- the inferences of the previous file came to an end touching on two facts ･ \begin{align} \require{mathtools} \mathscr{T}_d \coloneqq\; & \style{font-family:var(--root-family)}{ \text{nearly everyone strives to maintain his or her personal security and freedom of action}} \\[-0.4ex] & \style{font-family:var(--root-family)}{ \text{near a maximum}} \\[1ex] \mathscr{T}_r \coloneqq\; & \style{font-family:var(--root-family)}{ \text{almost everywhere we acknowledge rights of personal security and freedom of action}} \end{align} ･ : re `came to an end.+(\{T\}_d .+ ･)$`s see `comes to an end.+${same}$`s @ 20.brec - my task now is to judge|test whether either of these facts could serve as the premise ⁠T⁠ for an argument that concludes with a moral duty ⁠A⁠ ･ {T \land (T \to A)\over A} ･ - now, suppose ⁠A⁠ were true (as that argument would have it) - then, by the reverse inferences ⁠A \to T⁠ which I previously detailed, it would follow that both ⁠\mathscr{T}_d⁠ and ⁠\mathscr{T}_r⁠ have moral correlates; true morals, that is, to which they correspond : see `^*∴ I am duty-bound to maintain.+personal security and freedom of action` @ 20.brec : see `^*- and from here.+I may infer the following attendant rights`s @ 20.brec - I will begin, therefore, by considering what it would take for those moral correlates to hold even now, regardless of ⁠A⁠ - if I knew what morals consist in, or more generally what determines them, then I might find the necessary determinants already present amid the facts, and therewith discern the inferences ⁠\mathscr{T}_d \to A⁠ or ⁠\mathscr{T}_r \to A⁠ of a complete argument ┈┈┈┈┈ r o u g h ┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈┈ - I have {come|brought myself} to the point of {a normative ethic|normative ethics}, which is to … - it is contentious nowadays - ‘nowadays’ is important, for it seems to me there were times when it was not / e.g. non-secular ages - in this seeming past, it must have been that they had: a) a standard for what determines morals, and b) a belief that the determinants obtained / namely in divine rules + introduce a further examplar from history (in addition to God), that of nature : join @ `^*- a clue to a.+solution attaches to the role of creator` - I need at least two exemplary cases in order to resolve a standard by the method of abstracting away all but a residue of shared features (relatively easy), as opposed to abstracting blindly from a single case / this becomes more important as I sharpen the standard to better support my inferences - one or both of (a, b) no longer holds - (b) no longer holds, that is certain - (a) might yet, and I assume still does - our concept of morality|morals had to come from somewhere and it certainly passed that way - what could (a) be? - formulated as a lexical definition, it could be this: morals: absolute and obligatory principles of right behaviour whose enforcement is authorized by an unimpeachable authority ? how might ⁠\mathscr{T}_r⁠ fit? - answer: the facts of ⁠\mathscr{T}_r⁠ fit the definition : privately see `enforcement rests on one’s own.+unimpeachable.+authority$`p @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec i) non-recognition of the right permits (authorizes) action (hindrance) which happens to include acts effective in enforcing the right - one then lies open not only to the permitted acts, but also to the enforcement they effect ? does permission carry likewise then — not only to those acts, but also to the enforcement — as the definition requires? - yes, in effect (literally so) the permission carries - while non-recognition might not always (nor indeed usually) be a deliberate choice as it must be in order to constitute permission and thus authorization, always it can be made a deliberate choice on reflection, e.g. on prompting by the enforcer - thus always permission is available by this route, and therefore can be seen as latent ii) recognition of the right approves (authorizes) conformance to (enforcement of) the right + better describe this by dividing|bisecting the (instances of) enforcement thus: remedial, enforcement by others in response to one’s non-conformance : see also @ `^*- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority` - this by the dichotomous logic of (i, ii), which makes the warrant for enforcement inescapable : privately cf. `^*∵ their inescapability arises from a conjunction of agency and logic`p @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec : privately cf. `^*- its inconstestability.+comes from the inconstestability of logic$`p @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec preventive, enforcement by oneself through willed conformance : see also @ `^*- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority` - this by (ii) - it appears the authority is the person, authorizing enforcement upon themselves - problem: - the personal authority in the present case fits the definition as it stands, but compares poorly with the past case on which the definition is based, such that I feel compelled to reject it - it is not on a par with the historical examplar of God, not being unimpeachable in the same sense - ‘unimpeachable’ must be qualified to better capture the sense that is essential here, making for a higher bar [to pass] - what I can think of: i) absolutely|always unimpeachable ii) unimpeachable in the sense attaching to a creator, whose creatures we are + limit the mode of authorization to one of approval - excluding authorization by mere permission, for it is: • too weak : join @ 40.brec • incoherent : join @ 40.brec - thus raising the bar even further - the problem is this: whatever qualification I settle on would have to be high enough of a bar (stringent enough) to exclude the present personal authority, at least as I have described it - intuitively, standing back from it, I lack confidence that it could pass a valid moral bar, whatever that bar might be - a clue to a possible solution attaches to the role of creator (ii) as exemplified in the two historical cases + introduce a further examplar from history (in addition to God), that of nature : join @ `^*- in this seeming past` - add to the role of creator the further role of sustainer iii) unimpeachable in the sense attaching to a sustainer, whose creatures we are - thus the authority provides for an existential mechanism - the bar is now high indeed - and so it was for these two historical exemplars - yet poignantly we no longer see them passing it : privately see notepad:2023-12-6c - now, in both historical cases, the role of creator/sustainer that made for a source of moral authority made also (as an ontological source, a source of being) for a source of identity : note : We seem to require that *we as subjects* and *we as enduring entities* be the same, as though by intuiting that all but the latter (and its source) are alien and threatening. - then it might be that the person’s source of identity, and not the person himself, operates as the moral authority *in the present case* ∴ looking among the general features that constitute the situation in the present case, I seek something that might serve as the source of his personhood - moreover I seek something prior to and larger than the person ∵ the authorization is prior to any particular enforcement, any particular person, and one general authority (shared in common) would be the simplest explanation - thus I find logic/reason, at least as concerns remedial enforcement : see `^*- the involvement of logic` @ `^^remedial, enforcement by others` @ `^*- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority` : privately see also https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/pub/1/article/902882 : this review — by Cohoe of Alex Long’s (2019) *Death and immortality in ancient philosophy* and (2021, editor) *Immortality in ancient philosophy* — cites ancient examples of reason’s employment as a source of identity/personhood - to see how logic/reason might the operative authority in the present case, I consider the two types of enforcement to be authorized remedial, enforcement by others in response to one’s non-conformance : see @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$` - the involvement of logic might seem to suffice, showing it to be the operative authority : re `the involvement of logic` see `the dichotomous logic of.+i.+ii` @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$` - but the logic is of two personal choices, such that one’s own person appears (at a deeper level) to *also* be an operative authority - for each of the two choices, then, the original question must be re-posed: is logic/reason nevertheless the true authority here? preventive, enforcement by oneself through willed conformance : see @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$` - again, one cannot answer, so the original question must be re-posed: is logic/reason the true authority here? + simplify the foregoing, for surely there is an simpler way to warrant the following question - thence, covering both facts, I ask: 1) does reason authorize the enforcement of either or both the striving of ⁠\mathscr{T}_d⁠, or the rights of ⁠\mathscr{T}_r⁠? - and then to learn whether logic/reason’s authority is moral: 2) is logic/reason unimpeachable, both absolutely and in the sense attaching to a creator and sustainer whose creatures we are? \ Copyright © 2023 Michael Allan.