20, notes + start drafting now or archive these notes to restart from scratch, else you will drown in notes + port all these file-specific (messy) notes to namesake candidate files, each attempting a (clean) workable redaction start here?+ : see @ `^^reason, as a potential authority$`i : see @ `^^warrant for autotelic reason$`i : see @ `^^resolution$`i @ `^^pure reason$`i / for the promise of warranting reason’s autotelism, as opposed to pleading for it entry | morality’s being contentious nowadays - ‘nowadays’ is important, for it seems to me there were times when it was not : privately see @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/30.brec + read to glean ideas for framing this : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/ : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-conventional/ : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological/ : see http://reluk.ca/var/post/secret/1989,%20Taylor.%20Sources%20of%20the%20self.pdf : see http://reluk.ca/var/post/secret/2007,%20Taylor.%20A%20secular%20age.pdf : ‘The shift to secularity… consists, among other things, of a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.’ p. 3 definition of morals, as distinct from other norms - by norms I mean standards of right and wrong behaviour \ not to say ‘principles’, which I reserve for fundamental truths or propositions morals: agent-neutral norms of [right] action whose enforcement is approved by an authority [that is] | [at once] a) unimpeachable, b) immortal and c) a creator [and sustainer] whose creatures we are | [both] a) unimpeachable and b) a creator and sustainer whose creatures we are : re `agent-neutral` see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-agent/ : ad `agent-neutral` note : to ensure that rights enforcement is logically incontestable, even against a claim (in a plural society) of a special status; for special status could only be conferred by an agent-relative norm, which being amoral (by definition) would be void against moral norms : privately re `logically incontestable` see `enforcement rests on one’s own.+unimpeachable.+authority` @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/30.brec : privately re `logically incontestable` see `^*• the autotelic principle is enforceable by means that are ${same}` @ ~/work/ethic/._/05/60.brec - such approval (of enforcement) makes the norms obligatory, as expected for morals / not to say their being obligatory is a prior condition of their being moral, as then I must explain whence arises the obligation, e.g. for the autotelic principle of reason ? better one premise, one ground, for the whole ethic - rather than two: one for a principle of reason, another for its moral interpretation : re `one for a principle of reason` see `^*resolve.+the envisioned premise$` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/00.notes.brec : re `one for a principle of reason` see `^*\| consistency with theoretic telicity$` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/00.notes.brec : re `another for its moral interpretation` see `^^definition of morals`i : which lately (revision 13) I have been thinking to invoke only after the future outlook implied/demanded the principle meets a boundary crisis that faith in the principle itself resolves in a manner sublime and moving : re `future outlook` see ../05/70.brec : re `boundary crisis` see `^*- ${same}$` @ ../07/50.brec : re `resolves in a manner sublime and moving` see ../05/80.brec : re `resolves in a manner sublime and moving` see ../05/80_motivation.notes.brec - lately the plan is to warrant the *whole ethic* by pointing to several problems, one being that of grounding an ethic such that it could ‘survive the theoretic skepticism of a scientific age’ : see notepad:2024-2-12b(1) consider+ this points to a simpler overall argument : join @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/05.notes.brec 1. directly ground in a practical interpretation of theoretic constraints on telicity not a principle of reason, but those of behaviour (morals) 2. find in practical reason the proper seat for such principles 3. resolve them (in the simplest case) to a single autotelic principle of reason - the two other problems, namely of motivation and fit with society, are not the fundamental problems to solve, nor questions to answer : re `two other.+namely of motivation and.+society` see notepad:2024-2-12b(1) - thus I do not take them as warranting the ethic and moving me to write it - already I was moved, already I saw the demands on society as feasible, with the sole provision of first finding a justifying theory !! I would lose the clean symmetry and unity of the relation between theory and practice as regards constraints, one that is fundamentally rational in being a relation between the theoretic and practical uses of reason - and regardless of what I take to warrant the ethic itself, a two-stage argument — via a) reason to b) morality — is easier and safer than one giant leap into the M world of morality : re `M world` see https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106960 : ‘the four Ms … Morality, Modality, Meaning and the Mental.’ Price and Jackson, 1997. Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds. p. 247 - both base premises — (a) a principle of reason and (b) its moral interpretation — I argue for by the same conservative strategy: conformant fidelity to an independently verified core structure which serves as a flying buttress across (a) fields of knowledge or (b) periods of history : see also @ `^^\?\+ how might those theoretic formulae apply to practical telicity.+\?` @ ../12_teleo_object_subject/00.notes.brec nature, as a potential authority - we can still think of nature as a creator and sustainer - yet knowing of natural selection, no longer can we think of it as normative in itself - nature enforces directly, not indirectly through approvals dismissing nature, as the authority / so allowing me to focus on reason alone - nature approves nothing ∵ nature directly yields no approvals (or other norms) - nature might yield an authority, which authority then yields an approval (or other norm) - nature and that authority would not be identical, however, though they were related + clarify; I must at least explain that approvals (or other norms) are inherently|essentially direct - nature is simply given - to follow it as a norm, therefore, would be an absurd pantomime definition of ‘moral law’ - from *Oxford english dictionary* - introducing reason as a potential|candidate authority reason, as a potential authority : re `authority` see `approved by an ${same}` @ `^^definition of morals`i - unlike nature, reason is not given - rather it is at once elusive and {impossible to dismiss|indismissable} - impossible to dismiss because its normative verdicts are incontestable, yet elusive because the precise norms behind it are difficult to pin down - the remainder of the ethic’s argument is to be structured as a [hypothetic] investigation - namely: - could reason be the moral authority? / other candidates having failed of the conditions - what would follow if it were? ∵ this better holds the reader ∵ it makes my inferences more confident ∵ it neatly dispells any implicit assumption of an argument based on necessity / though I do seem to achieve such an argument : see `necessary to the faculty.+and thereby proper to the norms`s @ `^^warrant for autotelic reason$`i ?+ how square that achievement with this hypothetical approach? | it seems I use ∵ the conclusions need only be plausible and overall coherent ∵ the premise is explicitly hypothetic start here?+ : join @ `^*\+ start drafting now` ? hence how to the next step? : re `next step` see `^^warrant for autotelic reason$`i how introduce the concept of autotelic logic and its occurence in nature?!! : re `logic.+in nature` N.B. `a.+category error, logic being proper to thought alone$` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec - the next step requires these, in light of which I must reconsider the various alternative answers further below : re `answers further below` see `^*\? hence how to the next step\?$` + consider this may depend on the precise definition of morals that I choose : re `definition of morals` see | : see notepad:2024-1-11a : see also `^*\| practical logic is essentially autotelic$` : see also `^^resolution$`i @ `^*\| base logic$` @ `^^pure reason$`i : see also `^^scoping the logic of reason$`i | - a critique of reason as immortal|sustainer brings me near the possibility of its autotelism : see notepad:2024-1-8a,b | end approver : see `enforcement is approved` @ `^^definition of morals`i - the premise of an approved end (for what follows) might require a temporary, probing assumption that reason approves our sustenance, as opposed to simply guaranteeing it - it will follow that the end must be justified absolutely, so justified in itself : privately see @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/40.brec - it is a mystery what end could be justified in itself - stuck, I turn my attention from the condition of an approver to that of a creator and sustainer creator and sustainer : see `${same}` @ `^^definition of morals`i | somehow this gets me to question the source of reason’s normative authority : see `^*whence reason’s normative authority\?$` | because reason is itself a created, sustained thing whence reason’s normative authority? : cf. `^*b. also wanting.+explanation for the.+normativity.+of reason$`p @ `^^resolution$`i @ `^^pure reason$`i - a puzzle how normless nature could make normful reason | reason alone is the source of all normativity - so reason’s normativity comes from itself - here is warrant for self-reference, a short step from autotelism - why be rational? | in asking for a reason to be rational, or justification to be justified, the question is incoherent, or self undermining - it is like asking, why ask a question? | ∵ reason is justified in itself | practical normativity is born of a self-referential practical logic, one that takes itself as an end, and/or as a means to itself - so literally an autotelic logic, as opposed to the logic of autotelism that I refer to elsewhere as (the misnomer) ‘autotelic logic’ / it may have a theoretic counterpart: a self-referential theoretic logic that alone yields theoretic normativity ?+ how could this question help the argument, as opposed to tying it up in a morass of speculation? | : see `^*- here is warrant.+, a short step from autotelism$` | it gives me warrant to turn my attention to the remaining question - how normless nature could make normful reason is another mystery that I must defer investigating : re `mystery` see `a ${same} what end could be justified in itself$` @ `^^end approver$`i - stuck, I turn my attention from the condition of an approver to that of a creator and sustainer : cf. @ `^^end approver$`i + so put this up with the former : re `the former` see `^^end approver$`i + later conjecture the answer | what I want to get to from here is not the question of reason’s normative source, but rather how it could be a creator and sustainer in its own right : contra `^*whence reason’s normative authority\?$` ?+ a weaker rhetoric, in being presumptive of what I must prove? | not weaker | presumption is given : see `^*- the.+argument is to be structured as.+investigation` @ `^^reason, as a potential authority$`i : see notepad:2024-1-8a : already I have ‘presumed’ to question the other candidates re meeting the conditions of moral authority | for it is presumptive only temporarily, probingly warrant for autotelic reason | autotelic logic is necessary to the faculty of reason, and thereby proper to the norms of reason : see notepad:2024-1-6e,f : see notepad:2024-1-7c : advertising the defeasibility of this conclusion by exposing [to scrutiny] the conditions that would undermine it start here?+ : join @ `^*\+ start drafting now` - absurd then to suppose: • that reason would persist without autotelic logic, with no means of self-homeostasis or autoreplication deployed either by the faculty of reason itself or by the carrier on which it supervenes, whether that be a genome under natural selection or something else - it would not last a moment - reason cannot exist for a moment unless something, in effect, takes itself as end • that the autotelic logic necessary to the faculty of reason would be foreign to the norms of reason - that Reason would rely on alien hands to keep its house in order and [its] home fires burning - the logic of diachronic integrity is no less proper to rational thought than that of synchronic coherence • that reason should|would rest [content while it is] dependant on chance : see notepad:2024-1-7b - reason born of autotelic logic and sustained by it - note the correlation with my reflective|intuited definition of morals : re `definition of morals` see - what am I to make of this? | practical logic is essentially autotelic : see notepad:2024-1-6d | all practical logic (witnessed) is essentially autotelic ∵ all practical logic (witnessed) is either autotelic or supervenient on it, if not parasitic ∵ all practical logic (witnessed) is ultimately autotelic / unwitnessed exceptions would be quantum flukes - all practical logic (witnessed) is autotelic, or supervenes on it as an exception - ultimately the exceptions, however, prove to be otherwise - the exceptions are relatively short-lived - each appears thereby as a miscarriage of the logic on which it supervenes that ultimately is corrected by that logic - each appears thereby no longer as an exception to that logic, but rather as a [further] instance of its [homeostatic] autotelism | all practical logic is autotelic - even doing what one merely pleases is an instance of autotelic logic / this would not undercut the ethic, as reason pure (the norm set) would remain autotelic | the only enduring instances of practical logic are autotelic homeostators | - nature approves nothing : see - nature as it relates to reason, however, yields a warrant for autotelic reason - nature is a sustainer : see notepad:2023-12-25c - how nature sustains and how it relates to reason together yield a warrant for autotelic reason evolutionary argument : see notepad:2023-12-26a : see notepad:2024-1-2b : This line of thought seems very convincing and coherent with lines elsewhere, making it potentially the best option to start the drafting. : see notepad:2024-1-13a - grounding on a likely adaptive path + consider starting this from the basic problem of making the expensive brain pay for its keep - else natural selection would long ago have jettisoned our large, energy-intensive [and reproductively cumbersome] brain as useless baggage : see notepad:2023-5-25j - grounding on efficiency of natural selection - directed to the end of autoreproductive fitness, the light of reason is a faster, more precise guide to that end than the blind manipulations of direct natural selection, a slow and cumbersome mechanism based on trial and error - then the light of reason might guide not only our thoughts, e.g. correcting them where unruly, but also our passions - then we may expect our passions to manifest the guidance of reason (rational ends or means) just as our thoughts do - the genetic basis of this could be fixed (by natural selection) within populations of our human ancestors / I have noted this previously, somewhere in another file ∵ our ancestors being hunter/gatherers were ordered in small groups ∵ these small groups were rich in close kin - grounding not on necessity : contra notepad:2023-12-27a - external direction of reason suffices, e.g. by ‘the passions’ as Hume put it, so there was never any *necessity* for reason in itself to be end-directed \ - the only necessity is, if reason *does* direct itself to an end, \ then it must not contradict the end of natural selection (autoreproductive fitness) \ ∵ otherwise it would be implausible at best, \ and therefore nigh impossible to conform to \ : see notepad:2023-12-27a \ ∵ we as autoreplicators are bound [hand and foot] by natural selection \ to its end (autoreproductive fitness) \ / moreover reason would then be impeachable \ : re `impeachable` contra `un${same}` @ `^^definition of morals`i \\ I can do without such claims; and our genotypes etc. autoreplicate, not us - how reason would be affected : see also `^^normative experience of autotelic reason$`i - the simplest and therefore most likely adaptive path for the telic direction of reason might be to direct it to the lineal group or community - effectively this would bring it close to true autotelism : cf. notepad:2023-12-30a : autotelism as the ideal adaption ∵ even true autotelism of reason would have as an *effective* end only a small group within the total population of reasoners ∵ our ancestors being hunter/gatherers were ordered in small groups : see @ `^*- the genetic basis of this could be fixed` - it would be harder, anyway, to direct it to the reasoner’s genotype if( this argument would be hard writing and clumsy reading ordered by inference alone ) + consider telling it narratively, as a story : e.g. notepad:2024-1-13a normative experience of autotelic reason : see notepad:2023-12-29a : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-normative/ / from what nature has written into the constitution of our minds / I had better avoid the term ‘moral’ here, going no further than ‘absolutely normative’. Else I might be constrained prematurely by the definition of morals, forced e.g. to beg for my release by pleading that moral sense is not morals. : re `definition of morals` see - as the experience would be normative in the absolute sense, this might be my transit point back to inferences as opposed to narrative : re `back to inferences` see `^*- it will follow.+the end.+be justified absolutely` scoping the logic of reason - apparent similarity between the logics of reason and nature : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#FormThouStruRealL4MeetO3 : re `nature` N.B. `a.+category error, logic being proper to thought alone$` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec - yet generally we do not extend the scope of reason’s logic as far as nature’s - we stop before the telic logic apparent, for instance, in genotypes/autoreplicators under natural selection - extending reason’s scope to match - for sake of: - reflective equilibrium needs or benefits from a stable centre serving as a seed on which a reflective equilibrium may form : see @ `^^resolution$`i @ `^*\| base logic$` @ `^^pure reason$`i ?+ then should the evolutionary argument come first? : join - a non-arbitrary scoping criterion, in being an objective one - consistency|harmony in the relation between nature and reason, reason being directed to the same end as genotypes/autoreplicators under natural selection, namely autoreproductive fitness : see notepad:2023-12-25c : see notepad:2023-12-26a ?+ then should the evolutionary argument come first? : re `evolutionary argument` see if( yes ) - the facts underlying the evolutionary argument offer a good way to introduce the other arguments for autotelic reason : re `the other arguments for autotelic reason` see `^^scoping the logic of reason$`i : re `the other arguments for autotelic reason` see `^^pure reason$`i - then reason would be autotelic, at least in effect - nature’s logic is practical only in genotypes and other autoreplicators under natural selection : cf. notepad:2024-1-1a : re `nature’s logic` N.B. `a.+category error, logic being proper to thought alone$` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec - all autoreplicators are formative standards - the logic of autoreplicators under natural selection is practical in that it effects means (effectively designed/purposed) to the end of autoreproductive fitness, and thereby of autoreplication - the logic is thus self-referential, self-maintaining of the autoreplicator - reason could exhibit this logic by autotelism, taking itself as an end - reason could do this [only] because it is both a formative standard and (as an embodied power of mind) autoreplicative : cf. notepad:2024-1-1b - a person *cannot* exhibit this logic, because a person is neither of those things / one would need an *innate* ability to clone oneself - at most one may act as an *agent* of an entity that exhibits this logic — of a genotype, for instance, or of reason — seeking to reproduce and thus maintain that entity : cf. notepad:2024-1-6c : ‘the tension between the two conceptions … plays out in the … controversy over whether practical reason is wholly instrumental’ ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ pure reason : N.B. notepad:2023-12-31a : avoiding metaphysics, for the most part : contra notepad:2023-12-30d,e : avoiding this, for the most part | base logic - the faculty of reason is a power of mind based on logic - the logic on which it is based may be considered independently of it : N.B. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#Logi : I must place it among the different conceptions of logic, or maybe in their relations : cf. notepad:2024-1-6c : ‘the tension between the two conceptions … plays out in the … controversy over whether practical reason is wholly instrumental’ - so we consider the base logic of reason resolution - by reflective equilibrium - using the faculty of reason to resolve a base logic that is consistent and stable under reflection - from a stable core - reflective equilibrium needs or benefits from a stable centre serving as a seed on which a reflective equilibrium may form - the logic apparent in nature may serve as that core : see `^*- apparent similarity between the logics of reason and nature$` @ `^^scoping the logic of reason$`i - ‘the logic [that] one’s rational power of mind answers/conforms to’ is [necessarily] both the logic manifest in nature (a stable core), and that resolved by the related arguments of reflective equilibrium : see notepad:2024-1-2a : re `the logic manifest in nature` N.B. `a.+category error` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec : re `a stable core` see `^*- from ${same}$` @ `^^resolution$`i @ `^*\| base logic$` @ `^^pure reason$`i : re `reflective equilibrium` see `^*- by ${same}$` @ `^^resolution$`i @ `^*\| base logic$` @ `^^pure reason$`i - we know the ‘purpose’ for which the faculty of reason was ‘designed’ - what reason to believe that it could validly be used for another purpose, let alone any purpose that one might happen to choose? - the default criterion of validity should be the most conservative one, namely that the original purpose alone is valid, till shown otherwise : cf. https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/de/lehrbereiche/ethik/mitarbeiter/schmidt/schmidt-instrumentalism-about-practical-reason-2016.pdf : Schmidt, 2016. Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default. (untrackable journal) - to begin, we must ‘resolve the logical constants to which our [rational] power of mind answers/conforms *in fact*’, viz. as an evolutionary adaptation : see notepad:2024-1-3a : re `logical constants` see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#DiffConcLogi : ‘The words that are kept fixed are the logical vocabulary, or logical constants, the others are the non-logical vocabulary.’ : re `logical constants` see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/ - only then, with good reason, may we deviate - then the base resolution and its possible deviations together comprise the raw material of reflective equilibrium, the grist to its mill - any other resolution of reason’s underlying logic (at least in its practical use) would be unwarranted, arbitrary - this makes autotelic reason nigh to a necessary conclusion ! what I claim to be wanting might not be a type of logical constant : see notepad:2024-1-4a a) any device to correctly focus a process of reflective equilibrium would qualify : see notepad:2024-1-4a / it need not be a standard of logic or reason, but any device at all that is non-arbitrary, e.g. objective - the total of norms governing the faculty of reason is the target for a process of reflective equilibrium - what I claim to be wanting is a further norm to focus that process b) also wanting is a warrant|explanation for the {normative authority|normativity} of reason : see notepad:2024-1-4b,c - I fulfill this want by locating the source of reason’s {normative authority|normativity} - the source as concerns the *faculty of reason* I ‘show’ to be natural : re `show` see @ non-fractal notepad:2024-1-4b ? which of (a,b) is the place to start drafting? ? how strong is the need (a, procedural) to stabilize reflection versus (b, ontological) to account for normative authority? - a process of reflection *might* stabilize itself - this is the basic idea of reflective equilibrium ∴ valid *norms of reason* might be attainable by reflecting on just the *faculty of reason*, and nothing outside of it - insofar as they are so attainable, (a) is modally weak - if i) the faculty of reason has an ontogenetic source, and ii) it alone (outside of the faculty) exhibits practical logic, then iii) one *must* have a good reason to exclude that source from reflection as concerns the norms of reason - (i) and (ii) hold - no reason (iii) for exclusion is apparent ∴ (b) is modally strong in that one *must* include the ontogenetic source of the faculty (nature) in reflection as concerns the norms of reason - on considering the ontogenetic source (b) as apparently one must, one sees *in that source* the faculty as a means to an end, and infers by the evolutionary argument a telic logic *in that faculty* : cf. `^*- we know the ‘purpose’ for.+the faculty of reason` - one *must* have a good reason to reject that telic logic from the norms of reason : cf. `^*- the default.+should be the most conservative` @ `^*- we know the ‘purpose’ for.+the faculty of reason` - failing that, one needs no *further* reason to include it ∴ construe (b) as per the argument directly above start here?+ : join @ `^*\+ start drafting now` ? how convincing my claim that the apparent logic of nature should be a factor in resolving the base logic of reason? : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#FormThouStruRealL4MeetO3 : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence/ : see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ : re `logic of nature` N.B. `a.+category error, logic being proper to thought alone$` @ `^^logic in nature, sic.$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec | a standard of rationality or reasoning : cf. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#Logi : While formerly I had thought to categorize the standard as one among the different conceptions of logic (particularly the one that conceives of logical constants), now I suspect I should be looking at conceptions not of logic, but of rationality or *theories of rationality* as the author puts it. / “In its original meaning, the word ‘rational’ referred to the faculty of reason — the capacity for reasoning. … [It] later came also to express a normative concept — the concept of the proper use of this faculty [a standard for reasoning].” : see https://academic.oup.com/book/8196/chapter-abstract/153725436 | principles - despite its constitution being forced by natural selection, reason in hindsight (through its agents) sees itself only as a set of fundamental norms (principles) of pure reason, divorced of outside influence - we do not think anything makes reason what it is - we think of reason as an independent normative authority resting on nothing more fundamental than itself - we expect to be able to use it as such, consult it as such - therefore we think of reason as a fundamental set of norms (principles) of pure reason - one might at times distinguish between logic disembodied and reason embodied as a power of mind based on that logic - but always one thinks of the two as tightly bound, if not identical \ - it would be costly to break with this \ - it would be unsettling \ - it would undermine my previous appeals to consistency|harmony \ as a principle \ : privately re `previous appeals to (consistency.harmony)` see \ `^*• for sake of ${same}` @ `^^warrant for autotelic reason$`i \ : privately re `previous appeals to consistency.harmony` see \ `exemplary cases.+to resolve a standard` @ \ `^*- in this seeming past` @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/30.brec \ - here is warrant, without pleading, for the telic principle (already warranted) \ to be *auto*telic \ - for consistency|harmony (again) we would expect the telic principle *too* \ to be of pure reason, independent of outside influences, \ and resting on nothing more fundamental than reason itself \ - then reason cannot take its end from nature, and so rest on nature \ - then the only possibility that remains is for reason to be autotelic \ Copyright © 2023-2024 Michael Allan.