80, notes — precepts

    ? how anchor the rights as strongly as the duties
            ∵ the *principle of right by duty* cannot do this
                : privately re `(.(principle) of right by duty.)` see
                  `^*${2}: what law enjoins by duty it entitles by right.+\\ ${1}` @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec
                : privately re `cannot do this` see `^*- it is a weak principle` @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec
        | reason’s being justified in itself directly constrains the will not only positively as an end,
          but also negatively as a limiting constraint
            : see notepad:2023-12-23c
            - to infer the negative duties (rights) as surely as the positive requires a strong principle
                - if symmetry will not suffice for that principle (I doubt it can), then rest on
                  the fact that reason exists both individually in each mind and at large among all
                    - for the former, only duties perfect and negative make sense;
                      for the latter, only duties imperfect and positive
            - no need to claim that *only* reason as an end is justified in itself
                - rather I refer to the (abstract) set of *all* ends that are justified in themselves
                    : e.g. notepad:2023-12-23c
                - thus I need claim only that reason is a member of that set



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