────── inference of conditions ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈      + Resolve the precarious conditions of rational action.      / Viz. those apt to be suboptimally realized.      : privately see notebook:2021-8-5g      - Resolve them as those safeguarded and supported by the institutions of contemporary society on one hand, and medieval and early-modern societies on the other.      + Explain how they condition rational action.      : privately see notebook:2021-11-13c      ends justification      : cf. @ `^+entailment by duty$`      / Viz. justifying one’s ends.      + Suggest a relation between ends justification and freedom of will (as opposed to action).      / To hang references on, not theory, which surely has already been worked out.      + Hang references on that suggestion.      : see `^*Schneewind.+1998.+The invention of autonomy` @ sources.brec : p. 290.4. His quote of Harrington is promising, though he does not discuss it in this light.      + Read Honderich’s *How free are you?*.      freedom of action      : cf. @ `^+entailment by duty$`      ──────────────────── entailment by duty ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈      ends justification      : cf. @ `^+inference of conditions$`      - Willing the bounden ends entails, through practical reasoning, a requirement for ends justification.      ∵ One must critically examine one’s ends to ensure that no unjustifiable end conflicts with a bounden end, as that would be contrary to duty.      + For this purpose, define unjustifiable as both unreasonable (rationally ungrounded) and amoral.      : re `unreasonable` see `^*principle: Reason in its practical use requires` @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec      : re `both` see `^*no rational ground for morality and moral certainty$` @ `^+Notes?$` @ moral_uncertainty.brec      - Such a conflict would not be open to arbitration by prudence because an unjustifiable end weighs nothing in the balance against duty.      : re `an unjustifiable end.+against duty`s see `^*principle: ${same}`i @ rights.brec      freedom of action      : cf. @ `^+inference of conditions$`      - Willing the bounden ends entails, through practical reasoning and action, a requirement for freedom of action.      - Willing the bounden ends entails action directed to those ends.      - It entails thought *at the least*, and thought requires action to sustain it. One must keep oneself going.      / The only exceptions that obtain in practice are an incapacity for self maintenance or a resolution to die.      / Normally, of course, one needs no prompting from duty. Nature has equipped us to carry on both individually and collectively, and continues to urge that we do. But *that duty also enjoins it* matters if, from this fact, by way of an ethic of clear norms, we can inform the structure of a society that better supports it, a society that bridges the gap between what nature has bestowed and the cosmos at large promises.      : re `(individually).+\R.+(duty.+enjoins it)` see `One must keep oneself going`      : re `(collectively).+\R.+(duty.+enjoins it)` see `^*H\. The.+macrocommunity of humankind extant` @ moral_uncertainty.brec      : re `gap` see `If you have what it takes to reach me` @ http://reluk.ca/project/way/ethic/axiologic_uncertainty.brec      : re `promises` see `I will give you time and space unbounded in which to carry on` @ http://reluk.ca/project/way/ethic/axiologic_uncertainty.brec      ?+ Does not duty’s enjoinment of a will to our carrying on collectively (H) entail action *beyond* that of sustaining thought, at least by some?      : re `H` see `^*H\..+humankind extant` @ moral_uncertainty.brec      - We’ll persist one generation at most if all we do is think, and the probability of attaining moral certainty during that period is too small to take seriously.      personal security      - Each of the foregoing conditions entails, in turn, a condition of personal security.      : re `foregoing conditions` see `^*ends justification$` @ `^+entailment by duty$`      : re `foregoing conditions` see `^*freedom of action$` @ `^+entailment by duty$`      + Qualify this condition as likewise precarious and warrant the qualification. \ 🅮 This file has been dedicated by its author(s) to the public domain. 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