exploration, notes + highlight the power of the method by abstracting it, after all, up front - so to let the object of positive duty be inferred from the argument, rather than presumed - so the better to hold the reader, right from the beginning, while on the trail of discovery / exposing the reader to the same mystery, which puzzles me - do so explicitly - originally I omitted this only because it was clumsy to warrant the abstraction, but now let my warrant be this explicitly: to hold the reader attentive ! the inferences of the reverse and forward arguments turn out dissimilar enough, unrelated enough, that I can hardly (in hindsight) justify the equation of reverse conclusion and forward premise - it seems mere coincidence that this method of argument happens (in the end) to work out | but there is a relation, a similarity | it rests on two tendencies a) reason in its practical use tends (however subtly) to lock in place such that the combination is self-enduring - practical reason amounts to an existential mechanism b) morals tend (however subtly) to be {tied to|bound up with} an existential mechanism - I hardly yet understand these tendencies, but will comment|note where I see them manifest in the arguments that follow ? how to incorporate this solution in the draft? + note up front both the problem it solves and the solution + highlight the *lock in place/self-enduring* tendency earlier (`20.brec`) rather than later (`30.brec`, where it no longer serves a purpose) : see notepad:2023-12-13c - rights|norms that secure the conditions of their own existence, whereby the conditions together lock themselves in place and are self-enduring - the conditions to have these rights qua moral are the very things which they safeguard : re `qua moral` see notepad:2023-12-5b / indeed the things to safeguard were inferred as conditions of exercising a right, or conforming to a (positive) duty : see `^^axiom: having a right.+one.+has a right to.+its conditions`s @ 20.brec : see `^^axiom: having a duty.+one.+has a duty to.+its conditions`s @ 20.brec / and one could have neither norm (I suppose) if one could never action (exercise or conform to) it / if nothing else, then, memory of the relevant axioms confers (rhetorical) access to (discovery of) this point of normative self reference + sync en passent with the latest notes, making the argument herein much stronger : see notepad:2023-12-2a,b,c : insofar as these notes still apply now that I’ve settled on an earlier placement of the argument, namely in `20.brec` ∴ the conditions together lock themselves in place and are self-enduring, tending to their own security by way of these rights : N.B. notepad:2023-12-6a : in so far as rights possibly *could* do so - the conditions of security and freedom follow (if from nowhere else) by entailment from the condition of self-made action ∵ the right of freedom of action is, more precisely, a right of freedom of self-made action ∵ self-made action is conditional on security and freedom : see `self-made action.+conditional on.+security.+freedom` @ 20.brec / thus the right of freedom is conditional on what it safeguards - we seem *made of stuff* that *protects itself* - this is interesting and jives with my existential project here - the conditions of moral rights (negative moral duty) would also condition positive moral duty / though I mispoke of them as entailments : see `from here.+two chains of inference:.+entailed duties, .+entailed rights$`s @ 20.brec / rather they are constitutive, being inferred from the constitution of will