Moral uncertainty: the ground of right + Claim the fact of moral dissensus. : privately see notebook:2021-10-17a,26c,27b,29a - Aware of this moral dissensus, I am in a state of moral uncertainty. !! A mere agent-relative fact would not suffice to ground (the mutual recognition of) rights. : privately re `! (.+)$` cf. `${same}$` @ ~/work/ethics/normative/._/00_default_restart/20_default_moral_norms.brec - The ground here would have to be a belief that moral norms in fact exist and bind one. : privately e.g. `^*belief: Moral norms exist and bind one.$` @ ~/work/ethics/normative/._/00_default_restart/20_default_moral_norms.brec - For a skeptic may believe that the cause of moral dissensus is, for instance, a mistaken belief in the reality|truth|possibility of moral norms. / As per Moore’s error theory, I believe it was. - The ground here being merely a belief (an agent-relative fact) then, it would not follow that others necessarily hold the same belief and thereby have the same rights as oneself. - I have reason to suspect that without my knowledge one or more norms are morally binding on me. - Therefore I am duty-bound to make a best effort at learning what those norms are. : cf. `^*- Having no knowledge.+\R.+I am rationally bound to go in search of that knowledge` @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec : Another instance of a binding default norm triggered by one’s awareness of normative ignorance. principle: Having reason to suspect that one is morally bound by a norm without one’s knowledge, one is morally bound to seek knowledge of that norm and whether indeed it binds. + Consider adding comparative references. : see `^*Schneewind.+1998.+The invention of autonomy` @ sources.brec : p. 217.2. Spinoza claims that moral norms are artifacts of our ignorance, our incompleteness. : see `^*Schneewind.+1998.+The invention of autonomy` @ sources.brec : p. 398.1. Reid relies on an axiom that enjoins discovery of one’s duty. - On this principle, I must take M as my end. M. Knowledge of what norms morally bind one. : re `On this principle` N.B. `^*no rational ground for morality and moral certainty$` @ `^+Notes?$` + Explain what knowledge here consists in. : cf. @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec • acquaintenance - Enough to identify the norms. - Identification is necessary in order to establish the existence of those norms. ?+ Might existence alone be what is necessary here, not identity nor any other wider acquaintenance with the norm? • know-how - Enough to apply the norm, at least roughly. - Rough know-how suffices initially because one can, on the fly, refine it insofar as one judges prudent. ?+ Given the identity of the norm, cannot even this initial, rough know-how be learned on the fly, just as any *further* know-how would be? - The upshot being that even a rough, initial know-how might be unecessary here. + Clarify (at least in a comment) that the premise of M alone, or any bounden end at all, suffices to infer the rights with which the ethic concludes. - Only a stable consensus can validate knowledge on a topic that lies open to controversy. : re `open to controversy` see `^*\+ Claim the fact of moral dissensus` C. A stable consensus on what norms morally bind one. + Warrant this claim. : cf. @ `^*- Only.+consensus can validate` @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec - Warrant by principle and/or argument. - C refers exclusively to norms not premised on moral uncertainty. / A consensus on the present ethic, for example, would not suffice. - A stable consensus requires a sustained quorum. H. The rational macrocommunity of humankind extant through C to M. + Define the ‘rational macrocommunity of humankind’. : cf. @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec - The macrocommunity must be rational because reason is necessary to M, as it is necessary to all knowledge. ∵ Knowledge is justified belief, which means it originates ‘in sources we have *good reason* to consider reliable’. : see `^*Steup.+and.+Neta.+2005.+Epistemology` @ sources.brec : italics added - In binding me to an end (M) that is necessarily collective (C), duty has bound me to the interim maintenance (H) of the collective itself. - Short of M, no alternative exists within moral bounds. : cf. `no alternative exists within the bounds of reason\.$` @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec - M is unlikely to be attained in my own time. But even if I judged it unattainable, duty would nonetheless bind my will to it, and thereby to C and H. - Nothing in the principle that warrants M entitles me (in a state of moral uncertainty) to presuppose what an unknown norm consists in, or to whom (or what) it is owed, and then excuse myself from duty’s entailments on that basis. : re `principle that warrants M` see `^*principle: Having reason to suspect.+one is.+bound` - The unknown norm *itself* might well entail a concern for what lies beyond the span of my life. ∴ I must take M as my end, and with it C and H. ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ - Morality and [practical] reason pull, each by|on|with its own oar, through the same ends. ━━━━━━ Note ────── no rational ground for morality and moral certainty - Note that while moral certainty (M) is here given a moral ground, nowhere does the present ethic give it a rational one. : re `moral ground` see `^*principle: Having reason to suspect.+one is morally bound` : re `rational one` e.g. `^*principle: Reason in its practical use requires` @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec - How morality and moral certainty are to be rationally justified is left unanswered in the present ethic. A clear connection to practical reason (and motivation) enters only with the entailment of H, which, in virtue of its namesake, is rationally grounded through to the point of axiologic certainty (W). : re `H` see `^*H\..+of humankind extant through C to M` : re `its namesake` see `^*H\..+of humankind extant through C to W` @ axiologic_uncertainty.brec \ 🅮 This file has been dedicated by its author(s) to the public domain. To the extent possible \ under law, the author(s) waive all copyright and related or neighbouring rights to this file \ under the terms of a CC0 1.0 waiver. See `LICENCE.txt` in the base directory of this waycast.