My notes for the ethic
outline+ the bare argument, isolating its logical structure in the fewest lines
: privately cf. @ `^^!! lost my sense of the argument as a whole` @
~/work/ethic/._/07/notes.brec
!! overcomplicated and fraught with internal tension
- yet the argument (when I scan it) seems strong and attractive
at the grand (societal, cosmic) scale
: re `argument` see
: re `(societal).+scale` e.g. `^*\| structural conformance of society`
: re `(cosmic).+scale` e.g. `^*\| structural conformance of the cosmos`
?+ might I simply investigate a line of agents moved by pure reason?
- for that would quickly entail the cosmos, indeed intercosmic lines
- and my taking up their moral law, in emulation of them
- and the feasibility of doing so given its societal fit and its denial of logical ground
from which to protest its imposition
argument
? what argument
|
1. ‘what to do?’ → reason being (hypothetically) an end justified in itself
- as before, but admitting that this (justification) is hypothetic
: re `before` see `^*\| analysis of the question, ‘what to do\?’$`
: privately see
`warrant the recourse that follows on the.+unclear meaning of the above$` @
~/work/ethic/._/07/50.brec
2. search for meaning of reason as an end justified in itself
- as before
: re `before` see `^*\| analysis of the question, ‘what to do\?’$`
3. hypothetic autotelic principle → (assumed) autotelic principle
- new
- assuming that the hypothetic principle actually holds
4. (assumed) autotelic principle → entailments (e.g. of prospective conformance)
- as before
: re `before` see `^*\| analysis of the question, ‘what to do\?’$`
5. facts|truths that agree with the entailments|concomitants,
so supporting (the assumption of) the hypothesis (3)
: see `^*- the argument proceeds by finding support for the leading hypothesis$`
- new
c. a choice (in conclusion) of whether to accept the hypothesis over the alternatives
- if yes, then the question ‘what to do?’ yields a definitive answer,
novel in at least one regard (the institution of ends justification)
- in any case, one is forced (under modern democracy) to conform
(at least outwardly) to the principle, while also being denied
any logical ground from which to protest
: re `forced.+under modern democracy.+to conform` cf.
https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.torontopubliclibrary.ca/doi/full/10.1177/07352751231169012
: ‘a recurrent conflict between security and freedom that has marked the
evolution of capitalism’, referring to a dichotomy that accords (at least)
with that of the two rights enforced
+ seek further confirmation of this dichotomy,
which I claim is basic to modern society
| analysis of the question, ‘what to do?’
: cf. `^*\| context removal$` @ `^^introduction$`i :
for that also is a summary of this argument, not merely an introduction to it
- it suffices, for its analysis (or contextual vacuum) draws in the normative,
[thence|then] to issue in the result
a) (all as now)
b) (additionally) analysis of the question, ‘what ought I morally to do?’
- via algebraic resolution of the moral law ‘do X’
- just one more way of answering the leading question
- or rather, one more way of eliciting the meaning of reason
as an end justified in itself
- this time seeking an answer (or clue) in norms not of reason,
but of morality
- for *any* positive obligation X entails the same rights (at least)
in support of reason, so pointing to that
: cf.
| regressive analyis
: e.g. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/ : so the author terms this
type of analysis: take as given what one would prove as given (hypothesis),
then find among its entailments a truth that supports the hypothesis.
/ whereby both to expose a would-be regress of conditions in practical reason,
and to force a solution from this barren context, taking nothing from outside
- if the question ‘what to do?’ can be answered by analysis
- one would have an absolute norm of action
: see `^*\| context removal$`
- practical reason would have to supply that norm
∵ of all modes of thought, practical reason alone could
(in this absolute context) yield a norm of action
: privately re `modes of thought` see `^*• thought$` @
~/work/ethic/._/07/notes.brec
- practical reason’s normative function would have to avoid failing
on a regress of conditions
- the simplest solution is that reason is justified in itself
/ this conclusion is pretty much forced by the leading hypothesis
: viz. `^*- if the question.+what to do.+can be answered by analysis$`
- the argument proceeds by finding support for the leading hypothesis
: viz. `^*- if the question.+what to do.+can be answered by analysis$`
- finding among the entailments|concomitants of the hypothesis
facts|truths that support it
- each fact|truth stands as evidence for the truth of principle,
which in turn explains (at least partly) the origin of that fact|truth
- each fact|truth might have alternative (or additional) explanations,
but the principle explains all at once
? what facts|truths do I find?
| reason’s existence
- explained by reduction of *p* in conformance
to the autotelic principle
- or by self-reproduction
: N.B. notepad:2023-8-10b
: N.B. notepad:2023-8-11d
- that *p* reduction (re the genome) was forced on us
by the mechanism of natural selection matters not
- the fact of autotelic conformance (re reason) remains
- natural selection then becomes part of the explanation (working
forward by synthesis) of how the tendency behind the autotelic
principle of reason was born in humans
- a second part of that explanation has to do with reason’s
contributing role in subsequently disengaging us
from the mechanism of natural selection
- a third part is looking forward, at how reason
is to stabilize its existence against contingency
- after all, consider:
? does reason serve as an instrument for the reproductive fitness
of the genome, or does the genome serve as an instrument
for the reproductive fitness of reason?
- one could explain it either way, at least till reason
has a hand in disengaging from natural selection
(the ‘second part’ above)
- then only the latter view makes sense, especially going
forward indefinitely (third part), for then the genome is
likely to become more of an encumberance to reason,
and be discarded
- reason (or its principles under the autotelic)
may then be taken as replacing natural selection
- and societal instutions (and perhaps cosmic structure)
as replacing the genome
| expectation|hope of continued existence, fear of extinction
| being moved by intergenerational bonds and/or lineal rational community
| structural conformance of society (to entailed norms)
| structural conformance of the cosmos (to the autotelic principle
entailed by the question)
? how could the principle be the cause of these facts|truths
without us knowing of the principle?
: re `these facts.truths` e.g. `^*\| reason’s existence$`
: re `these facts.truths` e.g. `^*\| structural conformance of society`
| not the principle itself is the cause, but its underlying physical basis
- reason is a power of mind, wherein the principles we can discern of it
are but formalizations of a real, underlying basis
/ I might avoid having to explain what that basis is
- therefore reason can (and typically does) work without our having first
[discerned and] formulated its principles
| analysis of the question, ‘what ought to be done?’
/ where ‘ought’ has moral modal force
a) analytic resolution of the question ‘what to do?’
b) algebraic resolution of the moral law ‘do X’
? what logic eventually turns a *singularly rational end* to a *moral law*?
? what is the difference between a *singularly rational end* and a *moral law*?
- the latter is:
- (also) generally an other-regarding obligation|norm
- I owe my conformance to others, and they theirs to me
- supreme over other norms
- it has precedence
\ enforcement, expectation and
\ - in giving the law, one is bound (logically) to take it upon oneself, too
\ - its obligations rebound immediately on one
\ - one cannot (logically) object to the law’s enforcement
\ - in breaking, denying or otherwise defying the law,
\ one effectively consents to its enforcement,
\ which is but taking it from one, denying one its protections
\ - in denying it, one is denied of its protections and thereby lies open
\ to its enforcement
\ - its object (reason) vanishes
\ - *any* positive obligation would yield the same (other-regarding)
\ enforcements
\ N.B.+ nowhere can one find purchase to question the law’s validity, or force
\ ?+ is it skeptic proof?
\ ?+ reflection and purity, what of these?
\ - they occur with reason, too
| fit
- reason as an end is simply fit to resolve a moral law,
as it is fit to answer the question ‘what to do?’
+ to the objective part of the search, add a method that seeks the object in a moral
law that (like the question) abstracts from its object
- so analytically
- so trying to resolve the object by resolving the law
/ just as I try also to resolve it by resolving the question
- thus a one-part search, constituting the whole ethic
/ for the modality of the former second part (modal determination) now is
brought into the search as a precondition/assumption of the method
- so analysis of the question, ‘what ought I morally to do?’
- for *any* positive obligation X entails the same rights (at least)
in support of reason, so pointing to that
: see
- reason is then most fit for X
introduction
| context removal
: cf. `^*\| analysis of the question.+what to do\?` @ `^^argument$`i :
for this also is a summary of that argument, not merely an introduction to it
- an absolute norm abstracts from all relative contexts
∴ precisely *by* abstracting from all relative contexts,
might one expect thereby to expose that absolute norm?
- in any case, a norm exposed by that method would certainly be absolute
- seeking an answer to the question ‘what to do?’ by analysis of that question
qualifies as an instance of that method
- this I will do
| my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do?’
: see
- working this into the introduction, too
| the question ‘what to do?’ is both unavoidable|inescapable and pregnant with meaning
: cf. `^*\| analysis of the question.+what to do\?` @ `^^argument$`i :
for this also is a summary of that argument, not merely an introduction to it
: re `meaning` see `^^meaning of life$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec
- morever its answer (by analysis) happens to encompass a normative ethic
- enabling me to develop the argument to that end,
and so categorize the present text
| my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do?’
- I asked it in 1988
- then quickly the clue
- it promised an answer entailing something deep, ineffable, akin the meaning of life
: re `meaning of life` see @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec
- else I probably would not have come to philosophy,
to revisit the question through analysis