Notes on the pro-extantial ethic argue+ for a stable ground : see 75.brec : join `^*${same}` @ ../._/14_default+stable_ground/7_remedial_premises/75.brec | convince the reader we will eventually settle on (the power of) agency itself as both the ground and the object of the self-causal binding : re `the ground` contra `^*\| though not a ground, properly speaking$` : whose postulates smack of question begging : re `object of the self-causal binding` see notepad:2024-11-20d : margin note on first leaf asserting the object can be anything we choose, as we have complete freedom to choose it \ - the ground will be (as consensus marks it) determined through free will \ / literally we are making our own moral law \ - it will either become the object we succeed in generally binding ourselves to, \ or remain (by default) the knowledge (obtained through this very exercise of free will) \ of that object \ ∴ already (effectively) we are engaged in seeking that knowledge \\ not sure about that, or whether it helps - our (we as agents) carrying on is (as an end): - is how we came to be agents in the first place, over the course of at least 3+ billion years - entailed by the default ground - entailed by the constitutive norm of willing/action ∵ the binding (as an end) entails (as object of the binding) the conditions of that binding ∵ the conditions of that binding are those of agency, which entails our existence as agents - traces precisely the time/space boundary of moral|practical normativity : see `practical normativity \(or morality or ethics\) concerns only will or action`p @ ../._/14_default+stable_ground/5_moral_conclusions/56.brec : viz. is bound by the power of agency, thus the extent of agents + take these (and any others I find) each as clues and together as warrant for a hypothesis that our carrying on will always be a moral duty, viz. either: a) the default ground that entails it holding forever; or b) the eventual stable ground either being or entailing our (we as agents) carrying on + then use the revelations of that hypothesis’s own entailments to further support it - we will continue to bind ourselves to this indefinitely - never will we accept a ground that does not at least entail this, because it would be wholly alien [to us] - that, plus the satisfaction and joy of doing what we were made|created for, of being true to ourselves, and coming fully into our own - these will carry us through | though not a ground, properly speaking - rather an end that binds morally in virtue of being *both* an absolute norm, and absolutely grounded (viz. always all have reason to take it) : see notepad:2024-11-20d : penultimate paragraph starting ‘BUT’ / both are (I think) necessary conditions for a conclusion of moral bearing in a constitutive argument - thus yielding a moral duty that must figure in any full (and true) normative ethic + add a second postulate|hypthesis: never will we be in a state of knowledge re practical grounding in which we know there is *no* stable ground / only then can I conclude that the norm is absolutely grounded, as follows : re `absolutely grounded` see `binds morally in.+being.+${same}.+viz. always.+all have reason to take it`s ∴ always we will have a ground ∵ in a state of knowledge, we will know there *is* a ground / given this postulate ∵ in a state of ignorance, the default ground holds ∴ always we have a reason for willing and action (toward the ground) ∴ always we have a reason to conform to the constitutive norm of willing and action comparable projects AI search : privately see `^^AI$`i @ ~/_/zz.brec ' Compile please a list of philosophers who most recently have argued for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance, complete with dated citations. Exclude from the list arguments that are based on maximizing a valued good, such as happiness or lives lived. Order the list from latest to earliest. : see https://www.perplexity.ai/ Q. Compile please a list of philosophers who most recently have argued for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance. Exclude from the list arguments that are based on maximizing a valued good, such as happiness or lives lived. Order the list from latest to earliest. A. Here is a list of philosophers who have recently argued for an obligatory aim of extinction avoidance, excluding arguments based on maximizing valued goods like happiness or lives lived, ordered from latest to earliest: • Toby Ord (2024) - Argues that humanity has intrinsic value beyond just the sum of individual human lives, and that we have an obligation to preserve this. : see https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/107/2/99/7629690?login=false • Johann Frick (2017) - Contends that humanity has "final value" that should be cherished and protected, distinct from simply creating more happy people. : see https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/107/2/99/7629690?login=false • Nick Bostrom (2013) - Proposes that we have a stronger moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population compared to smaller-scale disasters, based on the unique value of humanity's continued existence. : https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12056&context=etd - This list is relatively short because many arguments for avoiding extinction are based on maximizing goods like happiness or the number of lives lived, which were excluded per the query instructions. The philosophers listed above argue for humanity's intrinsic or unique value as a reason to avoid extinction, rather than solely focusing on maximizing positive outcomes. \ Copyright © 2024 Michael Allan.