20 origin, notes ! separate summaries are an obstacle to working the text, a cart before the horse : re `separate summaries` see README.html : and the leading summaries of its referents + archive the summary text of the readme file + incorporate leading summaries of each file (bulleted ‘•’) directly into the text as leading lines to be developed + isolate all claims and base the leading summaries on them | : see notepad:2023-7-4 : see notepad:2023-7-5a,b,d,e : see notepad:2023-7-6d : see notepad:2023-7-7a,d,e,g,h : see notepad:2023-7-7g,h : the decision I must now make in this regard - but bear in mind, this might not be constitutivism, as that normally applies to action in general, not to reason 1. the origin of the principle in a precursor in service to natural selection (genotelic), thence by disengagement in service to itself (autotelic) - disengaging us from God en passent : see notepad:2023-7-9b,c : see notepad:2023-7-10a,b 2. departing immediately from metaphysics (Kant’s and Korsgaard’s theories) after displacing the categorical imperative with the autotelic principle : see notepad:2023-7-7g : (including Kant’s oversight of the autotelic principle of pure reason) - and asserting it constitutive of reason, its agents [society and the cosmos] 3. turning to my main theme: how the principle makes reason (through its agents, society and the cosmos) an existential mechanism, self-reproductive and self-stable against contingency | last standing source / inferences alone from below, dispensing with the frame story which now gets in my way : re `below` see `^*\| weaving the outline of the frame story together with its rationale` @ ~/work/ethics/normative/._/05/._/origin.notes_boneyard.brec : private | inference from ethical implications of present state to an ethic (without the big preface) : see `^*- if the approach .is. valid, then just take it, rather than plead for it$` - as an explanatory theory, a normative ethic must take its principles from one or another source independent of the thing to be explained, which is normativity in the absolute sense: moral normativity, aka morality - alternative sources if one were to choose: nature, God or reason • reason alone stands uncontested as a normative source in contemporary society, then only for norms of logic \ nature (naturalism) is constested \ God (voluntarism) is constested \ reason (Kantian ethics) is constested - there simply is no uncontested source of morals in contemporary society - yet reason stands out in another regard: among its uncontested principles are those of practical reason, the concern of which (what to do) bears a likeness to that of morality (what *ought* to be done) !! without my claim that enforcement/application is logically incontestable, what difference does contestability make? | use hypothesis|proposition that the cause of each source being contested is either that no longer is it seen as a creator, or it never yet was seen so : e.g. notepad:2023-6-23a • reason alone has no recognized existential mechanism • reason has disengaged us from the existential mechanisms of the other two sources | unity, synergy and stability of reason, right and being by way of a common principle - | {I|it is my} will that we shall endure and all society bend to the task : cf. notepad:2023-6-11f : cf. `^^\| one wills that we shall endure` @ `^^- taking the principle as law` ?+ does this not rub too harshly against what moves me (community)? - {I|it is my} will that X and all society bend to the task \ Q. What X would yield the best chance of success? \ A. What in any case we would hold [on]to Q. what X would be innocent of the charge: to will it would be futile, to enforce it unjust|overbearing? : see notepad:2023-6-15a : see notepad:2023-6-16a A. X that we do already (by and large), and X that is morally right - these X are precarious things, which moreover we question even the (ultimate) possibility of : ad `question.+of$`s note : though often asserting it as imperative all the same : e.g. file:///home/mike/library/2018,%20Moynihan.%20The%20intellectual%20discovery%20of%20human%20extinction.pdf : (near the beginning) : e.g. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.torontopubliclibrary.ca/stable/26445245 : (near the beginning) - other X like to it: meaning, purpose in life - I cannot abide that we should perish without even *trying* to endure : see @ `^^\- taking the principle as law, which then is moral law$`i - reason within me fails at the thought - all seems meaningless, menacing - I am left with no guiding norms, no purpose, to move me ? can one hang an ethic on the (widely shared) feeling behind this - yes - not as ground, but as one of the foreground facts to be explained, showing how it fits in a larger (normative etc.) frame - rather as a rhetorical entry device to win the sympathy of the reader, or of those readers at least who would be sympathetic to the larger ethic - so opening with reference to what moves one to take the principle as law | seeking normative ethic and existential means, that is the aim - note the only trusted normative source (ad the former) alone lacks an existential means (ad the latter) | note also that reason is a thing we would hold [on]to - note too that it is precarious, though we do not question the possibility of it - here is a triple|double clue, let us follow it - now seeing the moral potential of such a principle, a triple clue: all of these (reason, right and being) are things we are determined to hold [on]to, we would not let them go - moreover each alone is poorly defined - learn who we are: rational, moral agents with a will to exist as such - and leaning them together, each finds clear definition ?+ what is the crux here? what drives the argument and holds the reader? / knowing that, I could infer how to unfold the argument from the beginning : privately cf. @ ~/work/ethics/normative/._/05/._/origin.notes_boneyard.brec | what more need I than the last standing source? : see e.g. notepad:2023-6-11a,b,c,d | cause to consider normative sources in the first place | something of an existential bent | a feasible way forward | a principle that makes incontestability a valid consideration : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason/ | nothing | justification by default axiom: those principles stand justified that posited, no reason can strike them down / this *is* apodictic, no? ?!! is this not merely the criterion of a valid synthetic proposition? - viz. it is opposition/resistance that must be justified, not position/enforcement - viz. there are no grounds for the principle set to be foreclosed, and not being foreclosed means principles can only be rejected by a defensible argument *after the fact* : see @ `^^- so reason supplies the principle$`i - true for *any* principle set - so prospective principles are *innocent till proven guilty* : see @ `^^- so reason supplies the principle$`i ? how does this relate to the notion that already the moral law operates amongst us effectively unopposed? : see notepad:2023-6-11f | by a mechanism of selection, of optimatization - this does *seem* to tie everything together + use it to discern where operative principles might lie : see notepad:2023-6-11f - so seeing in reason the only potential source of norms + use it also to infer and then posit principles - so echewing a prior argumentive ground in favour foreseeing and {forefending against|forestalling} potential lines of attack | no effective resistance/opposition [ignorance aside] ?+ is this to be expected, and so a principle? : see `^^\| a principle that makes incontestability a valid consideration$`i ?+ who (after all) would oppose/resist right? : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weakness-will/ | inference from ethical implications of present state to an ethic (big preface about that) + the opportunity of an approach + the approach - attend to the ethical implications of our present state, draw the necessary conclusions, and thereby arrive at the normative ethic implied by that state, for there is only one + the cause of the opportunity - of all possible sources of moral norms, one alone is uncontroversial - it has uncontested validity (in theory) and is generally accepted (in practice) + the promise of the approach, its potential - from uncontested validity of the normative source, an ethic that is incontestably valid / so defensible in theory - from general acceptance of the normative source, an ethic that is feasible of application / so prescriptive in practice - fit to our state like a tailored suit, the ethic should be ‘easy to wear’ - from feasible application, and insofar as application would solve the existential problem, a workable solution to that problem + conditions of realizing the potential - inferences drawn from the source must themselves promise to carry its uncontested validity (in theory) and general acceptance (in practice) through to the conclusion + the promise connected to the present aim ?!! what is that unease that I feel about this approach - if the approach *is* valid, then just take it, rather than plead for it - too abstract in description - the state and source should be told up front | dispense with this practical ('criterion') approach and rest on factual claims - our norms are in fact sourced in reason, though we have yet to fully recognize it and draw the necessary conclusions | maybe they came to be so sourced and the reason to work upon our moral intuitions and societal institutions (probably by degrees through early to mid modern era) following a path of least resistance - anyway, by following such a path now, we can arrive at our *implict* ethic | + criterion of incontestability - the condition of a successful ethic !! inconsistent with aim - aim includes explaining the present source of our moral norms + incontestability in a plural society + nature (naturalism) is constestable + God (voluntarism) is constestable + reason is inconstestable - reason alone left standing as a (moral) normative source - this proposition depends on my having an exhaustive set of sources : see notepad:2023-6-14d : criteria for inclusion in the set of (moral) normative sources - now reason of itself must supply an end - but reason of itself (pure reason) can supply nothing external to itself - so reason supplies the principle - if nothing suffices to reject it (after the fact), then mere will suffices to emplace it : cf. `^^\| justification by default$`i - viz. if there are no gatekeepers, which there cannot be without begging the question - viz. there are no grounds for the principle set to be foreclosed, and not being foreclosed means principles can only be rejected by a defensible argument *after the fact* - so prospective principles are *innocent till proven guilty* / could reason be the author of its own principles if the set were foreclosed? - I argue against an absolute scoping constraint (pure logic) as a criterion for defining the principle set, in favour instead of a criterion of failure proofness or self stability or coherence (how to put it?) / for bare logic can succeed without an autotelic principle / a scoping constraint (as cause for rejection) is not really question begging (unless it were put beyond question), rather something I must argue against - an instance of the principle in action is reason’s search for the unconditioned (as Kant puts it) : see notepad:2023-6-18c - ever seeking further causes, further ends, never satisfied till it finds a condition that stands|holds of itself / an example of such, as I argue here, being reason itself - here again (as with provision of its own conditions) reason would fail in absence of conformance to the principle - here again the question arises: where else could we reasonably seat such a principle if not among the principles of reason? - this informs me *who’s* endurance I will, viz. who we are and thereby who I am - an autotelic principle, stipulating self-reproduction, defines who we are: it is constitutive for us : see notepad:2023-6-16e : defines the self whose reproduction it stipulates : see also `^^- learn who we are: rational, moral agents with a will to exist as such$`i - taking the principle as law, which then is moral law : see notepad:2023-6-8a : to choose right action is, in formal terms, to take the principle as law; the latter defines the former - on taking the principle as law, one thereby sees it as defining right action : see also notepad:2023-6-8b : possible relation to autonomy as natural disengagement: on taking the principle as law, one makes moral law, and is thereby autonomous (literally) \ | looking to the future, endlessly \ - probability of extinction *p* would have to decline endlessly \ - other necessary conditions of rational agency would have to hold indefinitely \ - witnessing this from the outside, one could only take it as a stochastic law \ that rational agency has this behaviour \ / for it is neither mere chance nor contingency, but there is necessity to it \ ▷ this stochastic law, viewed from the inside, one would call moral law \ - as such, the autotelic principle would be operative \\ !! all or most of the steps in this argument seem weak, and the argument specious overall | rather taking the principle as *absolute* (= as absolute norm = as moral law) is simply to *acknowledge* it as such - which is to acknowledge the principle as the guide and ground of reason, will and action - for already the autotelic principle *is* absolute : see `^*∵ the principle is an absolute norm$` @ 60.brec | moral = rational - a rational agent is an agent *of* reason, one who acts on *behalf* of reason \ ?+ rational agency is the agency *of* reason, reason itself as an agent (of reason) \ : cf. `^*- a rational agent is an agent.+who acts on \*behalf\* of reason$` @ \ `^*\| moral = rational$` @ `^*- taking the principle as law, which then is moral law$` | going from optional = potential opposition (to hazard) to actual = mandatory : see notepad:2023-6-25b : cf. notepad:2023-6-25c | for this is (or is becoming) what lies behind our present concept of moral obligation - as I think the inference (in next file) of precepts will bear out - then too, for one or more other reasons below | so to make it obligatory : cf. file:///home/mike/library/1992,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20sources%20of%20normativity.pdf : ‘What morality demands of us is what it is reasonable for us, at least as a group, to do. The rules of morality are the rules that make social life possible, and social life is necessary for human beings. Hobbes and Pufendorf clearly supposed that in many cases this consideration could be motivationally sufficient as well. Pufendorf, especially, says that in the absence of obligation we would still do what is right because it is useful. The legislator is not invoked to supply the content of morality or to explain why people are often motivated to do what is right. The legislator is necessary to make obligation possible, that is, to make morality normative.’ p. 30 ? better to let reason make the law that I then recognize (viz. take as such), is it not? : see file:///home/mike/library/1996,%20(O'Neill)%20Korsgaard%20++.%20The%20sources%20of%20normativity.pdf : Cohen in reference to Kant: “For it is reason as such that is sovereign over us, and that gives determinacy, stability, and authority to a law that would otherwise lack all that: 'the ground of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man . . . but a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason'.” p. 172 | rather than make law myself, what I want is to enter that [lineal] community that takes the principle as its law - I want to be a member of that, and partake in eternity : N.B. `^^- this informs.+who we are and thereby who I am$`i @ `^^- now reason of itself must supply an end$`i : N.B. `stipulating self-reproduction.+it is constitutive for us$`s @ `^^- now reason of itself must supply an end$`i - so to be a willing *subject* of the law of that community, not myself a lawmaker - all the advantages of this section then apply as reasons for seeing that community as attractive, as effective in pursuit of the end (and securing our existence) - moreover the advantages of authority deriving from my own will still apply, as I would contradict myself to disobey the law ? but then am I not, as Cohen argues, still under a weakened form of moral obligation since, after all, I could always leave the community? | no, for there is no other place to go : see `^^- and it seems.+we are on the verge of this$`i - already I identify with that community - I suspect I always did, though without seeing it as such, rather in rejecting its opposite which I saw instead - it would tear me apart to leave it - and it seems already that we are on the verge of this : see `^^\| for this is.+what lies behind our.+concept of moral obligation$`i - without which it’s necessity to me would not carry in general - I cannot abide that we should perish without even *trying* to endure | so to obligate our being, our existence, in accord with our identity : see `^^- this informs.+who we are and thereby who I am$`i @ `^^- now reason of itself must supply an end$`i : see also notepad:2023-6-25c - the moral law is what we enforce against nature, so determining ourselves : see notepad:2023-6-16c - we enforce the law on ‘ourselves’ only where (still) we are in thrall to nature - thus [both autonomy {if I allow it} *and*] self-determination - law is a means to the end - the end (maintaining reason) being larger than I am, exceeding my grasp, law is an efficient means of (a tool for) pursuing the end *at large* : privately see also `^^- Will without law cannot propagate.+in positive effect.$`i @ ~/work/ethics/normative/._/03_origin_hypothesis/40_law.notes.brec : privately see also `like.+a wet noodle, as opposed to the.+cantilever of law` @ ~/work/ethics/normative/._/03_origin_hypothesis/40_law.notes.brec - in taking this means (as an intermediary end) I will that the principle be law - this is what I mean (elsewhere) by ‘all society bend to the task’ - better: it is my will, and I would have it extend [universally and] forever - an autotelic principle, stipulating self-reproduction, defines who we are: it is constitutive for us : see @ `^^- this informs.+who we are and thereby who I am$`i @ `^^- now reason of itself must supply an end$`i | or to maintain reason through one’s will, law alone suffices as the instrument : see e.g. notepad:2023-6-11d : I am an engineer. It is my will that this distance be spanned. Law alone suffices to span it. | one wills that we shall endure and all society bend to the task : cf. `^^\| \{I\|it is my\} will that we shall endure and all society bend to the task` @ `^^\| unity, synergy and stability of reason, right and being by.+a common principle$`i - moral law is then a fine instrument - posited here by the axiom of justification by default : see `^^axiom.+principles.+justified that posited, no reason can strike them down$`p - entailed (in the form of that law) is my expectation that others will conform, and thereby an obligation on my part (by my own authority) to *allow* them to conform - in wielding the instrument on others, it immediately rebounds on me - in giving the law, one is bound (logically) to take it upon oneself, too - its obligations rebound immediately on one | to choose right *is* to take the principle as law | if right is to exist, then this step is necessary - one chooses that right is to exist, and thereby one has no choice but to take this step - or *provided* rights exists, then this must be its principle | vitality or vigour of reason in vanquishing other normative sources - criterion of incontestability - the condition of a successful ethic - incontestability in a plural society - nature (naturalism) is constestable - God (voluntarism) is constestable - reason is inconstestable - initial inference of an autotelic principle of reason - a condition of reason’s being normative in itself - here reason would engage us by a self-reproductive, existential mechanism - nature too has such a mechanism in natural selection - reason has disengaged us from that mechanism - nature thus ceases to be vital for us, which indicates: - criterion of vitality: a vital source of guidance ?!! how does this relate to the criterion of incontestability : see `^*\+ criterion of incontestability$` | - how this incontestability came to be underscores reason’s vigour as a normative source - historically reason has disengaged us from sources formerly had incontestible hold - now incontestible itself - there simply remains no other normative source of independent/objective standing - its vigour having made it inconstestible, this shows reason to be inescapable for us - its vigour having knocked out all competitors, reason alone remains standing as an uncontested normative source - this (alone I think) is my argument in all of this ?+ what is the crux of the argument? what am I claiming? - reason’s vigour vis-à-vis other normative sources !! but natural selection was not normative in any useful sense | yet it *could* be the ultimate anchor of normative claims | both vitality and incontestability arise from the actual hold the source has on us - the incontestable hold that reason has on us makes it definitive of who we are - thus its normative force (?) | is a condition of *theoretic* incontestability, part of incontestability plain | supplements it, a further criterion | explains it, as the incontestability of a source depends (to some extent) on its vitality - why nature (naturalism) does not suffice : see notepad:2023-6-6a(i),7d : naturalism cut off by reason from its vital source \ wary here not to beg the question and dismiss it for existential reasons - why God (voluntarism) does not suffice : see notepad:2023-6-6a(v),7e : voluntarism cut off by reason from its vital source - reason’s vitality is demonstated by it having vanquished those other sources, cutting them off from their own vital sources | constitutive constructivism : see `^^constitutivism$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec : cf. `^*\| source of existential.*constitutive mechanism alone is non-alien and.+authorative$` ?+ combined with the existential mechanism, might I use this? : re `combined with the existential mechanism` cf. `^*\| source of existential.+constitutive mechanism.+is non-alien.+authorative$` | doubtful, it seems unhelpful in itself | Korsgaard’s argument with the autotelic principle in place of Kant’s categorical imperative : see file:///home/mike/library/2018,%20Katsafanas.%20Constitutivism%20about%20practical%20reasons.pdf : § 6.2.2, p. 6 | necessity opposing contingency → morality opposing extinction : see `^^\?.+the.+mechanism to oppose existential hazard.+results in a normative ethic`sp @ `^^\| source of existential-cum-constitutive mechanism alone is non-alien and.+authorative$` a) necessity (in theory) = what opposes contingency (unconditionally) - the two are opposites, mutually exclusive b) necessity in practice = what opposes hazard (if will conforms with effect) ∵ necessity in practice (aka obligation) = what opposes contingency (if will conforms with effect) ?+ how does ‘norm’ relate to ‘obligation’? : see e.g. notepad:2023-7-1c,d,e - I wonder why I don’t use the former here ∵ contingency opposed in practice = hazard ∵ mere will (unobligated) cannot oppose hazard, for such will is *subject to* hazard (and fortune), not *opposed to* it • practical necessity = normativity ∴ whatever argument I have here, it pertains to (e.g. explains) normativity ∴ moral norm = instance of absolute practical necessity - absolute here means unconditional, non-relative, universal and/or supreme : re `supreme` cf. `^*∵ supreme hazard = existential hazard$` c) moral law = what opposes existential hazard (if will conforms with effect) ∵ moral law (or moral obligation) = supreme necessity in practice ∵ supreme necessity in practice = what opposes supreme hazard ∵ supreme hazard = existential hazard ∵ supreme = most fundamental ∵ morality aside, nothing is as fundamental as being ∵ morality (the hazard of moral wrong) must be set aside here ∵ otherwise the argument would be circular, moral obligation being the thing to explain ? would supreme = absolute help here? : see notepad:2023-7-1d,e / I hope so, for that seems a clearer approach than ‘supreme = most fundamental’ | yes - it means that a moral-normative source must itself be both: • potentially immortal, else a norm opposing that hazard would be incoherent - e.g. by an existential mechanism for normativity itself • at risk, for this makes absolute hazard : see notepad:2023-7-1e : cf. notepad:2023-7-1c : Assertion that absolute norms and existential mechanisms, both being constitutive, must cohere. It now seems overly generalized and vague. + seek a normative source that meets the constraint of potential yet precarious immortality : see `^*\| last standing source$` : potential supporting arguments : re `constraint` see `^*• potentially immortal` : re `constraint` see `^*• at risk` | 1. necessity in theory = the opposite of contingency 2. necessity in practice = what opposes contingency in practice + explain the sense of ‘opposes’ : e.g. notepad:2023-7-3c : unlike the theoretic relation, the practical relation is continuous between the poles - but necessity in practice = normativity 3. normativity = what opposes contingency in practice 4. absolute normativity = what opposes absolute contingency in practice - but absolute normativity = morality - and absolute contingency in practice = the total absence of normativity 5. morality = what opposes the total absence of normativity ?+ conclusions? : e.g. notepad:2023-7-3d : the suggestion of one possibility for morality: that it is based on a purely formal principle, devoid of content : e.g. notepad:2023-7-3e : that normativity depends on morality | yes to 1d : see notepad:2023-7-1d / for 1e would jar with God as a normative source : see notepad:2023-7-1e - it depends on identifying a thing that is potentially immortal, which in turn depends on identifying an existential mechanism ?!! wouldn’t that potentially immortal thing have to be all important, too? else in what sense would the hazard be ‘absolute’? ?+ does this mean that any existential mechanism implies a moral law? !! no such conclusion follows from this analysis - nothing follows but what *already* is contained in the premises, and they are too thin to yield what I hope for here !!+ the qualifier ‘if will conforms with effect’ confuses and detracts from the argument - its import (effect on the argument) is unclear, leading the reader to suspect the worst !!+ I merely *assume* here the existence of practical necessity - yet practical necessity (or moral normativity) is the very thing to explain | I will proceed to seek its *source* among several possible moral-normative sources - yet it seems my intention must preface the argument, else it is unclear what the argument is *for* | source of existential-cum-constitutive mechanism alone is non-alien and thus authorative : see notepad:2023-6-21a,b : cf. `^*\| constitutive constructivism$` - non-alien is alone what constitutes us: the parts and their source (ex. mech.) - trying to sharpen this, for it might make that authority behind the source alone trustworthy, and thereby the only possible source of obligatory norms : e.g. notepad:2023-6-22b ? rather than an authority that is trustworthy (or in addition to it), one that is undefiable? - so two reasons: - any independent source other than our creator would be alien, giving one no positive reason to recognize its authority - to defy a creator (who makes and sustains) is to invite annihilation, giving one a negative reason to recognize its authority ? is not the collective basis of this reason jarring, maybe even begging the question? ? how infer that a normative source must (ultimately) be also a|the creative source? / e.g. sharpening my fumbling attempts (elsewhere) at this ? does it matter that both types of source (normative and creative) can entrain will? : re `both types of source.+can entrain will`s see `${same}$` ? might it be that the one effective|effective mechanism to oppose existential hazard (which I think means to oppose chance *period*) results in a normative ethic, and always has (for us) in the past (for the different mechanisms) - here opposition to chance (as a remedy) would save the old argument, for it was only the remedy of chance on which it foundered : privately see ~/work/ethics/normative/._/04_law_or_extinction/README.brec - chance cannot be a means of *opposing* hazard (a remedy), for it is the opposite: it is *surrendering* to hazard - here the mechanism to *oppose* existential hazard would be the *willful* indefinite reduction of *p* - then this would explain morality itself | : see notepad:2023-6-24a - law alone opposes chance - law here being either of nature, or of practice - practical law in positive opposition to negative existential chance we call moral law - moral law opposes existential hazard, that is - moral law entrains|entails identity : see also notepad:2023-6-25c - it defines what is to exist - what is (potentially) immortal - what is precarious - yet the existential *mechanism* defines what *can* exist ?+ how does an existential mechanism relate to moral law? how do chance-defeating mechanisms relate to law? - law can oppose chance only through a mechanism that makes it effective in that regard - law dictates how the mechanism must be used - this relates to how practical principles dictate the methods|means of a practice ?+ how does this relate to necessity | not in any interesting way | something to do with the consequence of non-conformance - loss of identity - unbinding|disengagement from what is immortal | something to do with the difference between principle and law - so related to the move of *taking* a principle *as law* | something to do with the difference between practical and moral ?+ structure around the necessity of a predictive theory? ?+ must moral philosophy (practical philosophy) be predictive, as opposed to merely descriptive and prescriptive? | equation: effective opposition to existential hazard = moral law - will alone is ineffective, unless stiffened and extended by law : cf. `^^- law is a means to the end$`i : and references there, including the ‘wet noodle’ one + sharpen ‘effective’ : cf. notepad:2023-6-24 : which drops ‘effective’ - both will and law *oppose* chance ?+ how then might law differ from will in this regard? | law *alone* opposes chance - will inconformant with law is will *by* chance ? whence authority, the power to enforce obedience? | one’s own choice in opposing hazard, so taking up the moral law ?+ could we accept the authority (power to enforce obedience) of an independent moral-normative source other than our creator? \ ?+ could *will* be *forced* to anything *other* than existence? | alien \ ?+ would an independent moral-normative source other than our creator \ necessarily be alien? \ ?+ could we accept the authority of an alien moral-normative source? ?+ why would its being alien matter? - both types of source (normative and creative) can entrain will - criteria from Korsgaard - my theory must survive reflection on the normative question, namely ‘whether we really have reason to yield to’ the norms that I claim : e.g. file:///home/mike/library/1992,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20sources%20of%20normativity.pdf : ‘The normative question, then, is whether we really have reason to yield to these desires and to try to be virtuous people.’ (etc., for this is the guiding question of her whole lecture series) p. 54 - one would reflect on why one took the autotelic principle as law, and whether those reasons still hold - the necessity of avoiding what one cannot accept (our extinction) and whether that still justifies taking the principle as law - the feeling that moved one to take the principle as law, and whether still it moves one to that - here I think of motivation, lineal rational community ? can it survive the sensible knave test? : see file:///home/mike/library/1992,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20sources%20of%20normativity.pdf : p. 57 - if the knave understands what law means and does not like to contradict himself, then yes