20, notes \ -*-brec-to-collapse-indent-blinds:t-*- / finding further assurance that I could argue for the leading premise without falling into a plea, I came here to redeem that promise and resolve the argument : re `further assurance` see `This alone saves my argument from falling into a plea`p @ `^*\| by structural conformance as a bridge between.+fields` @ `^*resolve\+ the envisioned premise$`i @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/00.notes.brec - now I work to draft a structural bridge to the most influential theoretic approaches, aiming at a graphic clarity that speaks volumes : re `structural bridge` see `structural conformance as a bridge` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/00.notes.brec : re `most influential theoretic approaches` see `historical and to this day main contender` @ `^^naturally selective`i @ `^^aetiologic`i @ `^^theoretic teleology`i @ research.notes.brec ? what might such graphics show in the way of an argument? • a degree of theoretic credibility, albeit slight / which may suffice to start; no ethic has compelling grounds • a satisfying symmetry and explanatory depth across the theoretic-practical divide : see notepad:2024-2-22c : re `explanatory depth` see `^*- noting the ${same} on the theoretic side$` @ `^*▶. schema of teleology.+grounded on the theoretic side$` : re `explanatory depth` see `^*- noting.+reasons.+on the practical side have ${same}$` @ `^*▶. schema of teleology.+grounded on the practical side$` - this demands a simple formula to start with 1+ start with the Taylor-Wright formula : see `^*- a.+simplified.+Taylor-Wright formula` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.brec • rational principles replacing natural selection as an evolutionary guide going forward : see `^*sₚ. by a process of rational selection, fact .eₚ\+fₚ. causes X$` @ `^*▶. schema of teleology.+grounded on the practical side$` ▷ natural form ⁠N⁠ of the schema ▷ shallow schematization : e.g. `^*- a.+simplified.+schema of the Taylor-Wright formula` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.brec ▶ schema of theoretic telicity, variable-free - therein qualifying O as an ‘end’ : see `^^‘end’.in schemata, warranting my use of$`i : see also `^^schematic object$`i : see ~/work/ethic/._/14_default+stable_ground/1_purpose_from_a_theoretic_standpoint/11.brec N.B. there I proceed from the assumption (contrary to much of what follows) that there is but *one form* of telicity (thus one schema) prior to the Holocene, which yet makes *two impressions* according to one’s outlook, whether subjective or objective - ‘outlook’ then corresponds in what follows to ‘inflection’, to what is ‘bridged’, if these latter are still correct ▶+ schema of theoretic teleology, variable-free : see `^^theoretic teleology$`i @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.notes.brec : cf. `^^practical teleology$`i @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/26.notes.brec - including in the schema how theoretic teleology does its explanatory work: by giving a theoretic reason, a reason for belief [that an order facts obtains] - the explanation in the natural schema of teleology, of telic explanations, of the reason an end is a reason, is just that: there are further reasons behind it : see @ `^*▶. schema of teleology.+inadvertently ungrounded$`i how schematize?+ | no schema, rather the surfacing of my concern with reasons giving - telicity by this schema (⁠\rm T⁠) validates teleology - it shows how telicity is possible and that telicity equates to teleology: - that the telicity of ⁠X⁠ involves a reason for [the existence of] ⁠X⁠; - that ⁠X⁠, in other words, is explained by its own telicity, which is the very definition of teleology : see `^*Pearsall.+2003.+Oxford dictionary of English`s @ ../03_origin_hypothesis/sources_boneyard.brec : ‘the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes’ : re `explained by its own telicity` see `^*\| that <⁠X⁠ has ⁠O⁠ for an end> is a reason for ⁠X⁠$` - but it is the giving of reason that I will be focusing on how then does reasons giving figure into the premise I am building?+ : join @ `^*▷ rational form ⁠R⁠ of the schema, discovering it$` | ⁠O⁠ is a reason for ⁠X⁠ / I suspect it involves a like statement ? how can ⁠O⁠ suffice as reason (or explanation) for ⁠X⁠ when alone ⁠O⁠ is not the cause of ⁠X⁠ - this is interesting, because it bears on how teleology (which takes ⁠O⁠ alone as the explanation) is involved, which is precisely my question | that <⁠X⁠ has ⁠O⁠ for an end> is a reason for ⁠X⁠ ∵ rather it is *as an end* served by ⁠X⁠ that teleology takes ⁠O⁠ as being explanatory, as being a reason ▶+ schema of teleology, theoretic-practical bridge : N.B. `^^aim$`i @ `^^practical inflection`i - introducing variables - this extends the scope of phenomena/objects to willful action, behaviour and artifacts - including in the schema how practical teleology does its explanatory work: by giving a practical reason, a reason for action - noting that, across the bridge on the practical side, the schema reflects as instrumentalism ▷ deep schematization : cf. `^*/ an extension of TW to cover an invariant among the formulae$` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.brec ▶+ schema of teleology, theoretic-practical bridge, grounded on the theoretic side - including (fₜ) the extension of a genotypic line under (sₜ) natural selection eₜ) X causes O / near effect clause; unchanged from before : re `before` see `^*/ an extension of TW` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.brec fₜ) O causes the extension of a genotypic line / far effect clause; a new clause, much as planned earlier : re `as planned earlier` see `^*/ an extension of TW` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.brec sₜ) by the mechanism of natural selection, fact (eₜ+fₜ) causes X / selection clause; changed from before : re `before` see `^*/ an extension of TW` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.brec - noting the explanatory depth on the theoretic side : see ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.notes.brec - noting that the schema on the practical side reflects as Hume’s ‘passions’ being normative for reason / reflects, that as, as phenomenology perhaps - here one takes the passions to be those strings of ours that natural selection pulls in order to engage instrumental reason and make our big brain pay for its keep ∴ the true schema (now revealed in full) does *not* reflect as instrumentalism : re `reflect as (instrumentalism)` see `the schema reflects as ${1}` @ `^*▷ shallow schematization$` ▷ rational form ⁠R⁠ of the schema, discovering it ▶+ schema of teleology, theoretic-practical bridge, inadvertently ungrounded - replacing with a linear blank ──────── the genotypic and naturally selective parts of clauses (f,s) ∵ natural selection is, for us, largely defunct - we change our environment so quickly that the mechanism has (for the most part) lost its selective grip / it is done pulling our strings for us / it steers too slowly, too wide in its turning radius, to navigate the numerous existential pitfalls we place in our [evolutionary] path - just as natural selection has come unhooked, unable to keep up with our rapidly changing environment, likewise our hunter-gatherer passions have become defunct, unsuited to that new environment - moreover, the topic of ethics goes beyond the scope the genotypic heritage that is particular to us - we cannot assume we will carry our present genotypic form indefinitely - indeed we ought to accept as plausible its eventual loss, perhaps by degrees - the practical side of this Holocenic bridge reflects the status quo in the blanks we draw on the fundamentals of practical reason, e.g. in the controversy over its scope as concerns ends ? what ultimately do we make of these blanks, and consequently of the scope of reason? ? do we read the blanks as ‘nothing goes here’, such that instrumentalism holds and ends lie beyond the scrutiny of reason? / the bridge shows that consequence: voiding the blanks, it collapses to a shallow form wherein the practical side reflects as instrumentalism : re `reflects as instrumentalism` see `${same}` @ `^*▷ shallow schematization$` - we are back to that mystery of instrumentalism, but with one difference: it now appears rests on a broken schema, a defunct concept of telicity ? or do we fill in the blanks, e.g. after the example of the natural schema ⁠N⁠ \ - such that ends once again are deeply grounded - with some further/other mechanism of telicity to augment/replace the naturally selective, sufficient to guide our adaptive path forward - I take the latter course to be the least arbitrary - we made those blanks ourselves, by our own unthinking actions ∴ we cannot take them as normative for us and accept them on that basis - we would need an *independent* reason for that - to establish an acceptable default in the present case requires a conservative approach - the normal state of the bridge is the natural state that predates our changes - the blanks should be filled such as to restore the essentials of its operation - the explanation in the natural schema of teleology, of telic explanations, of the reason an end is a reason, is just that: there are further reasons behind it - as these can no longer be theoretic reasons owing to our practical abilities having broken the bridge on that side, they must now be practical reasons how then does reasons giving figure into the premise I am building?+ : q.v. @ `^*▶. schema of theoretic teleology, variable-free$` : where the question first arises | something apropos of the motivational difference between theoretic and practical reason - the schema reveals a theoretic reason for [the existence of] ⁠X⁠, but a theoretic reason alone does not make a practical reason, because mere knowledge of it does not suffice to impress|guide one’s will ?+ what to make of this? | purpose, meaning - suppose one had a reason for action - thereby one would have a purpose in life / for a reason for action implies this ?+ how then (in the fewest words) usher in the topic of reasons for action, thence its relation to purpose, thus to access what follows? | ethics’ kinship to the popular search for meaning, purpose - of all the contemporary fields of inquiry, ethics lies closest to the popular search for an ultimate, all-embracing purpose or meaning, the purpose or meaning of life, as they say - else I am hard put to explain how I came to ethics, because (being an amateur, I can freely confess) this is the search I have been engaged in - is it not true though, this likeness|kinship of ethics to that popular search? - as ethics concerns norms of the highest priority, it is hard to imagine how they could be known to exist without thereby infusing life with meaning (in the popular sense); or, by the same token, how knowledge of such meaning would not ground, inform and support the institution of a normative ethic - then too, as ethics concerns reasons for action, likewise it is hard to imagine how they could be known to exist without thereby infusing life with purpose (again, in the popular sense) - moreover we have any number of historic examples of just that: meaning and purpose issuing broadly from commands, promises and threats of divine origin ∵ those commands made norms of highest priority, those promises and threats reasons for action A+ good, it seems I can write such an introduction - but step back, and for a moment embrace the appelation of purpose, for the very unacceptablity of it (at least in a scientistic age) holds a clue to the path forward - for it has been a spur to the discovery of the path in the past ? where then might we find that purpose, that reason for action? where then does the path lie? - in and through our reflections on the schema of telicity/teleology, much as planned for the present version - having found the schema to be (for us) broken, one naturally thinks of its repair - therein we discover a candidate purpose in the form of a reason for the existence of (an action as it might be) ⁠X⁠ B+ good, this much I have - having found a candidate purpose/reason, the question becomes: is it valid? is practical reason indeed autotelic? crucial, for the question’s provenance|warrant was unclear to me / till herein I cleared it up - entitled to say we have a plausible candidate for a (supreme) norm - we should lend it some credence on that account ! that just above is empty words ? how then state succinctly the premise by which I proceed hence - a form (of telicity) is given or suggested or hypothesized ? by what premise? i) a principle of conservation - taking the prior form as normative, and so hewing the new as near as possible to it ii) a principle of parsimony - taking the simplest form compatible with (i); viz. the simplest conservative form - hence consideration moves to its fulfillment, to function or whatnot - with that, we gain access to an interesting question ? does then this candidate (credence lent) fulfill the schematic conditions by moving us on the theoretic side? : see notepad:2024-7-3a,b : to proceed on this path with confidence : see `^*- ad empirical:$` : further confidence - the question is interesting: first ∵ it is empirical and inviting on that score; and second, ∵ if the answer is affirmative, then: - ad empirical: - looking forward, mathematics assures us of a positive empirical measure eventually, should we (or any other) still exist to take it ∵ outward conformance to the norm (to its form, that is) by chance alone is less likely the farther we go / on the plausible assumption of barriers to chance, like the one at present, e.g. at cosmic boundaries - eventually it would stand as evidence i) no skeptic can doubt it on naturalistic/theoretic criteria, for those criteria are given by the (abstract) schema itself, by its conditions, which manifestly (given just above) are met - no essential criterion/condition was removed in the change from a theoretic to a practical ground, no essential part of the schema lost : N.B. `^*i. a principle of conservation$` : N.B. `^*ii. a principle of parsimony$` ii) no skeptic can doubt it on practical criteria, for manifestly (given just above) it delivers a reason for action, again as confirmed by its conformation to the (abstract) schema : N.B. `^*i. a principle of conservation$` : N.B. `^*ii. a principle of parsimony$` iii) there follows a normative ethic - that of a moral law based (one might say) on a truth of telicity / as opposed to a truth of reason (Kant), or divine command (Old Testament) iv) there follows an existential mechanism or guide, a practical-rational equivalent to natural selection : re `equivalent` cf. `^*i. a principle of conservation$` v) there follows the meaning of life (in the popular sense) : see `norms of the highest.+infusing life with meaning`s @ `^*- is it not true though.+\?`s @ `^*. ethics’ kinship to the popular search for meaning` vi) there follows the purpose of life (in the popular sense) : see `^*/ for a reason for action implies this` @ `^*- thereby one would have a purpose in life` : see `^*- is it not true though.+\?`s @ `^*. ethics’ kinship to the popular search for.+purpose` ? how then would we know it? what would be its mark? | empirically, fulfilling the schematic conditions : see notepad:2024-7-3a,b : see `^*\? does.+this candidate.+fulfill.+by moving us.+\?$`s @ `^*crucial, for the.+provenance\|warrant was unclear to me$` : see `first ∵ it is empirical` @ `^*crucial, for the.+provenance\|warrant was unclear to me$` : see `^*▶.+indeed \*would\* those reasons move us\?` : e.g. `math.+assures.+a positive.+measure eventually`s @ `^*- ad empirical:$` | this I can answer (at least partly) by what marks it as distinctly practical, the mark of a practical (as opposed to theoretic) purpose or reason : viz. `mere knowledge of it.+suffice to impress.+will` @ `^*. something apropos of the motivational` | this I can answer (more deeply, in a moral/historic sense) from an old version of the ethic, namely by its likeness to a command of God’s - the question then becomes: does this candidate purpose/reason have the capacity to move one in the expected ways? : cf. `such that, in fact, those reasons move us` @ `^*▶. schema of teleology.+grounded on the practical side` : cf. `^*▶.+indeed \*would\* those reasons move us\?` - if so, then we have found what we sought: a purpose in life, and thereby (in the finding) a normative ethic C+ good, this I have, too | our actual impressions of practical reason, past and present, match the impressions one would expect from the schema of telicity/teleology, were it true - these facts vouch for the truth of the schema - thereby they vouch for both its predictive efficacy and (re practical reason) its normative validity - it is directly on the latter that I build my premise : see `^*- the normal state of the bridge is the natural state` ▶+ schema of teleology, theoretic-practical bridge, grounded on the practical side - including (fₚ) the extension of a rational line under (sₚ) natural selection eₚ) X causes O fₚ) O causes the extension of an agential line sₚ) by a process of rational selection, fact (eₚ+fₚ) causes X - adding detail for (sₚ), here given for just the theoretic side: s₁) by the norms of practical reason, fact (fₚ) justifies O s₂) by (s₁) fact (eₚ) justifies X s₃) cognizance of (s₂) causes X - adding detail for (s₁) • the autotelic norm|principle of reason - noting that the reasons for action given on the practical side have explanatory depth : see ../12_teleo_object_subject/26.notes.brec - noting that the reasons for action given on the practical side [alone] make causation work on the theoretic side such that, in fact, those reasons move us ▶+ question: indeed *would* those reasons move us? : re `those reasons move us` see `${same}` @ `^*▶. schema of teleology.+grounded on the practical side$` - let this question prompt what follows as I unfold the ethic 2+ advance to Millikan’s influential formula (as normalized by Christie et al.) : see `^*. Christie, Brusse, Bourrat, Takacs and Griffiths, 2021$` @ research.notes.brec : pp. 7-9 3+ does their subsequent critique of the formula bear on my purpose? | no ∵ while discovery of the practical inflection follows that of the theoretic inflection, its validation does not - the two processes of validation are mutually independent - once discovered, the practical inflection is validated independently of its origin ‘end’ in schemata, warranting my use of / as opposed to ‘function’ or ‘purpose’ if( however I run into trouble here, doubting the validity of this ) + simply split the term across the bridge, binding it differently on the theoretic and practical sides ∵ ‘function’ in the formulae is covered by ‘end’ in the sense of the object for which a thing exists : re `‘end’ in the sense of (the object for which a thing exists)$`p see `^*II.15. .+${same};` @ `^^‘end’$`i ∵ ‘end’ in this sense also means the purpose of a thing ∵ the object for which a thing exists (its end) is also the reason for which it exists ∵ the reason for which a thing exists is its purpose : re `(the reason for which) a (thing exists)` see `${1}.+${2}$` @ `^^‘purpose’$`i ∵ ‘function’ here means an activity that is the purpose of a thing : re `(an activity that is) (the purpose of a) (thing)` see `${1}.+${2}.+${3}$` @ `^^‘function’$`i ∵ the alternative, non-telic sense of ‘function’ would make the formulae pointless ∵ the point of the formulae is to account for teleology by defining the conditions under which the use of the telic sense of ‘function’ is valid in science ∵ if ‘function’ in the formulae had the non-telic sense of an activity that is natural to a thing, then there would be nothing to account for : re `(an activity that is natural to)( a )(thing)`p see `${1}.+${2}.+${3}$`p @ `^^‘function’$`i ∵ the validity of referring to the natural activity of things is unquestioned in science ‘end’ II.14.a. (c1305–) An intended result of an action; an aim, purpose. (Cf. Latin finis.) to accomplish one's end(s), to answer one's end(s), to fulfil one's end(s), to gain one's end(s), †to make one's end(s), to serve one's end(s): see those verbs. / subjective II.15. (1534–) A final cause; the object for which a thing exists; the purpose for which it is designed or instituted. / objective in referring to a thing (artifact or other phenomenon), yet still telic : see https://www.oed.com/dictionary/end_n?tab=meaning_and_use#5591724 ‘function’ - an activity that is natural to or the purpose of a person or thing : see `^*Pearsall.+2003.+Oxford dictionary of English`s @ ../03_origin_hypothesis/sources_boneyard.brec ‘purpose’ - the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists : see `^*Pearsall.+2003.+Oxford dictionary of English`s @ ../03_origin_hypothesis/sources_boneyard.brec schematic grounding forms : see notepad:2024-3-7c : re symbolic conventions and further details natural (⁠\boldsymbol N⁠) - grounded in theory • based on a genotypic/natural telic mechanism : re `telic mechanism` see rational (⁠\boldsymbol R⁠) - grounded in practice - based on an agential/rational telic mechanism : re `telic mechanism` see synchronic presence - insofar as natural and rational forms are continuous in time, they relate synchronically : cf. `^^dominance, diachronic changes$`i - as such, they might simply be two parts, sides or aspects of the same schema   ⁠N⁠   ⁠N_t⁠ ⁠N_p⁠   ┯ ╷   ╰───────▶╶───╯   ⁠t⁠ ⁠p⁠   ╭──╴◀────────╮   ╵ ┷   ⁠R_t⁠ ⁠R_p⁠   ⁠R⁠ - as the *longitudinal* sides represent theoretic (t) and practical (p) standpoints, let the *lateral* sides show theoretic-natural (top) and practical-rational (bottom) grounding / as opposed to pre-Holocene (top) and Holocene (bottom) - over time, the ‘traffic’ of reasons from the theoretic ground t → p (top) decreases, while that from the practical ground t ← p (bottom) increases, yet always both (top and bottom) are present dominance, diachronic changes - ⁠N⁠ tends to dominate before the Holocene, ⁠R⁠ during symbolic equations : join @ `^^variable bindings`i schematic inflections and aims aim, general - to explain telicity (by formulating the telic mechanism behind it) - to show how a phenomenon or thing X can be telic, how it can be directed to (serve) an end O theoretic inflection (⁠\boldsymbol t⁠) / the theoretic inflection of a schema - the schematic form particular to a theoretic standpoint re telicity aim - to validate teleology - to validate the explanation of phenomena or things by the purpose or ends they serve rather than by postulated causes : see `^*Pearsall.+2003.+Oxford dictionary of English`s @ ../03_origin_hypothesis/sources_boneyard.brec : teleology: ‘the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes’ - to explain (thus validate) telic explanations : N.B. `^*\? why.+formulate telicity.+to validate teleology.+\?$`s @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/24.notes.brec : re `formulate telicity` see `formulating the telic mechanism` @ `^^aim, general$`i practical inflection (⁠\boldsymbol p⁠) / the practical inflection of a schema - the schematic form particular to a practical standpoint re telicity aim - to reflect mindful telicity, purposiveness : see notepad:2024-3-7d - to show it works - to explain morality - to ground a normative ethic schematic object / what the schemata formulate, model or represent - telicity, end direction - telic things: things directed to, or otherwise in service of, an end : re `end` see `^^‘end’.in schemata, warranting my use of$`i telic mechanism / how telicity works - (telicity works by a mechanism of) selection, optimization and existence telic standpoints, standpoints in regard to telicity theoretic - the standpoint of theory - the standpoint of a theorist - it is taken with an objective stance practical - the standpoint of practice - the standpoint of an agent or practitioner - it is taken with a subjective stance variable bindings, between theoretic (t) and practical (p) sides of a schema - defined in-line : see notepad:2024-3-7b ∵ they are few in number, only one or two symbolic equations : see notepad:2024-3-7c \ Copyright © 2024 Michael Allan.