- conceptual analysis of free will yields an objective basis for a normative ethic ! the premise of free will (in this argument) needs a plausible objective warrant in order to justify the claim of objectivity : see e.g. notepad:2024-12-8c : (third paragraph) the necessary condition for a moral norm of universal applicability might not (in itself) suffice to warrant a premise of free (self-determined) will in arguing for that norm : re `the necessary condition.+of universal applicability`sp see notepad:2024-12-8a / else it is mere conjecture / only will or willing (and perhaps agency or action) are given by the (contextual) premise of moral normativity and thus common to all who are morally bindable, not free will | will just *is* self-determined [knowing] intentionality, intentionality that either determines itself or is determined by the subject whose intentionality it is : e.g. `^*- to will is to intend where the intention is knowing and self-determined$` @ 11_will_2.brec - the common understanding of will implies|contains the premise of its freedom - then from the theoretic law (entailments) of will (so defined) comes its practical law : N.B. `^*\| do not premise that .in fact. any will has always existed$` @ 11_will_2.brec ? what of the phenomenological/ontological hairiness of a (self-determined) will that outlives/transcends any individual? Q. Compile please a list, complete with dated citations, of philosophers who most recently have argued that self-determination or determinative freedom would entail some form of intersubjectivity, collective intentionality or a higher level of individuality. Order the list from latest to earliest. : privately see `^^AI$`i @ ~/_/zz.brec \ : see https://www.perplexity.ai/ : Compile please a list of philosophers who \ most recently have argued that self-determination or determinative freedom \ would entail some form of intersubjectivety, collective intentionality or \ a higher level of individuality. Order the list from latest to earliest. \ Include in the list only arguments that are premised \ on self-determination or determinative freedom. \\ a poor answer, even with the latter qualifier | collective|group will is [knowing] collective|group intentionality that is self-determined (determinatively free) at the collective|group level, viz. where the self is the collective|group : see `that plurality of wills.+is self-determined.+at the group level`s / no human nor collective|group of humans could have a will of their own, but at most a share in a larger collective|group will | action/agency (instead of will/willing) is the immortal effect/power - a power of action sits more easily at a higher level of individuality or unity, where one of willing would be harder to place - then it is agency (the power of action) that must be self-determined / no longer can I speak of will, because the potentially immortal agent is a group/plural agent comprising multiple (mortal) agents/wills / self-integrity (à la Korsgaard) might figure here as a crucial condition of (or constraint on) self-determination !! self-determination (on which my thesis rests) seems less necessary to agency, than to will - whereas self-integrity seems more so! | still group agency entails a plurality of collective wills / viz. the powers of collective intentionality of the individuals who comprise the group agent - thus it may suffice for group agency if that plurality of wills is self-determined *at the group level*, viz. where the self is the group [agent] ?+ if this holds, does it not solve the hairiness problem without having to rebase the argument on agency instead of will? - yes : see `group will is.+self-determined.+at the.+group level`s | premise that no moral law is (objectively) given to one|us : cf. `^*\| postulate that no moral fundament is knowable by analytic inferences$` - the necessity of autonomy follows, (if there is to be a moral law) + read up on autonomy : see @ ~/work/ethic/research.notes.brec - closely related and (I think) inferrable|implied is: / not only the necessity of synthetic reasoning, as per Kant (and possibly an outdated term of art), but: - the necessity of self-determination | postulate that no moral fundament is knowable by analytic inferences / plausible, the stubborn persistence of moral controversy standing as a witness - all premises (outside of moral-contextually given will etc.) being suspect, there is no uncontroversial analytic path to a moral normative conclusion / some support for this (enough maybe to serve as an introductory frame) comes from our vague (dialectic) definition of will (etc.) which admits of no conclusive analysis without a preceding synthetic step in order to sharpen it (with conditions), a step that inevitably invites controversy owing to the uncertaintly of its justification | - any sound argument for such a conclusion must be synthetic / as it seems Kant (no doubt with others of his day) held - but the only kind of synthetic argument with a claim to objectivity, and thus avoidance of controversy, is the a priori kind - thus altogether a synthetic a priori argument / again like Kant’s - thus self-determination ?+ how does self-determination follow? + read up on a priori reasoning and knowledge : see @ ~/work/ethic/research.notes.brec | inferring from an a priori standpoint (on will and/or agency) the conditions of that very standpoint | employ again the Taylor-Wright formula of telicity/teleology - the constitutive aim (determination, determinate object) ⁠O⁠ to which will is morally bound must (from a theoretic standpoint) meet the conditions of the formula - will must cause ⁠O⁠, and the fact that will causes ⁠O⁠ must in turn cause will ?+ but what follows from this? / e.g. what sort of mechanism for the latter causation? | employ again the argument of the default ethic, based on a default practical ground | argue that the best means of conforming to the default ethic’s most demanding duty of extinction avoidance is to motivate ourselves to that end by arguing for (and trying out) aeviternal ethics / this well meshes with a plural society, with a plurality of ethics under trial, being a means to the binding end of ethical knowledge and the duty to seek it \ | further postulate that a stable ground or other moral fundament is unknowable period, \ making the default effectively stable \ ?+ unknowable being too strong a postulate (contradicting the default ethic), \ how suitably weaken it? \\ !! this is untenable \ - this would also stabilize a plural society with a plurality of ethics under trial \ as a means to the binding end (knowledge of a ground or other moral fundament) | fall back to the default ethic alone, binding us morally not quite to aeviternity, but merely a conditional persistence - conceptual analysis of free will yields its constitutive law - the constitutive law of free will, considered from a practical standpoint of reflection, determines the regulative law of free will and thereby the morals that govern its agents : privately see `^^constitutive versus regulative norms$`i @ 14_default+stable_ground/research.notes.brec