Ethics notes + reach coherence + retitle tabular column *explanantic truth* more precisely as *truth mode*, or whatever term is accurate + make this part of the argument optional, if only implicitly, by deferring it : join repair+ this point : see @ ~/work/ethics/default/._/text.notes.brec ?+ better warrant (more encouraging) to set aside the others, is there? : join @ `^*\+ argue for my preferred safehold explanantia` + clear notepad references + clear notepad + begin (this philosophic frame) with (or involving) a search for the creator’s reason : re `creator’s reason` see `^*• God had reason to make the safehold$`s @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/text.brec : re `creator’s reason` see `^*• cosmocrafters have reason to.+cosmocraft lineally`s @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/text.brec but no+ ∵ the normative ethic is the proper place for seeking the creator’s reason : re `^*∵ (.+)$` see `^*∴ ${same}$` @ `^*- the command condition is proper to normative ethics$` wanted first+ is a (prior) reason to do that - the opportunity (presented by the safehold) to meet ‘Anscombe’s challenge’ of a modern (re)grounding for moral law : re `‘Anscombe’s challenge’` see doi:10.1017/9781139025065 : Darwall, Stephen. 2023. *Modern moral philosophy from Grotius to Kant.* pp. 1-4 : re `‘Anscombe’s challenge’` see doi:10.1017/9781009543835 : Darwall, Stephen. 2025. *Modern moral philosophy in the nineteenth century.* pp. 1-3 - the logic of so doing, then, informs the text : cf. ~/work/safehold/aetiology/._/01.logic_tour/ - to read: \ in addition to Anscombe and Darwall \ 1958. Anscombe, G.E.M. ‘Modern moral philosophy.’ + 1958. Remnant, Peter. ‘God and the moral law.’ : see https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/cjt/04-1_023.pdf + 2011. Murphy, Mark. *God and moral law: on the theistic explanation of morality.* : see doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.001.0001 + 2017. Rosen, Gideon. *What is a moral law?.* : see doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0006 + 2022. Driver, Julia. *Moral theory.* : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-theory/ \ 2023. Darwall, Stephen. *Modern moral philosophy from Grotius to Kant.* \ 2025. Darwall, Stephen. *Modern moral philosophy in the nineteenth century.* + re "Anscombe" "Modern moral philosophy" wanted first+ again, is a (prior) reason to do that - analysis of the concept of moral law (on the evidence of the safehold) suffices to ground the norms and facts (application) of an ethic - given that, we have no need of (the field of) metaethics : pace ../meta/ + so say there - the two conditions of moral law (that analysis yields) apportion cleanly between the two remaining fields of ethics (normative and applied) - the command condition is proper to normative ethics ∴ the normative ethic is the proper place for seeking the creator’s reason - the enforcement condition is proper to applied ethics ∵ outside the norms that guide, the only question is the facts that move us to conform - division of concept into conditions → division of ethics into fields + make consideration of the latter *follow* on that of the former / rather than consider first the customary division of ethics, then, in that light, the division of the concept - the customary fields of ethics I reuse if (and as) applicable : ad `\(and as\)` : I wear the shoe as it fits frame curtly+ aiming for extent (as proper to a frame) over content + argue for my preferred safehold explanantia here in the ethic (alone), where they figure as a premise : re `explanantia` see `be agnostic re design explanantia, not preferring one.+over others` @ ../applied/._/text.notes.brec : re `here in the ethic \(alone\)` cf. `so much for the aetiology: no need to argue here` @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/._/text.notes.brec - argue not on aetiologic or otherwise theoretic|epistemic grounds : see `^*Waller.+2020.+Cosmological fine-tuning arguments` @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/sources.brec : his chapter 1 convinces me there are none at present - nor on metaphysical grounds ∵ metaphysics mystifies me : contra `^*Waller.+2020.+Cosmological fine-tuning arguments` @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/sources.brec - rather argue on the practical|methodological ground of my preferred explanantia being the best|only on which to premise a normative ethic ?+ better warrant (more encouraging) to set aside the others, is there? | defuse the problem of exclusionary warrant immediately, up front, by shining enough light on the crucial features of the situation to make obvious the warrant : cf. `^*∵ exposing these crucial features suffices to defuse problem` @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/._/text.notes.brec : same technique for a similar problem - tabulating for each explanans its [direct] moral implication and/or its [potential] moral bearing table, Moral implications [direct] of known, possible explanantia for the cosmic safehold ╭╴ ╶╮ explain- explanantic name of explanans moral impli- able truth cation yes necessary physical necessity supernatural design moral law ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ contingent natural cosmogonal selection multiverse ensemble mundane design cosmic moral law ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ no null, brute fact - brute fact and physical necessity are fairly implausible - here is some encouragement - tabulating for each explanans its [direct] moral implication and/or its [potential] moral bearing table, Moral bearing [potential] of known, possible explanantia for the cosmic safehold ╭╴ ╶╮ explain- explanantic theoretic name of explanans moral bearing able truth ground yes necessary physical necessity supernatural design moral law ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ contingent none / natural natural cosmogonal selection multiverse ensemble mundane design cosmic moral law ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ supernatural natural cosmogonal moral law selection multiverse ensemble moral law mundane design moral law ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ no null, brute fact + make this part of the argument optional, if only implicitly, by deferring it ∵ regardless it cannot be dealt with up front ∵ dealing with it involves features of practical logic|reason that have yet to be introduced - proceeding to elaborate the ethic meantime on a promise of later disarming any skeptics + change in the explanantial table (title and payload column) the term *moral bearing* to the more precise *[implied|evidenced] moral source* or *[”] source of morals* 1+ eliminate as implausible the necessarily true safehold explanantia of *physical necessity* and *brute fact* + promise a second way of doing this : re `second way` viz. `^*2. eliminate.+the theoretic grounds` : ∵ these explanantia, in being necessarily true, are theoretic grounds ⇒ this leaves a table of contingent explanantia alone + there add a column of *ground*, which is a theoretic ground 2+ eliminate *for practical purposes* the theoretic grounds of *none, brute fact* and *natural necessity* from the table of contingent explanantia : re `for practical purposes` see notepad:2026-8-22a,b,c,d : where theoretic logic|reason necessarily is indecisive, practical logic|reason may *for practical purposes* decide a theoretic matter ⇒ this leaves only those explanantia that involve|imply a source of morals - skeptics are here disarmed + redeem the promise of a second way of doing 1 : re `the promise.+` see `^*\+ promise a second way of doing this$` | forget it | the others and their ilk must, at present, hang over and threaten all moral endeavours | there is no theoretic|epistemic ground : see `^*Waller.+2020.+Cosmological fine-tuning arguments` @ ~/work/safehold/aetiology/sources.brec : his chapter 1 convinces me there are none at present | uncertainty inheres in the one ground that we (at present) can locate | no choice at present re the others | they have no moral bearing (at present) precisely ∵ they rest on physics ‘yet unknown’ | all (at present) rest on physics ‘yet unknown’ | weighing the possible courses of moral action | productive|substantial vs. mere waiting (for physics) | absent the (present) possibility of theoretic warrant, fall back to practical ?+ where did Kant argue for practical warrant in such cases? ?+ does anyone else argue for it? ∵ one has neither practical warrant for the others (all being amoral), nor (at present) theoretic (all resting on physics ‘yet unknown’) moral law, conditions a) a principle defining the criteria of right action : re `principle defining the criteria of right action` see `^*: re .moral law.+${same}`s @ ../text.brec : join @ `^^moral law, conditions that hold$`i @ ../default/._/text.notes.brec •) its being absolute : re `absolute` see `^*: re .moral law.+a.+${same} principle`s @ ../text.brec , sub-conditions that suffice : ad `suffice` : this set of sub-conditions of absoluteness is sufficient, but might or might not be necessary, depending on whether ∃ a different set that also is sufficient b) its command (addressed demand) by our creator : cf. `^*: re .moral law.+a divine ordinance`s @ ../text.brec : join @ `^^moral law, conditions that hold$`i @ ../normative/._/text.notes.brec c) the creator’s backing of it by force : join @ `^^moral law, conditions that hold$`i @ ../applied/._/text.notes.brec - these suffice to remove any qualification of the principle and thereby make it absolute / here the particular principle that meets condition (a) is a principle of logic carrying the implicit qualification, ‘if one wishes to act logically’ ∵ together they make the principle obligatory without qualification / here they make the principle of logic apply regardless of one’s wishes, whether one likes it or not admit+ however a qualification of scope (cosmic) re the case of mundane creators and theoretic ground other than supernatural necessity - probably in that case the qualification must be elevated to the moral law, making it cosmic as opposed to universal in scope ∵ only a universal creator (God) could obligate universally / though the difference between cosmic and universal could hardly matter in practice / yet (a mitigation) the scope of obligation could at least be multi-cosmic, in being lineally inherited