1) does reason authorize the enforcement of either or both the striving of ⁠\mathscr{T}_d⁠, or the rights of ⁠\mathscr{T}_r⁠? : see @ 30.brec - already it appears so, from the inferences thus far, even if reason is merely instrumental : privately see notepad:2023-12-22a ! but authorization by mere permission appears: • too weak • incoherent ∵ it would authorize the enforcement of norms that appear dialectally immoral ∵ IR permits almost anything ∵ the norms are obligatory and their enforcement needs more than permission + limit the mode of authorization to one of approval : join @ 30.brec a dichotomous logic, like that of personal authorization : re `(dichotomous logic).+personal authorization` see `^*- this by the ${1} of \(i, ii\)` @ `^*remedial, enforcement by others in response to one’s non-conformance$` @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$` @ 30.brec - bare IR is similar to personal non-recognition (i), so authorization by mere permission : cf. `^*i. non-recognition` @ `^*- answer: the facts.+fit the definition$` @ 30.brec - a fuller conception of reason is similar to personal recognition (ii), thus authorization by approval : cf. `^*ii. recognition` @ `^*- answer: the facts.+fit the definition$` @ 30.brec 2) is logic/reason unimpeachable, both absolutely and in the sense attaching to a creator and sustainer whose creatures we are? : see @ 30.brec 2a) could it be? what are the conditions? : privately see notepad:2023-12-21a,c,d,e - the conditions include: • justification of an end : privately see notepad:2023-12-21a,c - it will follow that the end must be justified absolutely, so justified in itself : privately see notepad:2023-12-21a,c • stability : privately cf. `^*• self-sustenance$` @ `^*- the conditions exclude:$` / whether self-stability or stability by virtue of something else stable - the conditions exclude: • self-sustenance : privately contra notepad:2023-12-21d,e - while it might bring conditions (or even suffice in itself), the *whole* of self-sustenance is not a condition : see `^^self-sustenance of reason$`i - rather reason need only be stable : see `^*• stability$` @ `^*- the conditions include:$` - moreover my argument need not appeal to self-sustenance in order to zero in on reason as the object that is justified in itself : privately contra notepad:2023-12-21d,e - rather I could appeal to parsimony alone, as reason’s justification of itself would yield the simplest solution self-sustenance of reason : privately see `^*\+ highlight the \*lock in place/self-enduring\* tendency` @ 20_exploration.notes.brec - instrumental reason authorizes (permits) its own safeguarding : privately see notepad:2023-12-22b ∵ instrumental reason authorizes (permits) norms that safeguard the conditions of will : see `^^- already it appears so.+even if reason is merely instrumental$` ∵ will amounts to instrumental reason / so Kant says around 4:417 : cf. `Kant.+Groundwork.+4:417$`s @ `^*- to will.+is to commit to making myself an \*active cause\*` @ 20.brec - given the truths thus far uncovered, what conditions are lacking for: ?+ self-sustenance of reason? - weak self-sustenance needs only the justification of an end, any end : re `justification of an end` see `^*• ${same}$` @ `^*- the conditions include:$` - strong probably needs justification of reason itself as that end ?!! then I have learned nothing new here, right? : join @ 00.notes.brec : privately contra notepad:2023-12-22b : conflates permission with approval ?+ unimpeachability, both absolute and in the sense attaching to a creator and sustainer whose creatures we are? : see `^*2. is logic/reason unimpeachable` 2b) do those conditions obtain?