My notes for the ethic 10 / here the introduction - promise of the question, ‘what to do?’, from original experience : privately see `^*\| my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do\?’$` @ `^*\| context removal$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : thence its referent - specifically via the existential hook, looking into the clear night sky - else I might never have come to ethics - here to ask, ‘are we morally obligated to endure?’ - and then, ‘who are we, that are so obligated?’ - for the obligation gives rise to a question of identity 20 - one|the aim of normative ethics, and a claim that I will fulfill it - to explain|show how universal [and timeless] norms of behaviour [could] bind us {with a force|in a manner} [that is] logically incontestable|irresistible : cf. `principles.+whose enforcement is authorized.+by.+an unimpeachable authority$`sp @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec : better defining what I can deliver / that much I shall do - yet I cannot shake the original existential hook : re `original` see `from ${same} experience$` : introduction, leading section - thus my warrant for the telicity of the moral command I now propose - analysis by expansion of algebraic moral command, thus involving reason : see notepad:2023-9-10b → ‘what ought to be [done]?’ → S ought to be [done] → take S as your end : cf. notepad:2023-9-10b - avoid the misconception that I merely *take* the command to be moral law at this point, for here I analyze on the assumption that actually it is ? does not the argument of this leg show that one truly *can* be autonomous? - one can set *any* end as law, the content matters not provided it coheres, viz. provided it (its enforcement) contradicts no entailed right - and provided that any contestant of its enforcement who stands on a moral [or generally normative] ground would thereby contradict himself / as is the case for a contestant of the rights of personal security and freedom - my license for autonomy (for making law) comes by authority of logic - this points to reason, the power of mind based on logic - and the question ‘what to do?’ points to *practical* reason, the faculty of answering this question / and eventually I will learn that I make law not as an autocratic legislator, but rather as a representative legislator working on behalf of reason, for I am an *agent* of reason - the law one makes is truly moral in as far as concerns the core rights and perfect (negative) duties that correspond to them / for these hold regardless of S, and are obligatory in the sense of being universally enforceable; that is to say, one has licence to enforce them universally, viz. licence to make moral law as such - the imperfect (positive) duties, such as that of S, are imperfectly moral in falling short of being *both* absolute and obligatory / these being criteria of moral precepts|principles - they are obligatory only for one who *takes* S to be a moral duty, which makes them agent relative and thus non-absolute - this gives me a better (or further) warrant for asking ‘what to do?’ : re `‘what to do\?’` see `${same}` @ `^^40$`i - I am in a process of ascertaining moral law either by discovery or creation - but how am I, short of being Moses, to discover an *obligatory* norm? / the criterion of obligation is the difficult one to prove - better to make and enforce the law (or have it enforced by society), for then the obligation is built in - so I want to know what law to make / e.g. one we might reach a stable consensus on, once we have (as is our right) a system of ends justification - of course, in the present context (a normative ethic), I need no warrant to propose a moral law as such, viz. to make moral law - and the licence here, to propose/make a plurality of such laws, mirrors the reality of ethics past and present - yet still, an understanding of the licence itself may yield some opportunity - stability of the core rights in theory - and a felt responsibility to secure those rights in practice - I grew up in a society that guarantees them - I hold them dear, seeing they are not guaranteed everywhere - one means of securing them might lie in the choice of end, in the particular law that is made / an end of reason, for example, makes provision and maintenance of those rights a duty - warrant then to ask ‘what S? what law to make?’ go with this+ or something akin to it / in version 10, for I want ! not just any morally obligatory end would entail the rights of rationality / though that of reason would - practical reason is not necessary to willing an end | wrong, will does entail reason : privately see file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf : Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason. pp. 234.1, 245.1 - moreover it entails agency (in much the same way) / even while it entails no action - as it entails reason, thinking oneself a cause as Kant says, so it entails agency : privately re `as Kant says` see file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf : Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason. pp. 234.1, 245.1 ∵ to think oneself a cause (of the end) is also to think of applying one’s agency (to the end), so bringing it to bear (on the end), which thought requires that one *has* agency ∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization where it both lies in one’s power to do so, and would contravene no other justified end : cf. @ `^*\? mere willing.+requires so little rational agency` @ `^*80$` go with this+ | amend | overlay with a supplementary argument : see notepad:2023-9-21b : viz. not a replacement of the present argument, rather a supplement / this in conjunction with abandoning or reversing the present leg : re `abandoning` see `^*\| abandon this leg$` : re `reversing` see `^*\| reverse the argument in this leg$` | an existential principle by way of reduction to absurdity in a critique of practical reason - if there exists an end justified in itself, then it would have to be timeless, endless, permanent / viz. either non-existence or endless existence; death or immortality !! assumption without warrant that no end justified in itself could be agent relative, so ‘dying’ with the mortal agent - or potentially so, for it is an end not to attain, but to maintain - wherefrom follows existential risk *p*, for else maintenance would be given, no end at all - now indefinite maintenance and (what it entails) ever-declining *p* in turn entail indefinite rational agency - it too must be maintained forever ?+ how warrant the *necessity* of an end justified in itself, on which this amendment would depend? | the incoherence of instrumental reason alone : privately see file:///home/mike/library/bind/1997,%20Korsgaard.%20The%20normativity%20of%20instrumental%20reason/text.pdf : Korsgaard, 1997. The normativity of instrumental reason. pp. 220.1, 223.1, 229.2, 230.2 | a standard derived of pure rational agency : cf. `^*\| a standard derived of purely rational agents$` / shorn of desire, pure and innocent, one asks of reason, ‘What to do?’ - so assuming pure rational agency, which in turn warrants (as necessary to such agency) an end justified in itself / with that, I gain access to the reductio argument - afterward I look for facts in the entailments that would stand as evidence of the assumption, as originally planned / for this is merely a supplement of that plan : see `^*\| overlay with a supplementary argument$` | a standard derived of purely rational agents : see notepad:2023-9-21a : privately cf. `^*\?.+investigate.+agents moved by pure reason\?$` @ `^*!! overcomplicated and fraught with internal tension$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec | reverse the argument in this leg - begin with societal structure and/or recognized rights, wherein find an indicatation of reason (so involving it) - the germ of that indication is couched in the incontestibility of the (de facto) rights of personal security and freedom, which is a *logical* incontestibility - one cannot deny the fact of these rights, for we enforce them and thereby they do operate - nor can one (which is more to the point) impugn them morally, for their enforcement cannot [possibly] be unjust | abandon this leg - it yields nothing that others cannot, except possibly the involvement of reason + sync the other legs accordingly ? mere willing of an end requires so little rational agency, how can I infer full rights from it? : cf. @ `^*80$` - I cannot yet, but neither do I need the rights in their fullness, not at this point ? how does will entail the power of action and therewith *freedom* of action / for although will clearly entails reason, its entailment of active freedom is uncertain : cf. `^*. mere willing.+requires so little rational agency, how.+infer full rights.+\?$` @ `^*20$` | by the senselessness of practical reason in the absence of such a power : re `practical reason` see `^*/ for.+will clearly entails reason` : cf. `^*\| the indirect requirement suffices for the purpose$` @ `^^80$` / True here, too; though the weak entailment confers only weak support to the corresponding right, the same right is (eventually) discovered to be prototypic, and thus strongly supported after all. : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec + go with this | it does not - freedom of action enters (clearly) only as a prototypic right : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec - the entailments of will (its necessary conditions) include practical reason (rational thought) and thereby personal security, but not freedom of action - yet the former may prompt the discovery of freedom of action as a prototypic right | by the possible *necessity* of action : privately see `^*∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization` @ `^*20$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/09/notes.brec ? would the mere *possibility* of action’s *eventual* necessity warrant the necessity of an *immediate power* of action | by the necessity of action in support of thought / my old argument, I think : re `thought` see `to commit to making myself an .active cause.` @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/20.brec / here fit to societal structure : privately see `it informs the basic structure of society$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/05/60.brec : privately see `^*- in any case, one is forced .under modern democracy. to conform` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : with its associated notes 40 - cross-analysis of ‘what to do?’, or the like, again involving reason : see notepad:2023-9-10b : privately see ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions - reason *could* be justified in itself, it *could* seat an autotelic principle ? does it? is such a principle operative? - looking to the past, to its ancestral origin - yes 60 ? *is* the object attainable, *could* reason be maintained indefinitely? : see notepad:2023-9-10d / else one cannot hardly see it as a justified end - probability of extinction *p* would have to decline endlessly - implications through to cosmic structure : privately see ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions / here fit to cosmic structure ↓ whether being moved to take up the law as such, or by whatever other warrant : re `moved` e.g. notepad:2023-9-10d - it no longer matters so much, for already the aim of an ethic is fulfilled as per the topmost leading claim : re `topmost leading claim` see `^*- to explain.+how.+norms.+bind us$` @ `^^20$` | stronger perhaps ?+ for is not practical reason an unimpeachable authority? : re `(unimpeachable) (authority)` see `^^morals:.+${2}.+${1}`s @ ~/work/ethic/._/11/20.notes.brec : re `unimpeachable authority` see `^^morals:.+${same}`s @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/30.brec : re `unimpeachable authority` see `^^morals:.+${same}`sp @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec - the autotelic principle then fits the definition of a moral principle + add only a claim that no *other end* but reason could be justified in itself, and reason is *by the authority of reason* an obligatory end 80 - resolving the precepts in full, including the positive duties, now the object is known : see notepad:2023-9-10b ? mere willing of an end requires so little rational agency, how can I infer full rights from it? : cf. @ `^*20$` | full rights of freedom (of action) and security (of person) are prior, prototypic; they are discovered, not inferred : re `prior, prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec | full rights may be inferred once the end is known to be practical reason ∵ duty to an end implies a right to its realization - and since the end is conceived in its fullness, it implies a full right ∵ in willing an object, one necessarily acts in its realization where it both lies in one’s power to do so, and would contravene no other justified end : cf. @ `^*! not just any.+end would entail.+rationality$` @ `^*20$` - this remains true even of *mere* will, as failure to act under these circumstances would *belie* will ? how infer from mere will (thought) the positive duty of providing/maintaining the means of freedom of action - the problem here being that practical reason (as an end) does not clearly, or at least not directly, require freedom of action | the indirect requirement suffices for the purpose - namely: freedom of action ← power of action ← practical reason - true ∵ practical reason would make no sense — would be a dead letter — absent a power of action - however weak the entailment might be, it suffices for the positive duty / which duty alone rests on it, for the corresponding right is prototypic \ | an autotelic principle of rational agency, rather than practical reason \ - for freedom of action *is* necessary to agency \ - and the prototypic rights *do* arise from agency in conjunction with logic, \ so pointing to rational agency as the source, which in this defends itself \ : re `prototypic` see `^*∵ here practical reason.+effectively defends itself$`sp @ \ ~/work/ethic/._/10/._/autonomy.notes.brec \ ?+ could I live with this? \ - no more ‘agent of reason’ \ - no more autotelic principle of practical reason *pure* \\ !! too disruptive \ - it would introduce too many contortions into my argument \ (otherwise fairly straightforward) for too little gain 90 / here the conclusion - I answer the leading questions, those posed in the introduction ? the basis of morality : see `^*- here to ask, ‘are we morally obligated to endure\?’$` - summarizing the evidence, uncovered above, in support of the propositions : privately see `^*5. facts.truths that agree with the entailments.concomitants` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : thence its referent - underlining that, whatever other causes might effect the same evidence, here I propose a single cause to explain the lot : privately see `but the principle explains all at once$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/08/notes.brec : ∼ latest revisions ? our identity : see `^*- and then, ‘who are we, that are so obligated\?’$` - agents of reason, perforce by logic - agents of reason, willing in some instances ? what to do : see `^*- promise of the question, ‘what to do\?’, from original experience$` - what, as an engineer, I ought to do: build a system of ends justification, and to that end, propose the present ethic