My notes for the ethic outline+ the bare argument, isolating its logical structure in the fewest lines : privately cf. @ `^^!! lost my sense of the argument as a whole` @ ~/work/ethic/._/07/notes.brec !! overcomplicated and fraught with internal tension - yet the argument (when I scan it) seems strong and attractive at the grand (societal, cosmic) scale : re `argument` see : re `(societal).+scale` e.g. `^*\| structural conformance of society` : re `(cosmic).+scale` e.g. `^*\| structural conformance of the cosmos` ?+ might I simply investigate a line of agents moved by pure reason? - for that would quickly entail the cosmos, indeed intercosmic lines - and my taking up their moral law, in emulation of them - and the feasibility of doing so given its societal fit and its denial of logical ground from which to protest its imposition argument ? what argument | 1. ‘what to do?’ → reason being (hypothetically) an end justified in itself - as before, but admitting that this (justification) is hypothetic : re `before` see `^*\| analysis of the question, ‘what to do\?’$` : privately see `warrant the recourse that follows on the.+unclear meaning of the above$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/07/50.brec 2. search for meaning of reason as an end justified in itself - as before : re `before` see `^*\| analysis of the question, ‘what to do\?’$` 3. hypothetic autotelic principle → (assumed) autotelic principle - new - assuming that the hypothetic principle actually holds 4. (assumed) autotelic principle → entailments (e.g. of prospective conformance) - as before : re `before` see `^*\| analysis of the question, ‘what to do\?’$` 5. facts|truths that agree with the entailments|concomitants, so supporting (the assumption of) the hypothesis (3) : see `^*- the argument proceeds by finding support for the leading hypothesis$` - new c. a choice (in conclusion) of whether to accept the hypothesis over the alternatives - if yes, then the question ‘what to do?’ yields a definitive answer, novel in at least one regard (the institution of ends justification) - in any case, one is forced (under modern democracy) to conform (at least outwardly) to the principle, while also being denied any logical ground from which to protest : re `forced.+under modern democracy.+to conform` cf. https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.torontopubliclibrary.ca/doi/full/10.1177/07352751231169012 : ‘a recurrent conflict between security and freedom that has marked the evolution of capitalism’, referring to a dichotomy that accords (at least) with that of the two rights enforced + seek further confirmation of this dichotomy, which I claim is basic to modern society | analysis of the question, ‘what to do?’ : cf. `^*\| context removal$` @ `^^introduction$`i : for that also is a summary of this argument, not merely an introduction to it - it suffices, for its analysis (or contextual vacuum) draws in the normative, [thence|then] to issue in the result a) (all as now) b) (additionally) analysis of the question, ‘what ought I morally to do?’ - via algebraic resolution of the moral law ‘do X’ - just one more way of answering the leading question - or rather, one more way of eliciting the meaning of reason as an end justified in itself - this time seeking an answer (or clue) in norms not of reason, but of morality - for *any* positive obligation X entails the same rights (at least) in support of reason, so pointing to that : cf. | regressive analyis : e.g. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/ : so the author terms this type of analysis: take as given what one would prove as given (hypothesis), then find among its entailments a truth that supports the hypothesis. / whereby both to expose a would-be regress of conditions in practical reason, and to force a solution from this barren context, taking nothing from outside - if the question ‘what to do?’ can be answered by analysis - one would have an absolute norm of action : see `^*\| context removal$` - practical reason would have to supply that norm ∵ of all modes of thought, practical reason alone could (in this absolute context) yield a norm of action : privately re `modes of thought` see `^*• thought$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/07/notes.brec - practical reason’s normative function would have to avoid failing on a regress of conditions - the simplest solution is that reason is justified in itself / this conclusion is pretty much forced by the leading hypothesis : viz. `^*- if the question.+what to do.+can be answered by analysis$` - the argument proceeds by finding support for the leading hypothesis : viz. `^*- if the question.+what to do.+can be answered by analysis$` - finding among the entailments|concomitants of the hypothesis facts|truths that support it - each fact|truth stands as evidence for the truth of principle, which in turn explains (at least partly) the origin of that fact|truth - each fact|truth might have alternative (or additional) explanations, but the principle explains all at once ? what facts|truths do I find? | reason’s existence - explained by reduction of *p* in conformance to the autotelic principle - or by self-reproduction : N.B. notepad:2023-8-10b : N.B. notepad:2023-8-11d - that *p* reduction (re the genome) was forced on us by the mechanism of natural selection matters not - the fact of autotelic conformance (re reason) remains - natural selection then becomes part of the explanation (working forward by synthesis) of how the tendency behind the autotelic principle of reason was born in humans - a second part of that explanation has to do with reason’s contributing role in subsequently disengaging us from the mechanism of natural selection - a third part is looking forward, at how reason is to stabilize its existence against contingency - after all, consider: ? does reason serve as an instrument for the reproductive fitness of the genome, or does the genome serve as an instrument for the reproductive fitness of reason? - one could explain it either way, at least till reason has a hand in disengaging from natural selection (the ‘second part’ above) - then only the latter view makes sense, especially going forward indefinitely (third part), for then the genome is likely to become more of an encumberance to reason, and be discarded - reason (or its principles under the autotelic) may then be taken as replacing natural selection - and societal instutions (and perhaps cosmic structure) as replacing the genome | expectation|hope of continued existence, fear of extinction | being moved by intergenerational bonds and/or lineal rational community | structural conformance of society (to entailed norms) | structural conformance of the cosmos (to the autotelic principle entailed by the question) ? how could the principle be the cause of these facts|truths without us knowing of the principle? : re `these facts.truths` e.g. `^*\| reason’s existence$` : re `these facts.truths` e.g. `^*\| structural conformance of society` | not the principle itself is the cause, but its underlying physical basis - reason is a power of mind, wherein the principles we can discern of it are but formalizations of a real, underlying basis / I might avoid having to explain what that basis is - therefore reason can (and typically does) work without our having first [discerned and] formulated its principles | analysis of the question, ‘what ought to be done?’ / where ‘ought’ has moral modal force a) analytic resolution of the question ‘what to do?’ b) algebraic resolution of the moral law ‘do X’ ? what logic eventually turns a *singularly rational end* to a *moral law*? ? what is the difference between a *singularly rational end* and a *moral law*? - the latter is: - (also) generally an other-regarding obligation|norm - I owe my conformance to others, and they theirs to me - supreme over other norms - it has precedence \ enforcement, expectation and \ - in giving the law, one is bound (logically) to take it upon oneself, too \ - its obligations rebound immediately on one \ - one cannot (logically) object to the law’s enforcement \ - in breaking, denying or otherwise defying the law, \ one effectively consents to its enforcement, \ which is but taking it from one, denying one its protections \ - in denying it, one is denied of its protections and thereby lies open \ to its enforcement \ - its object (reason) vanishes \ - *any* positive obligation would yield the same (other-regarding) \ enforcements \ N.B.+ nowhere can one find purchase to question the law’s validity, or force \ ?+ is it skeptic proof? \ ?+ reflection and purity, what of these? \ - they occur with reason, too | fit - reason as an end is simply fit to resolve a moral law, as it is fit to answer the question ‘what to do?’ + to the objective part of the search, add a method that seeks the object in a moral law that (like the question) abstracts from its object - so analytically - so trying to resolve the object by resolving the law / just as I try also to resolve it by resolving the question - thus a one-part search, constituting the whole ethic / for the modality of the former second part (modal determination) now is brought into the search as a precondition/assumption of the method - so analysis of the question, ‘what ought I morally to do?’ - for *any* positive obligation X entails the same rights (at least) in support of reason, so pointing to that : see - reason is then most fit for X introduction | context removal : cf. `^*\| analysis of the question.+what to do\?` @ `^^argument$`i : for this also is a summary of that argument, not merely an introduction to it - an absolute norm abstracts from all relative contexts ∴ precisely *by* abstracting from all relative contexts, might one expect thereby to expose that absolute norm? - in any case, a norm exposed by that method would certainly be absolute - seeking an answer to the question ‘what to do?’ by analysis of that question qualifies as an instance of that method - this I will do | my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do?’ : see - working this into the introduction, too | the question ‘what to do?’ is both unavoidable|inescapable and pregnant with meaning : cf. `^*\| analysis of the question.+what to do\?` @ `^^argument$`i : for this also is a summary of that argument, not merely an introduction to it : re `meaning` see `^^meaning of life$`i @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec - morever its answer (by analysis) happens to encompass a normative ethic - enabling me to develop the argument to that end, and so categorize the present text | my personal rationale for the question ‘what to do?’ - I asked it in 1988 - then quickly the clue - it promised an answer entailing something deep, ineffable, akin the meaning of life : re `meaning of life` see @ ../13/research.notes_boneyard.brec - else I probably would not have come to philosophy, to revisit the question through analysis