My notes for the ethic
10
/ here the introduction
- promise of the question, ‘what to do?’, from original experience
: privately see `^*\| my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do\?’$` @
`^*\| context removal$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : thence its referent
- specifically via the existential hook, looking into the clear night sky
- else I might never have come to ethics
- here to ask, ‘are we morally obligated to endure?’
- and then, ‘who are we, that are so obligated?’
- for the obligation gives rise to a question of identity
20
- one|the aim of normative ethics, and a claim that I will fulfill it
- to explain|show how universal [and timeless] norms of behaviour [could] bind us
{with a force|in a manner} [that is] logically incontestable|irresistible
: cf. `principles.+whose enforcement is authorized.+by.+an unimpeachable authority$`sp
@ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec : better defining what I can deliver
/ that much I shall do
- yet I cannot shake the original existential hook
: re `original` see `from ${same} experience$` : introduction, leading section
- thus my warrant for the telicity of the moral command I now propose
- analysis by expansion of algebraic moral command, thus involving reason
: see notepad:2023-9-10b
→ ‘what ought to be [done]?’
→ S ought to be [done]
→ take S as your end
: cf. notepad:2023-9-10b
- avoid the misconception that I merely *take* the command to be moral law at this point,
for here I analyze on the assumption that actually it is
? does not the argument of this leg show that one truly *can* be autonomous?
- one can set *any* end as law, the content matters not provided it coheres,
viz. provided it (its enforcement) contradicts no entailed right
- and provided that any contestant of its enforcement who stands on a moral
[or generally normative] ground would thereby contradict himself
/ as is the case for a contestant of the rights of personal security and freedom
- my license for autonomy (for making law) comes by authority of logic
- this points to reason, the power of mind based on logic
- and the question ‘what to do?’ points to *practical* reason,
the faculty of answering this question
/ and eventually I will learn that I make law not as
an autocratic legislator, but rather as a representative legislator
working on behalf of reason, for I am an *agent* of reason
- the law one makes is truly moral in as far as concerns the core rights
and perfect (negative) duties that correspond to them
/ for these hold regardless of S, and are obligatory in the sense
of being universally enforceable; that is to say, one has licence
to enforce them universally, viz. licence to make moral law as such
- the imperfect (positive) duties, such as that of S,
are imperfectly moral in falling short of being *both* absolute and obligatory
/ these being criteria of moral precepts|principles
- they are obligatory only for one who *takes* S to be a moral duty,
which makes them agent relative and thus non-absolute
- this gives me a better (or further) warrant for asking ‘what to do?’
: re `‘what to do\?’` see `${same}` @ `^^40$`i
- I am in a process of ascertaining moral law either by discovery or creation
- but how am I, short of being Moses, to discover an *obligatory* norm?
/ the criterion of obligation is the difficult one to prove
- better to make and enforce the law (or have it enforced by society),
for then the obligation is built in
- so I want to know what law to make
/ e.g. one we might reach a stable consensus on, once we have
(as is our right) a system of ends justification
- of course, in the present context (a normative ethic),
I need no warrant to propose a moral law as such, viz. to make moral law
- and the licence here, to propose/make a plurality of such laws,
mirrors the reality of ethics past and present
- yet still, an understanding of the licence itself may yield some opportunity
- stability of the core rights in theory
- and a felt responsibility to secure those rights in practice
- I grew up in a society that guarantees them
- I hold them dear, seeing they are not guaranteed everywhere
- one means of securing them might lie in the choice of end,
in the particular law that is made
/ an end of reason, for example, makes provision and maintenance
of those rights a duty
- warrant then to ask ‘what S? what law to make?’
go with this+ or something akin to it
/ in version 10, for I want
! not just any morally obligatory end would entail the rights of rationality
/ though that of reason would
- practical reason is not necessary to willing an end
| wrong, will does entail reason
: privately see
file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf :
Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason. pp. 234.1, 245.1
- moreover it entails agency (in much the same way)
/ even while it entails no action
- as it entails reason, thinking oneself a cause as Kant says,
so it entails agency
: privately re `as Kant says` see
file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf :
Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason. pp. 234.1, 245.1
∵ to think oneself a cause (of the end) is also to think of applying one’s agency
(to the end), so bringing it to bear (on the end),
which thought requires that one *has* agency
∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization where it both
lies in one’s power to do so, and would contravene no other justified end
: cf. @ `^*\? mere willing.+requires so little rational agency` @ `^*80$`
go with this+
| amend
| overlay with a supplementary argument
: see notepad:2023-9-21b : viz. not a replacement of the present argument,
rather a supplement
/ this in conjunction with abandoning or reversing the present leg
: re `abandoning` see `^*\| abandon this leg$`
: re `reversing` see `^*\| reverse the argument in this leg$`
| an existential principle by way of reduction to absurdity
in a critique of practical reason
- if there exists an end justified in itself, then it would have to be
timeless, endless, permanent
/ viz. either non-existence or endless existence;
death or immortality
!! assumption without warrant that no end justified in itself
could be agent relative, so ‘dying’ with the mortal agent
- or potentially so, for it is an end not to attain, but to maintain
- wherefrom follows existential risk *p*, for else maintenance
would be given, no end at all
- now indefinite maintenance and (what it entails) ever-declining *p*
in turn entail indefinite rational agency
- it too must be maintained forever
?+ how warrant the *necessity* of an end justified in itself,
on which this amendment would depend?
| the incoherence of instrumental reason alone
: privately see
file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf :
Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason.
pp. 220.1, 223.1, 229.2, 230.2
| a standard derived of pure rational agency
: cf. `^*\| a standard derived of purely rational agents$`
/ shorn of desire, pure and innocent, one asks of reason,
‘What to do?’
- so assuming pure rational agency, which in turn warrants
(as necessary to such agency) an end justified in itself
/ with that, I gain access to the reductio argument
- afterward I look for facts in the entailments that would stand
as evidence of the assumption, as originally planned
/ for this is merely a supplement of that plan
: see `^*\| overlay with a supplementary argument$`
| a standard derived of purely rational agents
: see notepad:2023-9-21a
: privately cf. `^*\?.+investigate.+agents moved by pure reason\?$` @
`^*!! overcomplicated and fraught with internal tension$` @
~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec
| reverse the argument in this leg
- begin with societal structure and/or recognized rights,
wherein find an indicatation of reason (so involving it)
- the germ of that indication is couched in the incontestibility
of the (de facto) rights of personal security and freedom,
which is a *logical* incontestibility
- one cannot deny the fact of these rights,
for we enforce them and thereby they do operate
- nor can one (which is more to the point) impugn them morally,
for their enforcement cannot [possibly] be unjust
| abandon this leg
- it yields nothing that others cannot,
except possibly the involvement of reason
+ sync the other legs accordingly
? mere willing of an end requires so little rational agency, how can I infer full rights from it?
: cf. @ `^*80$`
- I cannot yet, but neither do I need the rights in their fullness, not at this point
? how does will entail the power of action and therewith *freedom* of action
/ for although will clearly entails reason,
its entailment of active freedom is uncertain
: cf. `^*. mere willing.+requires so little rational agency, how.+infer full rights.+\?$`
@ `^*20$`
| by the senselessness of practical reason in the absence of such a power
: re `practical reason` see `^*/ for.+will clearly entails reason`
: cf. `^*\| the indirect requirement suffices for the purpose$` @ `^^80$`
/ True here, too; though the weak entailment confers only weak support to the
corresponding right, the same right is (eventually) discovered to be prototypic,
and thus strongly supported after all.
: re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp
@ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
+ go with this
| it does not
- freedom of action enters (clearly) only as a prototypic right
: re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @
~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
- the entailments of will (its necessary conditions) include practical reason (rational
thought) and thereby personal security, but not freedom of action
- yet the former may prompt the discovery of freedom of action as a prototypic right
| by the possible *necessity* of action
: privately see `^*∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization` @
`^*20$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/09/notes.brec
? would the mere *possibility* of action’s *eventual* necessity
warrant the necessity of an *immediate power* of action
| by the necessity of action in support of thought
/ my old argument, I think
: re `thought` see `to commit to making myself an .active cause.` @
~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec
/ here fit to societal structure
: privately see `it informs the basic structure of society$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/05/60.brec
: privately see `^*- in any case, one is forced .under modern democracy. to conform` @
~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : with its associated notes
40
- cross-analysis of ‘what to do?’, or the like, again involving reason
: see notepad:2023-9-10b
: privately see ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions
- reason *could* be justified in itself, it *could* seat an autotelic principle
? does it? is such a principle operative?
- looking to the past, to its ancestral origin
- yes
60
? *is* the object attainable, *could* reason be maintained indefinitely?
: see notepad:2023-9-10d
/ else one cannot hardly see it as a justified end
- probability of extinction *p* would have to decline endlessly
- implications through to cosmic structure
: privately see ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions
/ here fit to cosmic structure
↓ whether being moved to take up the law as such, or by whatever other warrant
: re `moved` e.g. notepad:2023-9-10d
- it no longer matters so much, for already the aim of an ethic is fulfilled
as per the topmost leading claim
: re `topmost leading claim` see `^*- to explain.+how.+norms.+bind us$` @ `^^20$`
| stronger perhaps
?+ for is not practical reason an unimpeachable authority?
: re `(unimpeachable) (authority)` see `^^morals:.+${2}.+${1}`s @
~/work/ethic/._/11/20.notes.brec
: re `unimpeachable authority` see `^^morals:.+${same}`s @
~/work/ethic/._/10/30.brec
: re `unimpeachable authority` see `^^morals:.+${same}`sp @
~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
- the autotelic principle then fits the definition of a moral principle
+ add only a claim that no *other end* but reason could be justified in itself,
and reason is *by the authority of reason* an obligatory end
80
- resolving the precepts in full, including the positive duties, now the object is known
: see notepad:2023-9-10b
? mere willing of an end requires so little rational agency, how can I infer full rights from it?
: cf. @ `^*20$`
| full rights of freedom (of action) and security (of person) are prior, prototypic;
they are discovered, not inferred
: re `prior, prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @
~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
| full rights may be inferred once the end is known to be practical reason
∵ duty to an end implies a right to its realization
- and since the end is conceived in its fullness, it implies a full right
∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization where it both
lies in one’s power to do so, and would contravene no other justified end
: cf. @ `^*! not just any.+end would entail.+rationality$` @ `^*20$`
- this remains true even of *mere* will, as failure to act under these circumstances
would *belie* will
? how infer from mere will (thought) the positive duty of providing/maintaining
the means of freedom of action
- the problem here being that practical reason (as an end) does not clearly,
or at least not directly, require freedom of action
| the indirect requirement suffices for the purpose
- namely: freedom of action ← power of action ← practical reason
- true ∵ practical reason would make no sense — would be a dead letter —
absent a power of action
- however weak the entailment might be, it suffices for the positive duty
/ which duty alone rests on it, for the corresponding right is prototypic
\ | an autotelic principle of rational agency, rather than practical reason
\ - for freedom of action *is* necessary to agency
\ - and the prototypic rights *do* arise from agency in conjunction with logic,
\ so pointing to rational agency as the source, which in this defends itself
\ : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @
\ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec
\ ?+ could I live with this?
\ - no more ‘agent of reason’
\ - no more autotelic principle of practical reason *pure*
\\ !! too disruptive
\ - it would introduce too many contortions into my argument
\ (otherwise fairly straightforward) for too little gain
90
/ here the conclusion
- I answer the leading questions, those posed in the introduction
? the basis of morality
: see `^*- here to ask, ‘are we morally obligated to endure\?’$`
- summarizing the evidence, uncovered above, in support of the propositions
: privately see `^*5. facts.truths that agree with the entailments.concomitants` @
~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : thence its referent
- underlining that, whatever other causes might effect the same evidence,
here I propose a single cause to explain the lot
: privately see `but the principle explains all at once$` @
~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions
? our identity
: see `^*- and then, ‘who are we, that are so obligated\?’$`
- agents of reason, perforce by logic
- agents of reason, willing in some instances
? what to do
: see `^*- promise of the question, ‘what to do\?’, from original experience$`
- what, as an engineer, I ought to do: build a system of ends justification,
and to that end, propose the present ethic