Research notes for the ethic

    constitutive versus regulative norms
        : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-normative/#LogiConsNormForThou : Searle
    constitutivism, aka constitutive constructivism
        / Katsafanas, 2018.  Constitutivism about practical reasons.
          In *The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity*.
        / Katsafanas, 2019.  Constitutivism.  In *The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015*.
      \ : see https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869795.2019.1601754 : Haase and Mayr, 2019.
      \   Varieties of constitutivism. (out)
        / Paul, 2021.  Does action have a constitutive aim?
          *Philosophy of action: a contemporary introduction*, chapter 7.
      \ : see http://www.princeton.edu/~msmith/mypapers/Smith-Constitutivism-Promise-Parts.pdf :
      \   Smith, 2013.  A constitutivist theory of reasons: its promise and parts. (out)
        ambitious
            : cf. `^^modest$`i @ `^^constitutivism`i
            / Enoch, 2021.  Constitutivism: on rabbits, hats, and holy grails.
              In *The Routledge handbook of practical reason*.
            : see https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/items/2cd668f9-11ec-468a-8f35-4ab3efead922 :
              Vriend, 2022.  Agency and practical reason: a consideration of some objections
              to constitutivism.
        Kantian, Korsgaard
            : see http://reluk.ca/library/ : Korsgaard, 1996.  The sources of normativity. (old)
            : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/46522847-a533-3d6b-b10a-aca0a2ae3671 :
              Korsgaard, 1999.  Self-constitution in the ethics of Plato and Kant. (old)
        modest
            : cf. `^^ambitious$`i @ `^^constitutivism`i
    constitutivist skepticism
        : see http://reluk.ca/library/ : Katsafanas, 2018.  Constitutivism about practical reasons.
          § 16.5 (old)
      \ : see https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/download/220/202 : Lindeman, 2017.
      \   Constitutivism without normative thresholds. (out)
        agency/shmagency
            : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/20446897 : Enoch, 2006.
              Agency, shmagency: why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action. (old)
            : see http://reluk.ca/var/post/secret/Enoch,%202011a.%20Shmagency%20revisited.pdf :
              Enoch, 2011. Shmagency revisited. (new) in *New waves in metaethics*, Brady ed.
                : cf. http://reluk.ca/var/post/secret/Enoch,%202011b.%20Shmagency%20revisited.pdf
            : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/24704157 :
              Silverstein, 2015.  The shmagency question. (new)
            : see https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/Trc7nMCtDSDt8dps9sRMnxx/?format=pdf&lang=en :
              Paakkunainen, 2018.  Doing away with the “shmagency” objection to constitutivism. (new)
            : see https://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/download/573/241 : Leffler, 2019.
              New shmagency worries. (new)
            : see https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/2d29bd04-1229-49a9-9a48-92ee5730bd48/content :
              Vriend, 2022.  Agency and practical reason: a consideration of some objections
              to constitutivism. (new)
        Nietzschean
          \ : see https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/pub/2/article/640468 : Reginster, 2016.
          \   Comments on Paul Katsafanas’s *Agency and the foundations of ethics:
          \   Nietzschean constitutivism. (out)
            : see https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/article/640469 : Dannenberg, 2016.
              “Why?” Gets No Answer: Paul Katsafanas’s *Agency and the foundations of ethics*. (in)
          \ : see https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/pub/2/article/640470 : Huddleston, 2016.
          \   Normativity and the will to power: challenges for a Nietzschean constitutivism. (out)
            : see https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/pub/2/article/640471 : Katsafanas, 2016.
              Response to Bernard Reginster, Jorah Dannenberg, and Andrew Huddleston. (in)