Notes on the report of a default ground for practical reasoning

    argue+ for a default (practical) ground whose object is knowledge of whether
      there is a (practical) ground, and (if so) what [it consists in]
        : see @ ../../normative/._/14.default+stable_ground/4_our_practical_binding_to_a_purpose_of_endurance/45.brec
    moral law, conditions that hold
        a) a principle defining the criteria of right action
            : see @ `^^moral law, conditions$`i @ ~/work/ethics/._/text.notes.brec
            ∃ a principle that defines the criteria of right action as one criterion:

                criterion of right action: action having as an end a practical ground

            ∴ this condition holds
                - satisfaction of the criterion depends on the existence of a practical ground,
                  which at present is assured for us by the existence of a default practical ground
                    : ad `(at present).+(for us)` : if no other practical ground exists to be discovered
                      (viz. none that is stable) and we come to learn of this, then (for us) the default
                      ground will cease to exist and right action (by this criterion) will be impossible
                - but this contingency in satisfying the criterion affects neither the criterion itself
                  nor the principle, both remain absolute regardless
                    repair+ this point
                        ∵ now it is (at the least) out of context
                        ∵ coherence now (probably) depends on postulating either that a practical ground
                          exists to be discovered, or that we could never learn otherwise
                            ∵ our creators’ forcing us to do what is impossible makes no sense
                            - such a postulate, in assuring of the integrity of (practical) logic|reason
                              in itself, might qualify (instead or further) as a truth of logic|reason
                            ?+ might it instead be formulated as a (further) criterion
                              of right (qua rational) action?
                                - strange to think (yet quite possible) that such an *optimistic outlook*
                                  in regard to our prospects is made an obligatory standpoint for action
                                  by our creators’ command and enforcement of it
        b) its command (addressed demand) by our creator
            : see @ `^^moral law, conditions$`i @ ~/work/ethics/._/text.notes.brec
        c) the creator’s backing of it by force
            : see @ `^^moral law, conditions$`i @ ~/work/ethics/._/text.notes.brec