75 ⁠\bf Q_7⁠: what might that practical ground or other moral fundament be? : see @ ../0_leading_question/07.brec argue+ for a stable ground of [rational] agency simplicter or the universal plural agent / here ‘agency’ means ‘ability or capacity to act’ : see https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/7988786272 : Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “agency (n.), sense II.4,” March 2024. \ ?+ put the constitutive argument (with indeterminate object of self-causal binding) \ into the default ethic, as further warrant for a conclusion of moral bearing | [\rather] what constitutes willing is an effective binding to [that] binding itself : see notepad:2024-11-22d - binding is the necessary object of the effective binding, not agency - agency is, however, entailed in that binding - one can *get* willing through an effective binding to binding to ⁠O⁠, where ⁠O⁠ is any object, including agency - but it’s not necessary to state any object except binding simpliciter ? could we *in practice* so minimize it? - no, an *instance* of willing cannot be *synchronically* recursive [like that] - the recursion (self-causality) must at least play out *in time*, and probably also *in a population* how fasten on agency as the stable ground? / viz. not only as the object of the self-causal binding that constitutes will | do not, it is not required up front - the two foundations, namely a default ground and a constitutive aim, are mutually compatible and complementary - moreover the former supports the latter ∵ I may take the moral bearing to hold temporarily *at least* as concerns the aim of binding ∵ one has reason to aim at the binding that is constitutive of action as a means maintaining agency ∵ maintaining agency is entailed by the default ground / viz. pending knowledge of whether practical reason has a stable grounding reason, and what it consists in ∴ the constitutive and logical norms here coincide ∴ they here they achieve moral bearing / QED / some constitutivist theorists hold that a constitutive norm as a premise does not suffice to warrant a conclusion of that norm’s moral bearing, but must be supplemented also by a reason for conformance : see also - together they are|yield ample resources to counter|answer the shmagencist skeptic and maintain (at least temporarily) the moral bearing of the constitutive norm / some constitutivist theorists hold that a constitutive norm as a premise does not suffice to warrant a conclusion of that norm’s moral bearing, but must be supplemented also by a reason for conformance / but I think what is here required is a reason *or other motive* / and I think it’s wanted specifically to counter|answer shmagencist skeptics - the default ground yields an answer, in the form of a default reason, to any shmagencist who is open to being convinced by logic ∵ one has reason to aim at the binding that is constitutive of action as a means maintaining agency : see - another answer, perhaps more convincing to other shmagencists, goes like this: - shmagencist skeptics like you will die - to the extent that our collective will strengthens, you will be replaced by non-skeptics who are bound to the binding that action requires, which binding you lack - in that case, your kind would headed for extinction ∵ your extinction (in this sense) is part of the constitutive aim of action whose moral bearing you deny - the force of this argument would be inversely proportional to how widely such shmagencists believe their skepticism can extend in the population - this extent is probably proportional the degree in which the constitutive aim is alienating vs. familiar / this may be the reason behind Katsafanas’s claim that a constitutivist must say something about alienation + consider taking this as my lead to explore the entailments of the constitutive aim in light of its moral bearing / which bearing the above answers suffice (at least for now) to uphold N.B. meantime the constitutive norm of action bears on us morally in the form of a duty toward binding ourselves to conformance, which binding entails overcoming shmagencist skepticism and any other obstacles to our being so bound ∵ I may take the moral bearing to hold temporarily *at least* as concerns the aim of binding : see - no doubt this overcoming of obstacles will include, where prudent, a search for a logical basis of convincing and thus binding others - no doubt that search will include, in turn, the search for a practical ground ∴ even without a moral bearing, in practice the constitutive aim of action is toward supplying *its own* moral bearing - it has self-creative power, to pull itself up by its own bootstraps, and thereafter staying power | hypothesis|postulate of agency being a (lawfully) closed system : ad `postulate` : might be too strong a word; what I aim at here is a coherent theory, which does not require the warrant of an explicit postulate : ad `hypothesis` : might be the wrong word, in that it (at least) suggests an experiment; unless seeking coherence in entailments counts as an experiment : ad `\(lawfully\) closed system` : the system has an enviroment, yet its effects on the system are contingent; whereas the effects of the system on itself *as a self-reproductive system* are lawful, constitutive of that system - we have practical reason and a moral obligation (using our self-determinate freedom) to determine for ourselves what this object of our binding ought to be - both the constitution of action/willing and its origin (and present status quo), point to it being a self-reproductive system, thus a closed, self-explanatory system : see also `^*- our.+carrying on is.+:$` @ `^*\| hypothesize we.+settle on.+agency` : further warrant for this conjecture - following closure on its self-reproduction, the operation of the system results in an on-going collapse of its aetiological explanation onto itself - and where the system includes the power of reason, this collapse might also be reflected by the practical standpoint : cf. `the reflection of the theoretic formula of telicity`p @ `^*- our.+carrying on is.+:$` @ `^*\| hypothesize we.+settle on.+agency` - with a hypothesis|postulate both that agency is a closed system, and that (by symmetry) its closure is reflected also from the practical standpoint, then: - it makes no sense to demand a further (practical) reason for agency, because such a reason would contradict the premise of a closed system ∵ the self-causation that yields function=purpose from a theoretic standpoint *also* (by the hypothetic reflection) yields it from practical standpoint, and purpose from a practical standpoint is an end ?+ do I mean: because the system itself generated that purpose|end, it makes no sense to ask for a further purpose|end? | hypothesize we will eventually settle on (the power) agency itself as both the ground and the object of the self-causal binding : re `the ground` contra `^*\| though not a ground, properly speaking$` : whose postulates smack of question begging : re `object of the self-causal binding` see notepad:2024-11-20d : margin note on first leaf asserting the object can be anything we choose, as we have complete freedom to choose it \ - the ground will be (as consensus marks it) determined through free will \ / literally we are making our own moral law \ - it will either become the object we succeed in generally binding ourselves to, \ or remain (by default) the knowledge (obtained through this very exercise \ of free will) of that object \ ∴ already (effectively) we are engaged in seeking that knowledge \\ not sure about that, or whether it helps - our (we as agents) carrying on is (as an end): - how we came to be agents in the first place, over the course of at least 3+ billion years - the present object (or a present object) of our will - already (status quo) we have given to us a will whose object (or among whose objects) is our carrying on - what from a practical standpoint would be the reflection of the theoretic formula of telicity, thus constitutive for will as the power of subjective telicity, and perhaps for practical reason as the power of subjective teleology - entailed by the default ground - entailed by the constitutive norm of willing/action ∵ the binding (as an end) entails (as object of the binding) the conditions of that binding ∵ the conditions of that binding are those of agency, which entails our existence as agents - traces precisely the time/space boundary of moral|practical normativity : see `normativity \(or morality or ethics\) concerns only will or action`p @ ../5_moral_conclusions/56.brec : viz. is bound by the power of agency, thus the extent of agents + take these (and any others I find) each as clues and together as warrant for a hypothesis that our carrying on will always be a moral duty, viz. either: a) the default ground that entails it holding forever; or b) the eventual stable ground either being or entailing our (we as agents) carrying on + then use the revelations of that hypothesis’s own entailments to further support it - we will continue to bind ourselves to this indefinitely - never will we accept a ground that does not at least entail this, because it would be wholly alien [to us] - that, plus the satisfaction and joy of doing what we were made|created for, of being true to ourselves, and coming fully into our own - these will carry us through | though not a ground, properly speaking - rather an end that binds morally in virtue of being *both* an absolute norm, and absolutely grounded (viz. always all have reason to take it) : see notepad:2024-11-20d : penultimate paragraph starting ‘BUT’ / both are (I think) necessary conditions for a conclusion of moral bearing in a constitutive argument - thus yielding a moral duty that must figure in any full (and true) normative ethic + add a second postulate|hypthesis: never will we be in a state of knowledge re practical grounding in which we know there is *no* stable ground / only then can I conclude that the norm is absolutely grounded, as follows : re `absolutely grounded` see `binds morally in.+being.+${same}.+viz. always.+all have reason to take it`s ∴ always we will have a ground ∵ in a state of knowledge, we will know there *is* a ground / given this postulate ∵ in a state of ignorance, the default ground holds ∴ always we have a reason for willing and action (toward the ground) ∴ always we have a reason to conform to the constitutive norm of willing and action \ | rather fasten on the binding as the ground \ - what constitutes will is an effective binding to binding itself \ : see \ - the constitution of will is itself a practical ground \ - if one had no binding reason to will that constitutive binding, \ then one might dispense with it and will some other end \ - but one cannot, for it is what constitutes will \ - it follows one *does* have a binding reason \\ !! false: what stopped one dropping the end is not necessarily \\ a ‘binding reason’, but could instead be something else \ - it makes no sense to insist on a reason for what one already has a reason for \ ∴ the constitutive binding is a ground \ - a demand for justification is a demand for an end and thereby for willing \ and what constitutes willing \\ !! this will get me nowhere - necessarily the object of the ground (agency or whatnot) is universal in scope / a narrower object (e.g. individual agent) could not be a ground | : see notepad:2024-11-18a,b : re `: (.+)` see also `${same}` @ `^*-.+when the.+binding comes from.+a population`s @ `^*\? how reconcile the following\?$` @ `^*\| moreover .e.$` can I make this argument? yes, it seems so also: it neatly solves the problem of a binding whose cause is both itself *and* the agent who is bound : see `^*-.+when the.+binding comes from.+a population`s @ `^*\? how reconcile the following\?$` @ `^*\| moreover .e.$` | : see notepad:2024-11-15c,d ? can I make this argument? \ what follows does not yet amount to an answer 1. tell how a (divisible) whole can be self-binding such that its contingent origin does not count as a cause / e.g. a whole comprising a population of (replicand) individuals / e.g. the origin being contingent and thus not binding (not by law) \ 3. tell how self-creation implies self-binding \ : join \ ?+ do I have this backwards in some sense? \ ∵ I need binding (lawful causation|conformance) to rule out contingency - an individual recognizes the law - in conformance to the law, the individual makes another individual 2. tell why an individual constituent of the whole cannot be so / e.g. on account of *being* individual \ 3. tell how self-creation implies self-binding \ | self-made and self-creative through being bound to self-creativity \ by [ongoing] reproduction|replication of its constituents \ - thus self-bound and self-binding \ : cf. `^*- as.+self-causal.+the entailed binding to self-causation is.+by the self$`p \ - thus having will \\ !! could be largely true of a constituent, too \ / e.g. an ‘individual’ human being constituted largely by reproductive cells \ | amend by adding thought|reason|awareness, e.g. to the reproduction|replication | given that {willing|will|practical normativity} is necessarily self-purposed, it makes no sense to demand a further purpose for it : see notepad:2024-11-10b : which expands on the above and mentions other potential warrants | : see also `strengthing my argument for universality of scope` @ `^*\| moreover .b.$` | a narrower object would be less certain of attainment : see notepad:2024-10-17c : N.B. notepad:2024-10-30b : for possible warrant in that the conditions of self-causation (and thus of willing) include the reduction of ⁠p⁠ (existential risk) + try to show how self-causation (and thus will) not only accumulate in degree, but also erode in default of conformance - this would strengthen the ground argument from agency-shmagency objections : cf. `^*∴ non-conformance has immediate \(indeed unpleasant\) consequences$` @ `^*\| moreover .b.$` ∴ it would make sense to demand a reason for the narrower object as such, which contradicts the definition of a ground : see `an end for which it makes no sense.+to demand further justification`p @ ../4_our_practical_binding_to_a_purpose_of_endurance/45.brec : definition of ground | recasting Korsgaard’s constitutive argument to the universal scope, where alone I find theoretic warrant for the self-determination she claims to be constitutive of agency : ad `theoretic warrant` : if not from Taylor’s asymmetry of explanation, then simply from self-causation over time : re `asymmetry of explanation` see notepad:2024-8-7a : re `asymmetry of explanation` see notepad:2024-8-8a,e,f,g × eight stories / having in the alternatives further below the resources for all eight stories × 2 plots: origin and deepening × 2 characters: collective and individual × 2 themes: - (determinative) freedom, self-determination, original causation - (further) persistence (of the self) = reproductive fitness / anormative as such - (determinatively free) will - (further) (proto-)active persistence (of the self) = the object of (proto-)action : re `.proto-.active` see `^*- when proto-action is self-causal, then.+will.+is born$` / normative as such, for reason is entailed + consider beginning with the most familiar story: deepening of individual will / viz. the capacity for willing, its constitutional strength | moreover (f) • inherent to (effect) binding is an increased tendency (of the effect) : see notepad:2024-11-3a - binding thus comes by degrees, so there are degrees e.g. of will and action \ ∴ inherent to persistence binding is ⁠p⁠ reduction \ : contra notepad:2024-10-30b : which has ⁠p⁠ reduction inhere instead in self-causation \ ∵ inherent to persistence binding is an increased tendency of persistence \ ∵ inherent to (effect) binding is an increased tendency (of the effect) \ : re `∵(.+)` see `^*•${same}$` \\ doubtful this makes sense, doubtful it might be useful | moreover (e) ? how reconcile the following? • ⁠S⁠ can will (commit itself to) ⁠O⁠ iff ⁠S⁠ is an original cause of its being committed to ⁠O⁠ • ⁠S⁠ can be an original cause only through self-causation, thus only of ⁠S⁠ false: ⁠S⁠ can be an original cause also when proto-action of ⁠S⁠ is self-causal : see `^*- when proto-action is self-causal, then.+will.+is born$` - specifically when the self-causal action/binding comes from ⁠S⁠, and ⁠S⁠ is a population : re `.S. is a population` see notepad:2024-11-18a,b : a more specific and detailed description of the constitution of action/willing based on a population structure, that moreover puts it at a general level : re `more specific and detailed`p cf. `^*- when proto-action is self-causal, then.+will.+is born$` : viz. more than that, below ∵ then agent and binding are co-extensive : cf. notepad:2024-11-20e - the binding constitutes action - the powers necessary to the binding are identical to those which usually are thought to constitute an agent as such / namely including reason, will and agency ∴ (traditional) agent and binding are co-extensive : re `∴.+(agent .+)` see `^*∵ then ${same}$` : QED ∴ all powers that usually are thought to constitute an agent are engaged in the binding that constitutes willing/action ∴ it is not incorrect to say (consistent with the meaning of willing/action) that the binding, though self-causal, is *at the same time* an effect of (viz. proper to) the agent - when proto-action is self-causal, then the will of a subject (⁠S⁠) is born / also born is action and ⁠S⁠ as an agent : cf. `^ \? how could it get started\? how could it come to exist\?$` : N.B. notepad:2024-10-30b : the conditions of self-causation - proto-action = effective binding of the subject to becoming a cause of an object as its effect / action = effective binding of the subject *by the subject* to *making itself* a cause of an object as its effect = effective will ∴ the proto-action of ⁠S⁠, in being self-causal, is a cause of that binding ∴ ⁠S⁠ (as proto-agent) is a cause of that binding - therein ⁠S⁠ has bound *itself* ∴ therein ⁠S⁠ has bound itself to *making itself* a cause - but this is what it means for ⁠S⁠ to will: to bind itself to making itself a cause (of an object as its effect) / QED - and proto-action *is* self-causal - the inborn self-causation of a human subject is proto-action : see `^*- a human is born self-causal$` - in causing the subject (in maintaining it), that proto-action reduces the extinction probability not only of the subject, but also of further self-causation of the subject, and thus of the proto-action itself : see notepad:2024-10-30b : the conditions of self-causation, in particular reduction of extinction probability ∴ each instance of proto-action causes (as a contributing factor) each further instance / QED / here I have acheived a degree of argumentive unity, clarity and coherence - this alone supports an attribution of binding (of will) to the subject, thus free will in the attributive sense : re `free will in the attributive sense` see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ - add to a proto-agent the conditions of self-causation *as a proto-agent*: now an agent is born : see @ `^*\?.+what distinguishes.+self-causation from.+willing self-causation.+\?$`s \ ?+ might the premise of the foregoing be inferred from the definition of will, \ thus *proving* will (in part) constituted by self-causal proto-action? ! while self-causation of a proto-agent makes sense, that of proto-action might not - the unity of an agent is clear, while that of a series of actions is not - yet the argument seems to need action (as opposed to a mere agent) in order to hook up with the definition of willing | actions have type unity, in that each *is* an action - better perhaps than the foregoing: - a human is born self-causal - with its first thoughts, the human becomes a subject - on the awareness of its self-causation, the human subject attains a will - on the awareness of the collective self-causation of humanity, the human subject attains a share of the deeper will that gave rise to its own - a simpler answer perhaps than the foregoing: : re `answer` see `^*\? how reconcile the following\?$` @ `^*\| moreover .e.$` - as the self is self-causal *as an agent*, the entailed binding to self-causation is *likewise* caused by the self | moreover (d) ?+ what distinguishes mere self-causation from the willing self-causation of agents, thus distinguishing a genome as such from a rational humanity? | the self’s awareness of its own self-causation, an awareness of cause and effect that entails reason (as a power of mind) / an improvement to the alternative below, following on further thought : re `further thought` see `^*\| moreover .e.$` - add to a self-causal replicator (e.g. genome or species) rational awareness: now a proto-agent is born / the first instance of our genome or humanity was thus a proto-agent - add to a proto-agent the conditions of self-causation *as a proto-agent*: now an agent is born : re `conditions of self-causation` see notepad:2024-10-30b : including ⁠p⁠ reduction | their {will to|willing of} willing self-causation / viz. their commiting|binding|pledging) themselves to that end ? how could it get started? how could it come to exist? 1. be bound (by external force) to further binding self-causation / viz. to ongoing self-causation 2. effect thereby (a degree of) further binding self-causation - born here is (a degree of) self causation, e.g. of a genome 3. evolve (the power of mind) reason as an effector of binding self-causation / e.g. by natural selection 4. be commited by chance to further commited self-causation / e.g. by learning or natural selection 5. effect thereby (a degree of) further commited self-causation - born here is (a degree of) willing, for the self has commited itself 6. will (commit|bind|pledge the self to) willing self-causation 7. effect thereby (a degree of) further willing self-causation - born here is a further degree of willing - and so on ⁠\bf W⁠ willing can exist only by effectively willing its existence : see notepad:2024-10-27a : see notepad:2024-10-28a ? could not the object of ⁠\rm W⁠ be further determined, as follows? ⁠\bf W'⁠ willing can exist only by effectively willing willed self-causation ⁠\bf W''⁠ willing can exist only by effectively willing willed counting of grass blades - no, these are untrue; will can occur as either of these, but not ‘only’ as one of them ? could not one’s object be more specific, as follows? ⁠\bf X⁠ willing can exist only by effectively willing willed self-causation ⁠\bf Y⁠ willing can exist only by effectively willing willed counting of grass blades - yes, but not as the ground, for it would make sense to demand justification of these particular ends ? how could it get started? how could it come to exist? : cf. / but here it seems harder, owing to the formulation of the object - in the same way, by supplying a particular object / any plausible object will do | moreover (c) ? how define degrees of self-causation? - as one defines degrees of causation in general: a) partial cause - something can be *a* cause, yet not the *only* cause - the measure of degree is the fraction of total causation b) cause of parts - the measure of degree is the fraction of parts caused c) combinations of these ?+ how deal with individual self-causation? | argue for it, perhaps in slight degree | by partial self-creation, viz. causation or creation of parts of oneself : see notepad:2024-10-24a : re `causation or creation` see `^*a\) partial cause$` : re `creation of parts` see `^*b\) cause of parts$` - e.g. self-creation of (the physical basis of) stable patterns of thought and behaviour - it applies collectively, too - not least through reproduction of the (individual) members | deny it : e.g. notepad:2024-10-25a | moreover (b) / what follows is merely suggestive as it stands, yet maybe I can hammer it into an argument, for it promises a great degree of coherence - autonomy is (C) constitutive for will ∵ binding oneself by law (giving to oneself a law) is C ∵ commiting (oneself) to making oneself a cause is C - *self-causation* is that law of will N.B. true both in theory and practice : re `theory` see `^*\|.+I find theoretic warrant for.+self-determination`p : viz. from Taylor who himself uses the term ‘law’ + this approach in addition (and maybe better) than my argument for a moral binding (moral law) based on an absolute norm : re `argument.+on an absolute norm`s see ../5_moral_conclusions/52.brec - self-causation is the ground of will N.B. true both in theory and practice : re `theory` see `^*\|.+I find theoretic warrant for.+self-determination`p : viz. from Taylor who himself uses the term ‘law’ N.B. not the agential self (in the first instance), but self-causation is the ground - thus strengthing my argument for universality of scope by making it more direct : re `argument for universality of scope` see `^*- necessarily the object of the ground.+is universal in scope$` ∵ self-causation (itself) is unattainable (in full) in finite time / at best one can continuously approach nearer to it + this approach in addition (and maybe better) than my argument based on the definition of ground : re `argument.+based on the definition of ground`s see `^*- necessarily the object of the ground.+is universal in scope$` ∵ self-causation is necessary to will ∵ self-causation is necessary to autonomy, to binding oneself, to commiting oneself crucial: will and agency both being proportional in degree to self-causation, both diminish as self-causation diminishes ∴ non-conformance has immediate (indeed unpleasant) consequences : contra `Enoch, 2006` @ `^^agency/shmagency$`i @ ../../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec : cf. `show how self-causation.+and.+will.+also erode in default of conformance$`s | moreover (a) to will | to commit (itself) to making itself a cause of an object as its effect : re `commit` see https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1070574464 : Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “commit (v.), sense V.15.a,” September 2024. ‘To obligate or bind (oneself) to a particular course of action, policy, etc., either explicitly or by some action or statement which implies an undertaking’ ∴ self-causation *is* essential to will ∴ self-causation can be grounding ! practical reason need not be responsive to the constitution of will - the self-causal genome (or whatnot) alone may determine will, as per instrumentalism untrue - will being practical, its laws|conditions fall under the purview of practical logic ∴ logic is responsive to the constitution of will, and reason to logic - one uncovers that logic (its constraints) through reflection on the possibility of will - all practical reasoning is reasoning as regards will : see does this hold? : cf. notepad:2024-11-9a | yes, basically - leaving aside reason and the notion of a ground, the claim herein (or something like it) does seem to hold as a standard of correctness, a law of willing and action based on what constitutes willing - the argument is formally valid as a constitutive one / viz. of the more ambitious sort, like Korsgaard’s : see e.g. `^*Katsafanas.+2019.+Constitutivism` @ ../sources.brec : quote of Silverstein in critique of Korsgaard: “The whole point of constitutivism is to derive action’s standard of correctness from non-normative facts about the nature of agency. Action’s constitutive norm is supposed to be the foundation of all practical normative authority”. p. 284 ∴ a human *cannot* have a will of its own ∴ ordinary speech is incorrect untrue \ | \ : see notepad:2024-10-21e \ - a human has *some* self-causation \ - to commit oneself can mean as little as choosing what determinant \ to *surrender* one’s will to \ - a human has at least enough self-causation for this \\ !! self-causation of S suffices to determine one (or anything else) \\ to S alone \ : see `what suffices to determine.+only apropos of itself`sp | : cf. notepad:2024-10-21e : largely contradicted herein - multiple determinants may compete for one’s identity, and thereby one’s will - one’s history (at any given time) determines the winner (or winners) of the competition / not free choice, one has no freedom in this regard - insofar as a given determinant suffices to determine (insofar as it is self-causal, in degree and depth of time) it directs will to itself alone - what suffices to determine (to explain, as per Taylor) does so only apropos of itself, which self alone it can give as the object / no freedom has the determinant as regards its object - yet it may do so indirectly, e.g. through means / the human genome, for instance, directs like this - otherwise its direction is haphazard, prey to contingency - an individual’s will, if not conflicted, is either whole or partial at any given time / which it is depends on the winning determinant - whole is the individual’s singular will / a human having some self-causation, this might be possible, but just barely - partial is the individual’s share of a plural will ?!! what if the determinant is the human genome? or mere contingency? - these have no will / the above seems to apply only for agent determinants | the solution must lie with that of the larger problem : see `^*!!.+I have slipped into the other definition` go with this+ : see !! here I have slipped into the other definition of will : re `other definition` see `^*\| to be commited to making itself a cause` - I must not go there : see `^*!! ∴ self-causation cannot be grounding$` @ `^*\| to be commited to making itself a cause` - I would lose the constitutive argument | allow for an agent alone as the determinant, either oneself or a plurality of which one is a member - this follows from the definition / which moreover is that of ordinary speech - other determinants can only disrupt will, never determine it go with this+ - the remainder of will (making oneself a cause of the object) is negative and (in a sense) passive - it consists in *not* impeding the determinant, rather having surrendered to the determinant such that it propagates through one with full effect - yet this surrender is part and parcel of willing itself, *already* determined by that which determined will | to be commited to making itself a cause of an object as its effect : re `commit` see https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/3278238999 : Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “commit (v.), sense V.15.b,” September 2024. ‘To obligate or bind (a person, group, etc.) to following a particular course of action, policy, etc., either explicitly or by some action or statement which implies an undertaking’ ∴ self-causation is *not* essential to will !! ∴ self-causation cannot be grounding | but now questions arise ? what determines will? ? can it be reason? | - only if reason is self-causal ?+ does this make self-causation grounding? | yes ∵ practical reasoning must be grounded ∵ otherwise there are no practical reasons at all ∵ the ground must (by definition) suffice to determine will : re `by definition` see `objective practical ground:` @ ../4_our_practical_binding_to_a_purpose_of_endurance/45.brec !! untrue, it need only suffice *as a reason* ∴ a human *can* have a will of its own ∴ ordinary speech is correct - agency is an objective practical ground : re `objective practical ground` see `^^${same}`i @ ../4_our_practical_binding_to_a_purpose_of_endurance/45.brec : re `agency` see `^*/ here ‘${same}’ means ‘ability or capacity to act’` - self-causation is essential to will : privately see notepad:2024-10-17 !! the individual (as such) already has will secure - only at (potentially immortal) plural scope is will insecure | both of the following - a narrower object would be less certain of attainment : re `^- (.+)` see `^*\| ${same}$` - the narrower one goes, the more likely failure becomes - the narrowest of all is *certain* to fail; one is going to die ∴ it’s unjustified given the wider-scope alternatives - simply put: one can find no valid reason in such a narrow frame, no ground - there simply is none this saves it right?+ - maybe, but in regard to what part of the will? commiting itself, or the causation that one commits to? / I need conceptual clarity here - it must be the former ∵ given a capacity for self-determination of the former, that of the latter seems to follow automatically : N.B. https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1070574464 : Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “commit (v.), sense V.15.a,” September 2024. ‘To obligate or bind (oneself) to a particular course of action, policy, etc., either explicitly or by some action or statement which implies an undertaking’ : cf. https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/3278238999 : Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “commit (v.), sense V.15.b,” September 2024. ‘To obligate or bind (a person, group, etc.) to following a particular course of action, policy, etc., either explicitly or by some action or statement which implies an undertaking’ - only the first sense is *self*-determinatitive, meeting the definition of will - thus I find the correct purchase (for my argument) in a deeper analysis of will : see notepad:2024-10-19b : see notepad:2024-10-20a | one has no capacity except as a group member : see notepad:2024-10-17g | still the individual must always will its own agency, as per logical constraint (ii) ?+ does this help me? - logical constraint (ii) is, like the self-determination constraint, for reason of securing the capacity of will or action - the individual agent is *not* secure - yet the rationales seem different between the two | closer - all practical reasoning is reasoning as regards will - will being practical, its laws|conditions fall under the purview of practical logic : see - the same is true therefore of all practical normativity ∴ the ethic is scoped at will ∴ I need not premise the inescapability of willing : re `premise.+` e.g. `^*- willing is inescapable for me` - self-causation is essential to will : see notepad:2024-10-17 ∴ we humans always have reason (in willing) to will humanity / we humans as a plural agent, that is ∴ any human as such always has reason (in willing) to will humanity ?+ true? ?+ better to say that one has a choice of one’s enclosing groups and seemingly reason to will any of them - here reason implies a ground - therefore go looking for a criterion to identify that ground - hint: narrower groups can be the means to the wider groups that enclose them - criterion: probability of attainment : see `^*- necessarily the object.+is universal in scope$` ? how again does this narrow scope (humanity) invalidate the conclusion (groundedness) ∵ we have a choice of scope, but reason only to choose the scope most certain of attainment : see `^*- necessarily the object of the ground.+is universal in scope$` | no action/will can be individual|singular as opposed to collective|plural, all action/will is collective|plural : see notepad:2024-10-14a : underlining the strength of this argument : see notepad:2024-10-11a : partaking in agency/will in being forever a part of it, which agency/will alone can commit to self-determination sub specie aeterni, in endlessly approaching it - willing is inescapable for me : q.v. `^*∴ I need not premise the inescapability of willing$` @ `^*- all practical reasoning is reasoning as regards will$` @ `^*\| closer$` - yet I cannot [sincerely] commit to self-determination, to making myself a cause, as correct (logical|rational) willing demands - a plural agent can - but a plural agent can will only through its members ∴ all correct (logical|rational) will is that of a plural agent exercised through its members ?+ instead of constrasting correct and incorrect will, might I instead constrast rational and natural will? - since *I* cannot will, yet willing is inescapable for me, it must be something *else* that is exercising my will - this is more compelling, too, commanding the reader’s attention ∵ it is substantial, as opposed to mere normative formality | while I cannot fully succeed in doing what (by willing) I commit to, namely making myself a cause free of external determining causes, reason demands that I aim in that direction, taking my agency as an end - and always, ∵ willing is inescapable for me - likewise reason demands that *we* aim in the direction of making ourselves a cause by taking *our* agency (or agency simpliciter) as an end - and again, willing (of shared ends) is inescapable for us / I define plural agents on the basis alone of shared ends !! while inescapability clearly holds for singular willing, it does not clearly hold for plural willing : cf. - and here our failure is not a foregone conclusion, because we together are potentially immortal / something on these lines I will argue, as described somewhere in the notepad ∼2024-8 ? is this alternative explanation based on a faulty memory of the notepad contents, namely in its implication that logical constraint (i) is a practical constraint, and thus untrue? : re `logical constraint .i.` see notepad:2024-8-21b(i) - yes, faulty memory - in the notepad I deem (i) a mere epistemic constraint : see notepad:2024-8-21f - no, not untrue - logical constraint (i) *is* a practical constraint : contra notepad:2024-8-21f - *prior* to will, (i) is perhaps a mere epistemic constraint - but with will comes a *commitment*, and thus the constraint is one of aiming at self-determination, not merely believing in it : see notepad:2024-10-14a | the ground itself, whether agency simpliciter or the universal plural agent, comes directly from logical constraint (ii) : see notepad:2024-8-21b(ii) : ‘in willing the object as its end the subject commits to making *itself* a cause in effecting that object, which does necessitate (ii) the subject itself as a viable rational agent.’ - this might not be the same as the self-determination constraint (i) of being free of external determining causes, for that might be a mere epistemic constraint : re `a mere epistemic constraint` see notepad:2024-8-21f : re `a mere epistemic constraint` see `^*\? is this alternative.+based on a faulty memory of the notepad contents` - regardless the two would be related, as conformance to practical constraint (ii) would yielding theoretic/epistemic warrant for constraint (i) : see notepad:2024-8-21e - the binding of contraint (ii) holds in virtue of the inescapability of willing !! while inescapability clearly holds for singular willing, it does not clearly hold for plural willing : cf. tie+ to reason : cf. @ ../9_motivation/._/95_value_at_stake.brec / this constitutive relation of self-determination to agency - this constraint on agency is proper to practical logic ∵ the concept of action is proper to practical logic - this constraint of practical logic is duly reflected by a principle of practical reason that stipulates [rational] agency as a necessary end (for all practical reasoning) - agency as an end is (by this logic) justified for its own sake ∵ literally we will agency for the sake of agency ∵ we will our agency for the sake of our self-determination, which in turn is constitutive of our agency ∴ it makes no sense to demand further justification, to ask ‘to what end agency?’ and insist on an answer other than agency itself ∴ agency is a practical ground : see `ground:.+an end for which it makes no sense.+to demand further justification`sp @ ../4_our_practical_binding_to_a_purpose_of_endurance/45.brec \ Copyright © 2024 Michael Allan.