- This file describes a final end in the full realization of humanity — in reason consummate, and achievement complete — and argues for its pursuit on the ground of prior duty. ━━━━━ Aim ─ the full realization of humanity ───── - An end in HR. HR - HR comprises H, R and HR proper. - If ever we judge from the high vantage of R that no standing end remains to be achieved, then we can infer that HR has been achieved. - We might reasonably risk extinction then, but not before. / And if instead we come to judge that our rational nature (or capacity for reason) is an end in its own right, as did Kant, then we will seek to expand it and prolong its exercise indefinitely, and so defy extinction. : re `as did Kant` see `^^Kant.+1785.+Groundwork` @ bibliography_boneyard.brec : ‘… *a rational nature [e.g. humanity] exists as an end in itself*’, which involves a concern not only ‘with the *preservation*’, but also ‘the *advancement* of this end.’ 4:429, 430, italics in original / This we would pursue as a standing end — a separate variant of the collapsible end R, lying in parallel with it, which we might call ‘R-ongoing’. HR proper - HR is more than the sum of H and R. : see `HR comprises H, R and HR proper` @ `^^HR$` - HR proper is what HR adds to that sum. ━━━━━━━━━ Warrant ─ an argument for pursuing HR on the ground of prior duty ───────── HR proper is apodictic ∵ It is reasonable to risk the extinction of that which serves no reasonable end. : re `serves no reasonable end` see `^^- If.+we judge.+that no standing end remains` / HR proper concerns nothing else. !! Untrue, it stipulates no extinction before R, but that is not apodictic. H is apodictic | ∵ Humanity extant is already a necessary condition of any reasonable end. / Making it explicit (as end H) serves only to clarify the definition of HR proper. | ∵ Humanity extant is a necessary condition of any actual end. ∵ An actual end requires a will. : re `actual end` viz. `An end that is willed` @ `^^actual end$` @ the_bounden_search.brec ∵ A will (in this context) is necessarily coextant with humanity. ∵ The scope of the present ethic is humankind alone. \ While it might be generalized, readability would suffer. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Pragmatic warrant ─ an argument for pursuing HR on the ground of prudence ─────────────────── !! Collapse of telic and pragmatic grounds. : join @ `^^Telic warrant` R is prudent, anything short of it (°R < R) poses a threat to H - The risk of a premature extinction, viz. earlier than H would allow, is inversely regulated by °R. ∵ °R inversely regulates the risk of underestimating the temporal scope of H, the length of time it requires humanity to exist. / The risk decreases as °R increases. + Finish. + Bear in mind that what follows is older (even) than the context. It uses outdated terms. | ∵ °R determines the referent ends of H. | ∵ The referent ends of H exclude ends which fail justification. ∵ Ends justification depends in part on °R. | ∵ The referent ends of H are reasonable ends. ∵ Whether an end is judged reasonable depends in part on °R. | ∵ °R determines whether an end is reasonable. ∵ Whether an end is reasonable determines whether it is a referent end. ∵ The referent ends of H determine its temporal scope. | ∵ The temporal scope of H is determined by its referent ends. ∵ The referent ends are determined °R !! This is headed for failure. - It would have depended on a claim that now appears to be unsupportable. : see `^^∵ Whether H has been achieved is yet uncertain\.$` ∵ °R determines the prevalence of will and fitness of means brought to bear on H. ∵ Our choices of ends willed, and of means brought to bear on them, are functions of practical reason. ∵ Whether H has been achieved is yet uncertain. - We have ends at present which are generally thought to be reasonable, and, if not final, aimed at some final end which is yet unkown. !! H stipulates *actual* final ends. - I could address the overall argument to a reader who already has a final end in mind (one that he believes would qualify as a standing end), but that would make for an extremely weak argument. - It would also reduce the impact of the single deontic warrant, how it makes everything hang on the thread of a single, hopeful question, which seems very much to complement the other parts of the ethic. ∵ Our competence in judging whether H has been achieved will increase with °R. ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Telic warrant ─ an argument for pursuing HR on the ground of consequential value ─────────────── !! Collapse of telic and pragmatic grounds. / A summary of the other alarm points that flag the points of collapse. - Neither ground can support a standing end, not that I can see. - Without a standing end, H is empty and HR collapses on R. - Neither ground can support R in isolation. - HR has supreme value. - No reasonable end E has greater value than HR. vHR ≥ vE ∵ vHR is an aggregate that includes vE. ∵ HR includes E. ∵ E is a reasonable end. ∵ All reasonable ends are included in HR. !! No standing end of value, even if one existed, would be included in HR. - HR does not *include* emanent ends, it only refers to them. + Rebase on the added value of R, what it contributes to overall value. !! It would collapse into the pragmatic warrant, which itself has already collapsed. - It could only contribute by reducing the risk of premature extinction, just what the pragmatic warrant claims. : see `^^Pragmatic warrant` - This would contribute value by reducing the risk of loss of a valued end. ∵ HR excludes all ends of net negative value. / The aggregate worth of other included ends cannot be less than zero. ∵ HR includes only reasonable ends. ∵ No reasonable end N has negative value except where it conditions a further end P of positive value, such that together they have net positive value. vN + vP > 0 + Expand to account for multiple N per P. / Viz. multiple conditioning ends of negative value per conditioned end. + Add to the evaluative criteria of ends justification. - Without predjudice to the foregoing, it seems safe to predict that any reasonable practice of evaluation will uphold the following stipulation: - No end that is a moral imperative has negative value. import of R / Why HR, not H alone? - R is a limiting factor of the aggregate value that warrants HR, and thereby warrants H. : re `aggregate value that warrants HR` see `^^ Warrant` @ the_bounden_search.brec - How far we exercise our capacity for reason (°R, the degree of R) affects the aggregate value in three ways. i. °R affects justification of the standing ends, which in turn determines what they contribute to the aggregate value. : see `is justifiably wanted` @ `^^- An end is reasonable that:$` @ the_bounden_search.brec - Lapses here will tend to lessen the aggregate value of HR by lessening the value of its standing ends. ii. °R determines the prevalence of will and fitness of means brought to bear on each standing end. ∵ The willing of ends and the choosing of means are functions of practical reason. - Lapses here will tend to undermine the aggregate value of HR by threatening the attainment of one or more standing ends. iii. °R determines the prevalence of will and fitness of means brought to bear on H. : re `°R determines.+will.+and.+means brought to.+H` see `${same}` @ `^^R is prudent` @ `^^ Pragmatic warrant` - Lapses here will pose a threat to the aggregate value of HR by risking a premature extinction that would cut short the attainment of its standing ends. + Shy not from ‘good’, ‘better’ and such instead of ‘value’, e.g. where they might simplify diction.