- the inferences of the previous file came to an end touching on two facts
･ \begin{align} \require{mathtools}
\mathscr{T}_d \coloneqq\;
& \style{font-family:var(--root-family)}{
\text{nearly everyone strives to maintain his or her personal security and freedom of action}} \\[-0.4ex]
& \style{font-family:var(--root-family)}{
\text{near a maximum}} \\[1ex]
\mathscr{T}_r \coloneqq\;
& \style{font-family:var(--root-family)}{
\text{almost everywhere we acknowledge rights of personal security and freedom of action}}
\end{align} ･
: re `came to an end.+(\{T\}_d .+ ･)$`s see `comes to an end.+${same}$`s @ 20.brec
- my task now is to judge|test whether either of these facts could serve as the premise T
for an argument that concludes with a moral duty A
･ {T \land (T \to A)\over A} ･
- now, suppose A were true (as that argument would have it)
- then, by the reverse inferences A \to T which I previously detailed,
it would follow that both \mathscr{T}_d and \mathscr{T}_r have moral correlates;
true morals, that is, to which they correspond
: see `^*∴ I am duty-bound to maintain.+personal security and freedom of action` @ 20.brec
: see `^*- and from here.+I may infer the following attendant rights`s @ 20.brec
- I will begin, therefore, by considering what it would take for those moral correlates
to hold even now, regardless of A
- if I knew what morals consist in, or more generally what determines them, then I might find
the necessary determinants already present amid the facts, and therewith discern
the inferences \mathscr{T}_d \to A or \mathscr{T}_r \to A of a complete argument
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- I have {come|brought myself} to the point of {a normative ethic|normative ethics}, which is to …
- it is contentious nowadays
- ‘nowadays’ is important, for it seems to me there were times when it was not
/ e.g. non-secular ages
- in this seeming past, it must have been that they had:
a) a standard for what determines morals, and
b) a belief that the determinants obtained
/ namely in divine rules
+ introduce a further examplar from history (in addition to God), that of nature
: join @ `^*- a clue to a.+solution attaches to the role of creator`
- I need at least two exemplary cases in order to resolve a standard by the method
of abstracting away all but a residue of shared features (relatively easy),
as opposed to abstracting blindly from a single case
/ this becomes more important as I sharpen the standard to better support my inferences
- one or both of (a, b) no longer holds
- (b) no longer holds, that is certain
- (a) might yet, and I assume still does
- our concept of morality|morals had to come from somewhere and it certainly passed that way
- what could (a) be?
- formulated as a lexical definition, it could be this:
morals: absolute and obligatory principles of right behaviour whose enforcement
is authorized by an unimpeachable authority
? how might \mathscr{T}_r fit?
- answer: the facts of \mathscr{T}_r fit the definition
: privately see `enforcement rests on one’s own.+unimpeachable.+authority$`p @
~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
i) non-recognition of the right permits (authorizes) action (hindrance)
which happens to include acts effective in enforcing the right
- one then lies open not only to the permitted acts,
but also to the enforcement they effect
? does permission carry likewise then — not only to those acts,
but also to the enforcement — as the definition requires?
- yes, in effect (literally so) the permission carries
- while non-recognition might not always (nor indeed usually) be a deliberate choice
as it must be in order to constitute permission and thus authorization, always it
can be made a deliberate choice on reflection, e.g. on prompting by the enforcer
- thus always permission is available by this route,
and therefore can be seen as latent
ii) recognition of the right approves (authorizes) conformance to (enforcement of) the right
+ better describe this by dividing|bisecting the (instances of) enforcement thus:
remedial, enforcement by others in response to one’s non-conformance
: see also @ `^*- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority`
- this by the dichotomous logic of (i, ii),
which makes the warrant for enforcement inescapable
: privately cf.
`^*∵ their inescapability arises from a conjunction of agency and logic`p @
~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
: privately cf.
`^*- its inconstestability.+comes from the inconstestability of logic$`p @
~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
preventive, enforcement by oneself through willed conformance
: see also @ `^*- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority`
- this by (ii)
- it appears the authority is the person, authorizing enforcement upon themselves
- problem:
- the personal authority in the present case fits the definition as it stands,
but compares poorly with the past case on which the definition is based,
such that I feel compelled to reject it
- it is not on a par with the historical examplar of God,
not being unimpeachable in the same sense
- ‘unimpeachable’ must be qualified to better capture the sense that is essential here,
making for a higher bar [to pass]
- what I can think of:
i) absolutely|always unimpeachable
ii) unimpeachable in the sense attaching to a creator, whose creatures we are
+ limit the mode of authorization to one of approval
- excluding authorization by mere permission, for it is:
• too weak
: join @ 40.brec
• incoherent
: join @ 40.brec
- thus raising the bar even further
- the problem is this: whatever qualification I settle on would have to be high enough of a bar
(stringent enough) to exclude the present personal authority, at least as I have described it
- intuitively, standing back from it, I lack confidence that it could pass a valid moral bar,
whatever that bar might be
- a clue to a possible solution attaches to the role of creator (ii)
as exemplified in the two historical cases
+ introduce a further examplar from history (in addition to God), that of nature
: join @ `^*- in this seeming past`
- add to the role of creator the further role of sustainer
iii) unimpeachable in the sense attaching to a sustainer, whose creatures we are
- thus the authority provides for an existential mechanism
- the bar is now high indeed
- and so it was for these two historical exemplars
- yet poignantly we no longer see them passing it
: privately see notepad:2023-12-6c
- now, in both historical cases, the role of creator/sustainer that made for a source of moral
authority made also (as an ontological source, a source of being) for a source of identity
: note : We seem to require that *we as subjects* and *we as enduring entities* be the same,
as though by intuiting that all but the latter (and its source) are alien and threatening.
- then it might be that the person’s source of identity, and not the person himself,
operates as the moral authority *in the present case*
∴ looking among the general features that constitute the situation in the present case,
I seek something that might serve as the source of his personhood
- moreover I seek something prior to and larger than the person
∵ the authorization is prior to any particular enforcement, any particular person,
and one general authority (shared in common) would be the simplest explanation
- thus I find logic/reason, at least as concerns remedial enforcement
: see `^*- the involvement of logic` @ `^^remedial, enforcement by others` @
`^*- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority`
: privately see also https://muse-jhu-edu.subzero.lib.uoguelph.ca/pub/1/article/902882 :
this review — by Cohoe of Alex Long’s (2019) *Death and immortality in ancient philosophy*
and (2021, editor) *Immortality in ancient philosophy* — cites ancient examples
of reason’s employment as a source of identity/personhood
- to see how logic/reason might the operative authority in the present case,
I consider the two types of enforcement to be authorized
remedial, enforcement by others in response to one’s non-conformance
: see @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$`
- the involvement of logic might seem to suffice,
showing it to be the operative authority
: re `the involvement of logic` see `the dichotomous logic of.+i.+ii` @
`^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$`
- but the logic is of two personal choices, such that one’s own person appears
(at a deeper level) to *also* be an operative authority
- for each of the two choices, then, the original question must be re-posed:
is logic/reason nevertheless the true authority here?
preventive, enforcement by oneself through willed conformance
: see @ `^*- answer: the facts of.+T._r.+fit the definition$`
- again, one cannot answer, so the original question must be re-posed:
is logic/reason the true authority here?
+ simplify the foregoing, for surely there is an simpler way to warrant the following question
- thence, covering both facts, I ask:
1) does reason authorize the enforcement of either or both the striving of \mathscr{T}_d,
or the rights of \mathscr{T}_r?
- and then to learn whether logic/reason’s authority is moral:
2) is logic/reason unimpeachable, both absolutely and in the sense
attaching to a creator and sustainer whose creatures we are?
\ Copyright © 2023 Michael Allan.