My notes for the ethic

    10
        / here the introduction
        - promise of the question, ‘what to do?’, from original experience
            : privately see `^*\| my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do\?’$` @
              `^*\| context removal$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : thence its referent
        - specifically via the existential hook, looking into the clear night sky
        - else I might never have come to ethics
            - here to ask, ‘are we morally obligated to endure?’
            - and then, ‘who are we, that are so obligated?’
                - for the obligation gives rise to a question of identity
    20
        - one|the aim of normative ethics, and a claim that I will fulfill it
            - to explain|show how universal [and timeless] norms of behaviour [could] bind us
              {with a force|in a manner} [that is] logically incontestable|irresistible
                : cf. `principles.+whose enforcement is authorized.+by.+an unimpeachable authority$`sp
                  @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec : better defining what I can deliver
            / that much I shall do
        - yet I cannot shake the original existential hook
            : re `original` see `from ${same} experience$` : introduction, leading section
            - thus my warrant for the telicity of the moral command I now propose
        - analysis by expansion of algebraic moral command, thus involving reason
            : see notepad:2023-9-10b
            → ‘what ought to be [done]?’
                → S ought to be [done]
                → take S as your end
                : cf. notepad:2023-9-10b
            - avoid the misconception that I merely *take* the command to be moral law at this point,
              for here I analyze on the assumption that actually it is
            ? does not the argument of this leg show that one truly *can* be autonomous?
                - one can set *any* end as law, the content matters not provided it coheres,
                  viz. provided it (its enforcement) contradicts no entailed right
                    - and provided that any contestant of its enforcement who stands on a moral
                      [or generally normative] ground would thereby contradict himself
                        / as is the case for a contestant of the rights of personal security and freedom
                - my license for autonomy (for making law) comes by authority of logic
                    - this points to reason, the power of mind based on logic
                    - and the question ‘what to do?’ points to *practical* reason,
                      the faculty of answering this question
                    / and eventually I will learn that I make law not as
                      an autocratic legislator, but rather as a representative legislator
                      working on behalf of reason, for I am an *agent* of reason
                - the law one makes is truly moral in as far as concerns the core rights
                  and perfect (negative) duties that correspond to them
                    / for these hold regardless of S, and are obligatory in the sense
                      of being universally enforceable; that is to say, one has licence
                      to enforce them universally, viz. licence to make moral law as such
                    - the imperfect (positive) duties, such as that of S,
                      are imperfectly moral in falling short of being *both* absolute and obligatory
                        / these being criteria of moral precepts|principles
                        - they are obligatory only for one who *takes* S to be a moral duty,
                          which makes them agent relative and thus non-absolute
                - this gives me a better (or further) warrant for asking ‘what to do?’
                    : re `‘what to do\?’` see `${same}` @ `^^40$`i
                    - I am in a process of ascertaining moral law either by discovery or creation
                        - but how am I, short of being Moses, to discover an *obligatory* norm?
                            / the criterion of obligation is the difficult one to prove
                        - better to make and enforce the law (or have it enforced by society),
                          for then the obligation is built in
                    - so I want to know what law to make
                        / e.g. one we might reach a stable consensus on, once we have
                          (as is our right) a system of ends justification
                    - of course, in the present context (a normative ethic),
                      I need no warrant to propose a moral law as such, viz. to make moral law
                        - and the licence here, to propose/make a plurality of such laws,
                          mirrors the reality of ethics past and present
                        - yet still, an understanding of the licence itself may yield some opportunity
                    - stability of the core rights in theory
                        - and a felt responsibility to secure those rights in practice
                            - I grew up in a society that guarantees them
                            - I hold them dear, seeing they are not guaranteed everywhere
                        - one means of securing them might lie in the choice of end,
                          in the particular law that is made
                            / an end of reason, for example, makes provision and maintenance
                              of those rights a duty
                        - warrant then to ask ‘what S? what law to make?’
                go with this+ or something akin to it
                    / in version 10, for I want
            ! not just any morally obligatory end would entail the rights of rationality
                / though that of reason would
                - practical reason is not necessary to willing an end
                | wrong, will does entail reason
                    : privately see
                      file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf :
                      Korsgaard, 1997.  The normativity of instrumental reason.  pp. 234.1, 245.1
                    - moreover it entails agency (in much the same way)
                        / even while it entails no action
                        - as it entails reason, thinking oneself a cause as Kant says,
                          so it entails agency
                            : privately re `as Kant says` see
                              file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf :
                              Korsgaard, 1997.  The normativity of instrumental reason.  pp. 234.1, 245.1
                        ∵ to think oneself a cause (of the end) is also to think of applying one’s agency
                          (to the end), so bringing it to bear (on the end),
                          which thought requires that one *has* agency
                        ∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization where it both
                          lies in one’s power to do so, and would contravene no other justified end
                            : cf. @ `^*\? mere willing.+requires so little rational agency` @ `^*80$`
                    go with this+
                | amend
                        | overlay with a supplementary argument
                            : see notepad:2023-9-21b : viz. not a replacement of the present argument,
                              rather a supplement
                            / this in conjunction with abandoning or reversing the present leg
                                : re `abandoning` see `^*\| abandon this leg$`
                                : re `reversing`  see `^*\| reverse the argument in this leg$`
                            | an existential principle by way of reduction to absurdity
                              in a critique of practical reason
                                - if there exists an end justified in itself, then it would have to be
                                  timeless, endless, permanent
                                    / viz. either non-existence or endless existence;
                                      death or immortality
                                    !! assumption without warrant that no end justified in itself
                                      could be agent relative, so ‘dying’ with the mortal agent
                                    - or potentially so, for it is an end not to attain, but to maintain
                                        - wherefrom follows existential risk *p*, for else maintenance
                                          would be given, no end at all
                                    - now indefinite maintenance and (what it entails) ever-declining *p*
                                      in turn entail indefinite rational agency
                                        - it too must be maintained forever
                                ?+ how warrant the *necessity* of an end justified in itself,
                                  on which this amendment would depend?
                                    | the incoherence of instrumental reason alone
                                        : privately see
                                          file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf :
                                          Korsgaard, 1997.  The normativity of instrumental reason.
                                          pp. 220.1, 223.1, 229.2, 230.2
                                    | a standard derived of pure rational agency
                                        : cf. `^*\| a standard derived of purely rational agents$`
                                        / shorn of desire, pure and innocent, one asks of reason,
                                          ‘What to do?’
                                        - so assuming pure rational agency, which in turn warrants
                                          (as necessary to such agency) an end justified in itself
                                            / with that, I gain access to the reductio argument
                                        - afterward I look for facts in the entailments that would stand
                                          as evidence of the assumption, as originally planned
                                            / for this is merely a supplement of that plan
                                                : see `^*\| overlay with a supplementary argument$`
                            | a standard derived of purely rational agents
                                : see notepad:2023-9-21a
                                : privately cf. `^*\?.+investigate.+agents moved by pure reason\?$` @
                                  `^*!! overcomplicated and fraught with internal tension$` @
                                  ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec
                        | reverse the argument in this leg
                            - begin with societal structure and/or recognized rights,
                              wherein find an indicatation of reason (so involving it)
                            - the germ of that indication is couched in the incontestibility
                              of the (de facto) rights of personal security and freedom,
                              which is a *logical* incontestibility
                                - one cannot deny the fact of these rights,
                                  for we enforce them and thereby they do operate
                                - nor can one (which is more to the point) impugn them morally,
                                  for their enforcement cannot [possibly] be unjust
                        | abandon this leg
                            - it yields nothing that others cannot,
                              except possibly the involvement of reason
                    + sync the other legs accordingly
        ? mere willing of an end requires so little rational agency, how can I infer full rights from it?
            : cf. @ `^*80$`
            - I cannot yet, but neither do I need the rights in their fullness, not at this point
        ? how does will entail the power of action and therewith *freedom* of action
                / for although will clearly entails reason,
                  its entailment of active freedom is uncertain
                : cf. `^*. mere willing.+requires so little rational agency, how.+infer full rights.+\?$`
                  @ `^*20$`
            | by the senselessness of practical reason in the absence of such a power
                : re `practical reason` see `^*/ for.+will clearly entails reason`
                : cf. `^*\| the indirect requirement suffices for the purpose$` @ `^^80$`
                    / True here, too; though the weak entailment confers only weak support to the
                      corresponding right, the same right is (eventually) discovered to be prototypic,
                      and thus strongly supported after all.
                        : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp
                          @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
                + go with this
            | it does not
                - freedom of action enters (clearly) only as a prototypic right
                    : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @
                      ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
                - the entailments of will (its necessary conditions) include practical reason (rational
                  thought) and thereby personal security, but not freedom of action
                - yet the former may prompt the discovery of freedom of action as a prototypic right
            | by the possible *necessity* of action
                : privately see `^*∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization` @
                  `^*20$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/09/notes.brec
                ? would the mere *possibility* of action’s *eventual* necessity
                  warrant the necessity of an *immediate power* of action
            | by the necessity of action in support of thought
                / my old argument, I think
                : re `thought` see `to commit to making myself an .active cause.` @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec
        / here fit to societal structure
            : privately see `it informs the basic structure of society$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/05/60.brec
            : privately see `^*- in any case, one is forced .under modern democracy. to conform` @
              ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : with its associated notes
    40
        - cross-analysis of ‘what to do?’, or the like, again involving reason
            : see notepad:2023-9-10b
            : privately see ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions
        - reason *could* be justified in itself, it *could* seat an autotelic principle
        ? does it?  is such a principle operative?
            - looking to the past, to its ancestral origin
                - yes
    60
        ? *is* the object attainable, *could* reason be maintained indefinitely?
            : see notepad:2023-9-10d
            / else one cannot hardly see it as a justified end
            - probability of extinction *p* would have to decline endlessly
            - implications through to cosmic structure
                : privately see ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions
        / here fit to cosmic structure
    ↓ whether being moved to take up the law as such, or by whatever other warrant
        : re `moved` e.g. notepad:2023-9-10d
        - it no longer matters so much, for already the aim of an ethic is fulfilled
          as per the topmost leading claim
            : re `topmost leading claim` see `^*- to explain.+how.+norms.+bind us$` @ `^^20$`
        | stronger perhaps
            ?+ for is not practical reason an unimpeachable authority?
                : re `(unimpeachable) (authority)` see `^^morals:.+${2}.+${1}`s @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/11/20.notes.brec
                : re `unimpeachable authority` see `^^morals:.+${same}`s @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/10/30.brec
                : re `unimpeachable authority` see `^^morals:.+${same}`sp @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
                - the autotelic principle then fits the definition of a moral principle
                + add only a claim that no *other end* but reason could be justified in itself,
                  and reason is *by the authority of reason* an obligatory end
    80
        - resolving the precepts in full, including the positive duties, now the object is known
            : see notepad:2023-9-10b
        ? mere willing of an end requires so little rational agency, how can I infer full rights from it?
            : cf. @ `^*20$`
            | full rights of freedom (of action) and security (of person) are prior, prototypic;
              they are discovered, not inferred
                : re `prior, prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @
                  ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
            | full rights may be inferred once the end is known to be practical reason
                ∵ duty to an end implies a right to its realization
                    - and since the end is conceived in its fullness, it implies a full right
                ∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization where it both
                  lies in one’s power to do so, and would contravene no other justified end
                    : cf. @ `^*! not just any.+end would entail.+rationality$` @ `^*20$`
                    - this remains true even of *mere* will, as failure to act under these circumstances
                      would *belie* will
        ? how infer from mere will (thought) the positive duty of providing/maintaining
          the means of freedom of action
                - the problem here being that practical reason (as an end) does not clearly,
                  or at least not directly, require freedom of action
            | the indirect requirement suffices for the purpose
                - namely: freedom of action ← power of action ← practical reason
                    - true ∵ practical reason would make no sense — would be a dead letter —
                      absent a power of action
                - however weak the entailment might be, it suffices for the positive duty
                    / which duty alone rests on it, for the corresponding right is prototypic
          \ | an autotelic principle of rational agency, rather than practical reason
          \     - for freedom of action *is* necessary to agency
          \     - and the prototypic rights *do* arise from agency in conjunction with logic,
          \       so pointing to rational agency as the source, which in this defends itself
          \         : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @
          \           ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
          \     ?+ could I live with this?
          \         - no more ‘agent of reason’
          \         - no more autotelic principle of practical reason *pure*
          \\        !! too disruptive
          \             - it would introduce too many contortions into my argument
          \               (otherwise fairly straightforward) for too little gain
    90
        / here the conclusion
        - I answer the leading questions, those posed in the introduction
            ? the basis of morality
                : see `^*- here to ask, ‘are we morally obligated to endure\?’$`
                - summarizing the evidence, uncovered above, in support of the propositions
                    : privately see `^*5. facts.truths that agree with the entailments.concomitants` @
                      ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : thence its referent
                - underlining that, whatever other causes might effect the same evidence,
                  here I propose a single cause to explain the lot
                    : privately see `but the principle explains all at once$` @
                      ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions
            ? our identity
                : see `^*- and then, ‘who are we, that are so obligated\?’$`
                - agents of reason, perforce by logic
                - agents of reason, willing in some instances
            ? what to do
                : see `^*- promise of the question, ‘what to do\?’, from original experience$`
                - what, as an engineer, I ought to do: build a system of ends justification,
                  and to that end, propose the present ethic