! A mere agent-relative fact would not suffice to ground (the mutual recognition of) rights.
        : re `! (.+)$` cf. `${same}$` @ ~/work/ethic/._/00_default_restart/20_default_moral_norms.brec
        - Were the ground here merely one’s own choice in taking up the law (an agent-relative fact),
          it might not follow that others would necessarily make the same choice
          and thereby have the same rights as oneself.
        - Yet I intended here that one take up the law *as such*, which would have sufficed (I think),
          for then one must expect others to take it up, and thereby get the same rights as oneself.
    - Rather this was boneyarded because, once I grounded the law in a truth of reason
      (subsequent to the present version of the ethic, I guess), the hypothesis
      (our conception of morality arising from an interpretation of the causal rule)
      no longer served a purpose, and indeed was in tension with the new ground.