Right and wrong: moral precepts • stance - The voice is first person singular. - These files will speak on condition that I pursue HR by the foregoing means and other conditions. - These files will speak (in regard to wrong and rights) of what I can reasonably expect and demand of others, and they of me (and I of myself). : re `reasonably` see `^^\? By what warrant.+do we impose` + Determine what I am allowed (in formulating the precepts) to rule; is it all things (as now), or merely personal acts|action. - It likely depends on what the non-hindrance premise (to move beyond R) covers. - Form F is promoted (only) by removal of impediments to it. : see notebook:2021-8-21c - Apparently this was intended to help in the case where determinism rules by outruling subterfuge in the promotion of (an appearance of) freedom, ?+ Does it really? If not, then what would? + Read Honderich, *How free are you?*. / It follows that F promotion entails countering wrong, and thereby that right entails countering wrong. / Wrong we already know entails countering *a* right. / So wrong and right are opposed, as we might expect, and maybe it is correct to say they *counter* each other. \ - These definitions will not amount to a complete reflection of the moral law, at least \ not according to the law of nature formulation, which Kant says is authoritative. \ / Rawls Lectures, p. 182. \ - There is no general duty of aid (to non-dependants), \ no injunction against breaking promises, and so forth. \ - Still they reflect all its conditions that are at risk in practice. \ - This is a rough and ready ethic for the times [of urgent need] \ in which we find ourselves. They should suffice to get us through \ if we ever could at all. \ + Remove generally the ‘personal’ qualifier attached to goals. \ - The qualifier properly attaches to ‘orientation’, not ‘goal’. \ / Otherwise it will be understood as limiting the scope of the goals, which is wrong. \ - But this attachment is difficult to clarify in phrasing. \ - That we are speaking of the orientation of persons as opposed to groups \ or organizations will generally be obvious from the context. + Add to the readme file mention of the moment of the argument here, the way it echoes and so confirms the substansive ‘entailed commitment to the conditions of reason’ of the foregoing files (which comprise the approach to the ethic) with a formal one (in the issue) that in any case was already there, so to speak. : see ../README.html : re `formal one` see `^^\? By what warrant.+do we impose` : see also notebook:2021-9-8b : cf. ../afterword.brec logic of pressing a moral demand, without contradiction to the ethic and its ground - These files will speak (in regard to wrong and rights) of what I can reasonably expect and demand of others, and they of me (and I of myself). : join : They being - This even if their moral beliefs differ from mine. / Referring to the lack of moral consensus in normative ethics, societies, etc. : see ../moral_uncertainty.brec - This even if my pursuing HR, or my choice of means, or both, are mistaken. / They must not speak of moral imperative, as that lies with the warrant of HR alone, and is not required here. ? How warrant then the moral terms such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’? - By the very fact that these are justified *demands of each to each*, justified because nobody can demand their justification without thereby confirming it. : re `confirming it` see `^^- Any who demand of us a reason` - The warrant to press depends on who (X) the demand is addressed to. : see notebook:2021-9-18 if( X shares my ethic ) - No problem. else - We share just two authorities to which we can appeal, reason and force. + Which does X expect of me? / Then by X’s own admission, I will have licence to press the demand accordingly. if( reason ) \ - Then X is forced (by reason) to allow me the use of reason, \ and so to allow me the enabling conditions of reason, \ and so allow the demand which is just that. \\ this might not hold, better + Then does X *respect* reason? if( X respects reason ) - Then X is forced (by reason) not to undermine reason by hindering the conditions that enable it, which is just my demand. else - X is incoherent in asking me for justification based on an authority he does not respect. !! This argument fails in assuming X is forbidden to exercise prudence. : see notebook:2021-9-24j + Consider a somewhat weakened argument here. : see notebook:2021-9-24p : see notebook:2021-9-25i.l - It seems necessary to *base* it on prudence. : see notebook:2021-9-25l + Verify that is not already assumed as e.g. the default in such negotiations. else / X expects force. - I have licence to press the demand by force minimal to that purpose. - We must not require that others pursue the same end (the bounden search for moral certainty) on pain of incoherence, as that would hinder their free choice of ends, so hinder reason, and thus the bounden search. / Here are the original thoughts that led me to discover how to press a demand without contradiction. - Moreover (and even worse) it might slight their own choices of endmost goals. - Therefore we do not impose a positive duty of right. ? By what warrant, then, do we impose a negative duty of right? | coherence of the very demand for warrant - Any who demand of us a reason for imposing this duty on them must thereby grant us the conditions of reason, else their demand is incoherent. : cf. notebook:2021-9-13h - In their demand, then, lies our warrant. / This works nicely. \ | no warrant, but again on pain of incoherence \ - To allow *others* to hinder reason would be just as incoherent \ as to hinder it ourselves. \ | something on the basis of our granting them the conditions of reason \ by non-interference right : see notebook:2021-9-19c - Bearing of the deontic ground, that of *moral uncertainty*, and the duty of M. / Whether and how the duty claimed there might bear on the definitions here of right and wrong. : see notebook:2021-9-26c - It appears the bearing on right alone is at issue. : see notebook:2021-9-9e,10h wrong - Apropos the formulae of these precepts: : see notebook:2021-9-28e