00, notes resolve+ the envisioned premise : re `resolve` see `^*!! the problem.+is one of working in the dark$` : re `envisioned premise` see `^*\| consistency with theoretic telicity$` : re `envisioned premise` cf. `^*- choosing from.+below a premise$` : whereby I might find an alternative, if the envisioned premise fails of resolution ?+ which formulae of telicity or teleologic explanation does philosophy of science credit? : see @ `^*!! the problem.+is one of working in the dark$` : join ../13/research.notes.brec | formulae of the naturally selective mode : see `historical and to this day main contender.+of the ‘function debate’` @ `^^naturally selective$`i @ `^^aetiologic$`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec ?+ how might those theoretic formulae apply to practical telicity, especially as regards will? : see @ `^*!! the problem.+is one of working in the dark$` : see `^*b. how it applies to practical telicity$` | by structural conformance as a bridge between the fields of ethics and science, or the vantages of practice and theory : see `show the core structure of the former \*also\* to be core to the latter` @ `^*• Price and Jackson, 1997$` @ `^^naturalism$`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec : see notepad:2024-2-22c : see notepad:2024-2-23a / but here truly I veer into a different argument : re `a different argument` see `\| direct theoretic ground for telic reason` : N.B. notepad:2024-2-24a : The core structure of reason’s telicity on the theoretic side includes reason’s direction to an end of persistence. This alone saves my argument from falling into a plea for such a principle on the practical side. : re `core structure` see `show the ${same} of the former.+to be core to the latter` @ `^*• Price and Jackson, 1997$` @ `^^naturalism$`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec / it matters not that the persistence on the natural side is that of a genotype, ∵ that genotype is part of the substance to be abstracted away (using variables) in order to yield the core structure that is common to both fields/vantages : re `variables` see `^*- the field-dependent ${same}` @ `^*• Price and Jackson, 1997$` @ `^^naturalism$`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec - both base premises — (a) a principle of reason and (b) its moral interpretation — I argue for by the same conservative strategy: conformant fidelity to an independently verified core structure which serves as a flying buttress across (a) fields of knowledge or (b) periods of history : see also @ `^^definition of morals`i @ ../11/20.notes.brec | direct theoretic ground for telic reason : viz. notepad:2024-2-23a : Reason’s natural origin. : N.B. notepad:2024-2-24a : It involves reason’s direction to persistence. This alone saves my argument from falling into a plea for such a principle on the practical side. - it matters not that this end of persistence is, on the natural side, that of a genotype — not even if taken verbatim for a default principle on the practical side ∵ my strategy is to argue for a (conservative) minimum of changes to yield a set of principles of reason that are plausibly stable under reflection !! no formula of theoretic telicity supports such an end for the faculty of reason - rather all support ‘functions’ more in line with instrumentalism, with reason in thrall to Hume’s ‘passions’ | bridging as does: | the teleosemanticist : see `^^teleosemantic$`i @ `^^practical and theoretic teleology`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec | the neo-Aristotelian : see `^^neo-Aristotelian$`i @ `^^practical and theoretic teleology`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec | Schlosser : see `^*• Schlosser, 1998$` @ `^^practical and theoretic teleology`i @ ../13/research.notes.brec / bridging alone might guarantee positive answers to the questions below, given that existential effects figure in the bridge, being core to the structure on both sides ?+ what might their application imply in the way of constraints on the practical use of reason? : see @ `^*!! the problem.+is one of working in the dark$` : re `constraints on the practical use of reason` see `^*\| what ${same} could survive.+skepticism` @ 05.notes.brec ?+ are those constraints as I had envisioned? ?+ do they constrain (rational) will to ends whose willing brings into existence rational agents themselves? : join @ `^*\?. what might those constraints imply in the way of an ethic\?$` ?+ what might those constraints imply in the way of an ethic? : see @ `^*!! the problem.+is one of working in the dark$` ?+ do those constraints imply the premise of an ethic? ?+ do those constraints imply the envisioned premise? : re `the envisioned premise` see `^*resolve.+${same}$` ?+ are they constraints that reason (as a practical end) would conform to? ?+ do they constrain (rational) will to ends whose willing brings into existence rational agents themselves? : re `rational` see `^*- we would add.+they are.+invalid.+as.+${same} ends` @ `^*b. how it applies to practical telicity$` : re `ends whose willing brings into existence rational agents themselves`p see `^*.s. fact .e. causes XE-types$` @ 24.brec ?+ are they constraints that practical reason (as autotelic) could reflect and re-prescribe to will? ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ secure+ a workable draft - choosing from the options below a premise - whether singly or in combination - drafting directly from the crux of its argument - salvaging from past draft attempts : privately re `past draft attempts` see ~/work/ethic/._/ - without further notes : privately N.B. `else you will drown in notes` @ ~/work/ethic/._/11/20.notes.brec | consistency | consistency with theoretic telicity start+ drafting the bare structure of the argument for this premise ────────────── : see 24.brec : see 24.notes.brec a. the schema of the formulae of telicity by which teleologic explanations are validated for theoretic purposes : see ../13/research.notes.brec + speak to what is essential (what explains and thus validates telicity) in the formulae by surfacing in the schema a more general invariant than [prescriptive] autoreplicator [replication]: | self-maintainer maintenance, the maintenance of what maintains itself and is thereby self-explanatory, thereby [a] reason [in and] for itself • self-maintainer - a thing (which may be a line of things) that maintains itself 1+ test draft such a schema : see notepad:2024-2-13f ! it is liable to short circuit, making all X self-maintaining by definition : see notepad:2024-2-13b | witness the problem in the schema, it might not be real : see 24.brec !! the problem I sense is one of working in the dark ?+ which formulae of telicity or teleologic explanation does philosophy of science credit? : join ?+ how might those theoretic formulae apply to practical telicity, especially as regards will? : join ?+ what might their application imply in the way of constraints on the practical use of reason? : join ?+ what might those constraints imply in the way of an ethic? : join |+ try to break the circle by having the ‘causes’ of existential clause operate by regeneration|reproduction|reinforcement of X / what presumeably X cannot do itself |+ try to break the circle by resurrecting the qualification of ‘prescriptive’ on the self-maintainer : see notepad:2024-2-13b,c,e ?+ yet is the arbitrariness of ‘prescriptive’ tolerable? 2+ test draft recursive versions, likely more elegant and powerful, yet potentially problematic in itself : see notepad:2024-2-13f : re `recursive versions` see `^*\| the maintenance of what is autotelic` : the alternative below, that is : re `potentially problematic` see `^*!! a schema of the formulae begins to look infeasible$` @ `^*\| the maintenance of what is autotelic` | the maintenance of what is autotelic, whereby it is self-maintaining and thereby self-explanatory, thereby [a] reason [in and] for itself / viz. self-maintaining by definition, by the formula, where it has self-maintenance as an end / cf. heterotelic !! a schema of the formulae begins to look infeasible - what confuses me just now (further below) is the type/class interpretation of X within the clauses : cf. notepad:2024-2-13a,b : it seems however that clause (f) (now ‘s’) alone needs type generalizion, as opposed to all X references | because (once again) I am trying to philosophize based on notes as opposed to a draft 1+ clarify the type/class interpretation in the schema - try using notation to differentiate between a single instance one one hand, and multiple instances or their class on the other 2+ use the clarified schema to test solutions to my other problems (further below) | ?+ might I do without a formula schema, yet still answer the leading question and gain my premise? ?+ how clarify that autotelic implies an end of self-maintenance? / having as an end an object that already exists can only mean the *maintainenance* of that object | try putting this in the causative clause (e) of the formula - that would be the clearest ?+ would it make the extended formula circular? | no, only recursive + prove it ────────────── : see 26.notes.brec b. how it applies to practical telicity : see notepad:2024-2-6e,f : see notepad:2024-2-7a : see notepad:2024-2-8a,c,d,e | premising an ethic on theoretic constraints innoculates it against theoretic skepticism : see `^*. tell my strategy` @ `^*usher in.+the ethic’s premise$` @ 05.notes.brec : it is the very strategy behind my premise / after all, what other kind of skepticism is there? - up-front justification of the premise from a practical vantage would be difficult (witness the alternatives below) and might itself attract theoretic skepticism - rather let the practical vantage justify the strategy, then put the strategy directly to work | any formula that constrains telicity in theory constrains it also in practice - all telicity in practice rests on intent, the willing of objects : e.g. `^*- no non-subject.+can pass.+except in virtue of some subject`s - to will an object is to commit to being an active cause in its realization, and thereby to making it an effect of one’s actions : cf. `^*Kant.+1785.+Groundwork` @ ../10/sources.brec : ‘for in the willing of an object, as my effect, my causality is already thought, as an acting cause’ 4:417 - one commits oneself to action in an objective|theoretic|phenomenal world of cause and effect wherein one is governed by the constraints of that world, as one phenomenon among others - as a phenomenon with intent, the formula that constrains telicity in theory constrains one’s intent !! one commits to action in that objective world, not to intent - theoretic constraints on action certainly apply; theoretic constraints on intent, that’s not so clear - while this action (or ‘acting cause’ as Kant puts it) is directed to a future effect and thus telic, the provenance of that direction is unclear, torn between subjective and objective worlds | practical telicity makes ends doubly telic : see notepad:2024-2-13d - first as what a person-as-subject by will commits his person-as-object to - second as what that person-as-object would accordingly do in theory !! one commits to action in that objective world, not to intent : join - only the latter is governed by the formulae which, being proper to theory, concern telicity in regard to phenomena (objects of perception) alone : re `phenomena` see @ non-fractal https://www.oed.com/dictionary/teleology_n - those ends which are false in theory remain true in practice - it remains correct to speak of them as ends in practice - we would add only that they are *invalid* as *rational ends* in practice ∵ the practical interpretation of the formulae rests on reason/justification for action, as opposed to reason/justification for believe - no non-subject X (e.g. artifact, behaviour) can pass the existential/selection clause (s) in regard to end E except in virtue of some subject selecting X as a means to E and therefore himself *having* end E ? what then happens if the subject selects X merely *believing* E to be his end *when in truth it fails the test*? - E remains *in practice* a true end, but invalid : see `^*- those.+which are false in theory remain true in practice$` - this dependency/supervenience on the subject/person case of X, which is the problematic one in the unextended formula, thereby makes *all* (practical) cases problematic c. the hidden invariant - leveraging the dichotomy between theoretic and practical reason - Wright tells of teleogy’s explanatory role, its giving of a reason : see https://www.jstor.org/stable/186722 : Wright, 1972. Explanation and teleology. - this focus on reasons-giving would support my claim that prescriptive autoreplication is *always* necessary for practical telicity, too, not merely for its being *well formed* ∵ reason fails unless one’s practical end is grounded by an end justified in itself, viz. the prescriptive autoreplicator of autotelic reason d. how it applies to practical telicity - here merging with my previous plan, to get the best of both : privately see `^*- what is true of natural.+true also of artificial telicity$` @ ._/26.notes_boneyard.brec e. the controversy over whether practical reason covers the justification of ends - instrumentalism claims that practical reason imposes no constraint on ends outside that of overall coherence - this by default, pending some special argument to the contrary : see https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/ethik/mitarbeiter/schmidt/schmidt-instrumentalism-about-practical-reason-2016.pdf : Schmidt, 2016. Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default. (untrackable journal) - yet this claim now requires a special argument in support of *it*, to explain how it is that certain objects can be taken as ends for *practical* purposes when they would be rejected for *theoretic* purposes : cf. `^*\| what constraints.+could survive.+theoretic skepticism.+\?`s @ 05.notes.brec research+ the present premise : see ../13/research.notes.brec review+ and vet all cited sources | consistency between theoretic and practical uses of reason in vetting (first) principles by the prior example of nature’s ‘logic’ : see notepad:2024-1-16d : re `nature’s ‘logic’` N.B. `a.+category error, logic being proper to thought alone$` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec | consistency in the practical principles, accepting not only the instrumental ‘logic’ of nature, but also (by default, pending good reason for rejection) the autotelic : see notepad:2024-1-16d : re `by default` see https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/ethik/mitarbeiter/schmidt/schmidt-instrumentalism-about-practical-reason-2016.pdf : Schmidt, 2016. Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default. (untrackable journal) ───── : cf. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#FormThouStruRealL4MeetO3 : 2023, Hofweber. *Logic and ontology § 4.6 The form of thought and the structure of reality* ───── : see also notepad:2024-1-16d : consistency *thereby* also with the claim of Kant: reason must see itself as being self-determined : re `self-determined` see notepad:2024-1-16e : how that actually is possible : privately see also `necessary to the faculty.+and thereby proper to the norms`s @ `^^warrant for autotelic reason$`i @ ~/work/ethic/._/11/20.notes.brec : consistency *thereby* also with this plausible principle | what is necessary to the faculty of reason is thereby proper to the norms of reason : privately see `necessary to the faculty.+and thereby proper to the norms`s @ `^^warrant for autotelic reason$`i @ ~/work/ethic/._/11/20.notes.brec : (for no closer did I come to a premise of necessity as opposed to pleading + coherence) | varying conceptions|theories of [practical] reason are in play | as a complementary alternative to reason’s self-determination by reflective equilibrium, e.g. from a default of instrumental reason: reason’s self-determination by definition : see notepad:2024-1-16d : two warrants for reason being self-determined: i) Kant’s claim it must see itself so, rhetorically connected to ii) consistency between its theoretic and practical uses, or the prior example in nature of practical logic : re `self-determined` see notepad:2024-1-16e : how self-determination is possible : re `prior example in nature of.+logic` N.B. `a.+category error` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec : re `default of instrumental reason` see also https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/ethik/mitarbeiter/schmidt/schmidt-instrumentalism-about-practical-reason-2016.pdf : Schmidt, 2016. Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default. (untrackable journal) | there is one thing in all of nature that manifests autotelic ‘logic’, and one thing that might : re `one thing in.+nature that manifests.+‘logic’` N.B. `a.+category error` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec | I tell what follows when the faculty of reason, borne haphazardly by the autotelic ‘logic’ of self-replicators under natural selection, so determined by nature and chance, reconceives itself as self-determined, self-borne by that same autotelic ‘logic’ : re `self-determined` see notepad:2024-1-16e : how self-determination is possible \ Copyright © 2023-2024 Michael Allan.