Research notes for the ethic, boneyard analysis : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/ analysis/synthesis distinction, the : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ : see https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ analytic philosophy : see https://iep.utm.edu/analytic-philosophy/ a priori reasoning and knowledge / Analytic—synthetic and a priori—a posteriori history. Weatherson, 2016. The Oxford handbook of philisophical methodology. p. 231. : see https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ : A priori and a posteriori. : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ : *A priori* justification and knowledge. autonomy : see https://iep.utm.edu/autonomy/ : Dryden. Autonomy. : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ : Christman, 2020. Autonomy in moral and political philosophy. : see https://iep.utm.edu/normative-autonomy/ : Piper. Autonomy: normative. / The invention of autonomy. Schneewind, 1998. / Kant. Timmermann, 2017. The Cambridge history of moral philosophy. p. 394. / Kant’s approach to the theory of human agency. Schapiro, 2021. The Routledge handbook of practical reason. : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/ : Buss and Westlund, 2018. Personal autonomy. instrumental reason : see http://reluk.ca/library/ : Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason. : cf. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321762 : Shaver, 2006. Korsgaard on hypothetical imperatives. (new) : cf. https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/25452/1/The%20Normative%20Source%20of%20Kantian%20Hypothetical%20Imperatives.pdf : Kong, 2012. The normative source of Kantian hypothetical imperatives. (untrackable journal) : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678494 : Hubin, 2001. The groundless normativity of instrumental rationality. (new) : see https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/kantian-rationale-for-desire-based-justification.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0001.003;format=pdf : Hurley, 2001. A Kantian rationale for desire-based justification. (old) : see http://reluk.ca/library/ : Millgram, 2001. Varieties of practical reasoning. / Hooker and Streumer, 2004. Procedural and substantive practical rationality. The Oxford handbook of rationality. p. 57. : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381695 : Lavin, 2004. Practical reason and the possibility of error. (new, already on Delilah) : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106948 : Smith and Harcourt, 2004. Instrumental desires, instrumental rationality. (untracked journal) : see https://jesp.org/index.php/jesp/issue/view/1 : *Multiple authors*, 2005. (boneyard journal, might resurrect) : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/40208717 : Beardman, 2007. The special status of instrumental reasons. (new) : see https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/ethik/mitarbeiter/schmidt/schmidt-instrumentalism-about-practical-reason-2016.pdf : Schmidt, 2016. Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default. (untrackable journal) : see https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/ppDMB6yGCfqDBvL7WwrjVwc/?lang=en : Mylonaki, 2018. Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a Murdochian constitutivist account. (untracked journal) : see https://digitalcommons.denison.edu/episteme/vol30/iss1/4/ : DeMatteo, 2019. Ends and persons: a transcendental argument. (untracked journal) : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-instrumental/ : Kolodny and Brunero, 2023. Instrumental rationality. laws of nature : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/laws-of-nature/ : Carroll, 2020. Laws of nature. : see https://iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/ : Swartz. Laws of nature. logic in nature, sic. / albeit it an apparent category error, logic being proper to thought alone / McIntyre, 2020 : see https://etherplan.com/2020/07/28/the-origin-of-logic/12219/ : his hypothesis: ‘what I see are the types of logic in nature’ meaning of life : see https://iep.utm.edu/mean-ear/ : O’Brien. The Meaning of life: early continental and analytic perspectives. : see https://iep.utm.edu/mean-ana/ : Seachris. The meaning of life: contemporary analytic perspectives. : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/ : Metz, 2021. The meaning of life. : see https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil150/Wolf.pdf : (stored already in library) Wolf, 2007. The meanings of lives. : see http://reluk.ca/library/ : Wolf, 2007. Meaning in life and why it matters: lectures I and II. : see http://reluk.ca/library/ : Wolf, 2010. Meaning in life and why it matters. sub specie aeternitatis : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/23013378 : Seachris, 2011. Death, futility, and the proleptic power of narrative ending. (untracked) : see https://go-gale-com.ezproxy.torontopubliclibrary.ca/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&retrievalId=70ce0673-c3c2-4d7a-9ecc-7fefa0a91c74&hitCount=18&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm¤tPosition=13&docId=GALE%7CA338894036&docType=Essay&sort=Relevance&contentSegment=ZONE-MOD1&prodId=AONE&pageNum=1&contentSet=GALE%7CA338894036&searchId=R2&userGroupName=tplmain&inPS=true : Seachris, 2013. The sub specie aeternitatis perspective and normative evaluations of life's meaningfulness: a closer look. (in) natural selection and morality, all old : see https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2020.0043 : Culture, humanities, evolution: the complexity of meaning-making over time. : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/510702.pdf : The Evolution of Morality. [book review] Richard Joyce. : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/30033814 : Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms for Cooperation. : see https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/pub/189/article/864249 : From Tools to Rules: The Evolution of Rule Following. : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/652292 : On the evolutionary debunking of morality. : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/671487 : Origins of Altruism and Cooperation: Developments in Primatology: Progress and Prospects. [book review] Robert W. Sussman and C. Robert Cloninger, editors. theoretic teleology aetiologic • Wright, 1972 : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/186722 : Explanation and teleology. a) ‘X has end O’ means: / schema of the Taylor-Wright formula i) X causes O ii) fact (i) causes X : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/186722 : Wright, 1972. p. 211 / to this, I would add the following invariant • O causes or is [prescriptive] autoreplicator replication : privately re `\[prescriptive\] autoreplicator replication` see `^*- invariably.+telicity occurs with ${same} among its ends$`p @ ~/work/ethic/._/12_teleo_object_subject/._/24.notes_boneyard.brec b) ‘X has end O’ means: / my extended schema of the Taylor-Wright formula i) X causes O ii) O causes or is [prescriptive] autoreplicator replication iii) facts (i,ii) cause X • Wright, 1973 : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183766 : Functions. c) ‘the function of X is O’ means: i) O is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there ii) X is there because it does O : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183766 : Wright, 1973. p. 161 - (i) has a complicated phrasing compared to his earlier formula (a) - Wright justifies the complication as necessary to exclude certain problematic cases ' The most easily generable set of cases to be excluded is of this kind: oxygen combines readily with hemoglobin, and that is the (etiological) reason it is found in human bloodstreams. But there is something colossally fatuous in maintaining that the function of that oxygen is to combine with hemoglobin, even though it is there because it does that. The function of the oxygen in human bloodstreams is providing energy in oxidation reactions, not combining with hemoglobin. Combining with hemoglobin is only a means to that end. : note : ibid. p. 159 - here he takes X = oxygen, the contextual ‘there’ = within human bloodstreams, the function O = provision of energy in oxidation reactions, and moreover O ≠ combining with hemoglobin (the case to exclude) - Wright assumes (maybe for ease of illustration) that oxygen enters the blood only *after* combining with hemoglobin - yet I prefer the earlier formula : re `earlier formula` see `^*a\) ‘X has end O’ means:$` ∵ it is simpler and clearer ∵ it handles the same exclusion with ease - let X = blood oxygen - let O = energy provision - clause (i) holds obviously - clause (ii) holds ∵ X is defeasible on (i): had it been the case that blood oxygen caused no energy provision, then oxygen would never have combined with hemoglobin and entered the blood in the first place - let O = combining with hemoglobin - clause (i) fails because blood oxygen does *not* cause combining with hemoglobin; rather the reverse is the case : N.B. `^*- Wright assumes.+oxygen enters.+only.+after.+combining`s : note : Cf. ibid., p. 161. ‘Its combining with hemoglobin is emphatically not a consequence of oxygen's being in our blood; just the reverse is true. On the other hand, its producing energy is a result of its being there.’ organizational • Schlosser, 1998 : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/20118085 : Self-re-production and functionality: a systems-theoretical approach to teleological explanation. + show Schlosser is wrong (§2): Wright’s original formula *can* account for new ends